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Abstract 
Hedge fund managers are characterised as either ‘market timers’ or ‘asset pickers’. Their 
superior performance can be attributed to either timing skill, selection ability or a 
combination of both. In the existing literature, average hedge fund performance across the 
entire time span under investigation is usually investigated and measured, and hence, 
potentially certain subtle but important features exhibited in different time periods can be 
averaged out in the analysis. This thesis investigates the structural breaks in the selection 
ability and timing skill of hedge fund managers. This research issue is of particular 
importance when the hedge fund performance before, during and after the recent financial 
crisis is compared and contrasted.  
This thesis conducts a structural break analysis of hedge fund managers’ performance in 
relation to market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality in the foreign exchange (FX) 
market. Liquidity commonality captures the co-movement of individual asset liquidities. The 
measure adopted in the existing literature has several limitations. This thesis proposes a new 
measure, termed the Beta Index, which is derived from the time-varying exposure of 
individual liquidities to market liquidity movements. It is shown that the developed Beta 
Index is more able to identify the level of liquidity commonality in the FX market. It is also 
more flexible in measuring commonality with different data sampling frequency.  
The obtained empirical results have some practical implications. They show that the selection 
skill and timing ability of hedge fund managers are subject to regime switches. Under severe 
market conditions, most hedge fund managers possess the skill to time FX market-wide 
liquidity and are able to reduce losses from the FX market by reducing their funds’ FX 
exposure prior to the FX market-wide liquidity deteriorations. In the meantime, most hedge 
fund managers are able to deliver excess returns from time to time due to their selection 
ability. However, when sudden shocks of crisis occur, they fail to forecast the unexpected 
behaviour in the price of individual assets underlying the funds and display unsuccessful 
selection ability. In addition, the results suggest that many hedge funds are exposed to the FX 
liquidity commonality risk which impairs hedging strategies and diversification performance. 
Keywords: Hedge Fund Performance, Liquidity Commonality, Structural Breaks, Timing 
skill, Selection Ability. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
The question of whether professional investment managers are consistently able to provide 
superior performance has attracted tremendous research interest. The resulting evaluations 
are of great use in the efficient allocation of investment funds by managers (Henriksson and 
Merton, 1981). Jensen (1968) and Fama (1972) break the performance of managers down, 
distinguishing between the parts of an observed return that are due to ‘timing’ and 
‘selectivity’. Portfolio managers are, therefore, characterised as either ‘market timers’ or 
‘asset pickers’ (Merton, 1981). Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross (1986) suggest 
that superior performance can be attributed to either timing skill or selection ability or, 
alternatively, to a combination of both. On the one hand, selection ability represents a 
manager’s ability to pick the best securities with a given level of risk by ‘microforecasting’ 
their price movements and identifying which are undervalued or overvalued relative to assets 
in general (Fama, 1972; Merton, 1981; Henriksson and Merton, 1981). Jensen’s alpha 
(Jensen, 1968) represents the incremental rate of return and is commonly used to measure the 
manager’s selection ability. On the other hand, timing skill is characterised by an informed 
manager’s ability to ‘macroforecast’ the future behaviour of the market as a whole (Fama, 
1972; Merton, 1981). It reflects how an informed manager responds to the information he or 
she obtains (Jensen, 1972; Fama, 1972; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986).  
Many studies in the literature have suggested that hedge fund performance may be subject to 
structural breaks when suffering from sudden shocks of crisis (Fung and Hsieh, 2004; Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2006). For instance, returns on many funds experienced a 
common structural break in December 2000 (Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007). Also, many 
investment strategies allow large negative returns once in a while in exchange for long 
periods of above average returns, such as the Fixed-Income Arbitrage. This is commonly 
referred to as ‘picking up nickels in front of a steamroller’ (Duarte, Longstaff and Yu, 2007). 
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In the existing literature, hedge fund performance is usually investigated and measured across 
the entire time span to identify an average, and hence, certain subtle but important features 
exhibited in different time periods can be averaged out of an analysis. This thesis investigates 
the structural breaks in the selection ability and timing skill of hedge fund managers. This 
research issue is of particular importance when comparing and contrasting the performance of 
hedge funds before, during and after the recent financial crisis.  
Since the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, liquidity risk 
management and its crucial impact on hedge funds has been the subject of much attention 
(Aragon and Strahan, 2012; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). Hedge funds are known to have 
an appetite for illiquid assets and have, therefore, long been suspected of being exposed to 
liquidity risk (Sadka, 2010; Kessler and Scherer, 2011; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). In 
this context, long-lasting deterioration of market liquidities, such as those that occurred 
during the recent financial crisis, will induce higher costs, and investors will request 
compensation at a premium on their investments (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Mancini, 
Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer, 2013). When the market liquidity conditions are severe, hedge 
fund managers are averse to unexpected liquidity shocks due to higher trading costs, such as 
the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006). For instance, a requirement for additional 
cash or the liquidation of positions is triggered when the net asset value or return falls below 
the thresholds of risk management controls. However, in a liquidity-constrained environment, 
cash is not an easy option, so liquidation normally occurs. As positions are unwound in an 
illiquid market, liquidation is likely to lead to a cascade of worsening performance. In the 
meantime, liquidation of positions in an illiquid market will move prices further than would 
normally occur, and some funds would prefer to invoke clauses that block redemptions. In 
this case, managers who fear getting stuck with their investments with no liquidity available 
will become averse to unexpected liquidity shocks and make a “flight to quality”, moving 
away from risky investments and into low-risk investments (Melvin and Taylor, 2009; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).  
The majority of studies in the literature have explored the role of the equity and bond markets 
in hedge fund performance, whereas few have focused on the FX spectrum. The FX market 
has long been thought of as extremely liquid due to being the largest financial market in the 
world with continuous growth in trading volume and turnover in global FX. However, recent 
studies have revealed that liquidities in the FX market may exhibit temporal and cross-
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sectional variations resulting from the market’s limited transparency, heterogeneity of 
participants and decentralised dealership structure (Lyons, 2001; Mancini, Ranaldo and 
Wrampelmeyer, 2013). Hedge funds often trade and use derivatives and leverages globally, 
and hedge fund managers often hold assets and employ investment strategies across a wide 
variety of markets. Therefore, it is expected that FX liquidity is associated with hedge fund 
performance. This thesis conducts a structural break analysis of the performance of hedge 
fund managers in relation to the FX market, especially of liquidity characteristics, a research 
area that has been subject to little academic investigation.  
Many studies in the literature have shown that liquidity is an important composition of the 
superior performance of hedge funds. In particular, two aspects of liquidity have been shown 
to be crucial. One of them is aggregate market-wide liquidity, which captures the aggregate 
ease of transacting a large quantity of assets in a short time without incurring high costs. It 
has been shown to be an important factor in asset pricing (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). The other is liquidity commonality, which captures the co-
movement of liquidities and represents the systematic component of market-wide liquidity. It 
has been suspected to be a priced risk factor that impairs hedging strategies and 
diversification performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 
2006). For instance, short-term money market positions are extensively funded via the FX 
markets. A decline in FX liquidity affects the funding costs, increases rollover risks and 
impairs hedging strategies. Take a hedge fund manager in the U.S. who holds portfolios in 
the GBP as an example. If the manager is suddenly in need of the USD but the GBP/ USD 
exchange rate is at a low level, he or she cannot liquidate the portfolio into the USD quickly 
at low prices. But if the manager also invests in assets in a third currency, such as the AUD, 
which tends to appreciate against the USD, he or she can choose to liquidate the AUD 
portfolio into the USD instead. In this way, the manager is able to hedge against and diversify 
the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of the GBP by taking advantage of imperfect (low or even 
negative) correlations of currencies liquidities movements in international markets. However, 
if the liquidity of the GBP and the AUD significantly co-move with the market and decline 
simultaneously due to certain severe market conditions, then the manager can liquidate 
neither the GBP nor the AUD into the USD quickly at a low cost and the hedging strategies 
are impaired.  
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In particular, it is expected that trading costs will be equilibrated in properly functioning 
markets (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). However, 
liquidity commonality will induce shocks to trading costs and have a varying unanticipated 
impact on individual securities. Therefore, it is one source of the non-diversifiable priced risk 
and exposes investors to a systematic liquidity risk (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 
2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; and Lee, 2011). The measure adopted in the existing 
literature has several limitations. This thesis proposes a new measure derived from the time-
varying exposure of individual liquidities to the movements of market liquidity, termed the 
Beta Index. It is shown in this thesis that the Beta Index is more able to identify the liquidity 
commonality level in the FX market. It is also more flexible in measuring commonality with 
different data sampling frequency. 
The empirical evidence provided in this thesis shows that the timing skill and selection ability 
of hedge fund managers are subject to regime switches. First, under severe market conditions, 
managers of most investment styles possess the skill to time FX market-wide liquidity. They 
are able to reduce the losses from the FX market by reducing their fund’s FX exposure prior 
to the deteriorations of FX market-wide liquidity. Managers of most hedge fund categories 
also simultaneously possess timing skill regarding FX liquidity (market-wide liquidity), FX 
volatility and FX return under severe market conditions. Second, managers of most hedge 
fund categories are able to deliver excess returns from time to time due to their selection 
ability, and some are related to FX volatility and FX return. However, when managers fail to 
forecast sudden shocks of crises and the consequent unexpected behaviour in the price of 
individual assets underlying the funds, they will display unsuccessful selection ability. Third, 
the findings of this thesis suggest that certain hedge funds are exposed to the systematic FX 
liquidity risk, which impairs hedging strategies and diversification performance. A range of 
robustness tests are conducted and the findings are robust to hedge fund risk benchmarks. 
These results highlight the important roles of FX liquidity in hedge fund portfolio 
management. The rest of this chapter briefly outlines each of the following chapters.  
In Chapter 2, a brief introduction to hedge funds is provided. The characteristics of hedge 
funds, the risk factors commonly used to benchmark hedge fund returns, and the two sources 
of superior hedge fund performance, i.e. selection ability and timing skill, are reviewed. In 
addition, the links between hedge fund performance and liquidity are discussed. Two aspects 
of FX liquidity, i.e. market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality, and their effects on 
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hedge funds are particularly discussed. Various measures adopted in the literature for 
liquidity and liquidity commonality are reviewed. Finally, the data applied in this thesis are 
defined, including hedge fund returns, hedge fund risk factors and liquidity in the FX market. 
In Chapter 3, the econometric methodologies used in this thesis, i.e. the state-space model 
and the Markov-switching model with and without time-varying transition probabilities, are 
reviewed and described.  
In Chapter 4, a new measure for liquidity commonality, Beta Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, derived from the 
time-varying exposure of individual liquidities to market liquidity movements is developed. 
The advantages of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 in comparison with the commonly used adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 are discussed. In 
particular, it is shown that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 demonstrates stronger ability in identifying high commonality 
and better flexibility in constructing commonality at different frequency levels. Liquidity 
commonality in the FX market is then empirically measured using 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 . High liquidity 
commonality is found to be caused by large market downside risk during periods of financial 
turmoil. The results are consistent with conventional wisdom, which suggests that FX 
liquidity deterioration was at the heart of the crisis in 2008 and 2009. 
Chapter 5 investigates the structural breaks in the FX-liquidity-timing skill of hedge fund 
managers. The timing models of Chen and Liang (2007) and Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) 
are extended to allow the timing coefficients to be path dependent and evolve according to a 
first-order Markov process. It is found that when liquidity crises occur, informed hedge fund 
managers show significant FX-liquidity-timing skill. In particular, they reduce their funds’ 
FX exposure prior to the anticipated market-wide liquidity deteriorations, such as those that 
occurred at the beginning and peak of the recent financial crisis. However, when the market 
is generally in good condition, hedge fund managers do not time FX liquidity or adapt their 
funds’ FX market exposure accordingly. It is suggested that their FX-liquidity-timing skill is 
triggered by increased risk aversion to unexpected FX liquidity shocks under severe market 
liquidity conditions (Sadka, 2006; Melvin and Taylor, 2009). 
Chapter 6 investigates the structural breaks in hedge fund managers’ selection ability and 
their potential relationship with FX market indicators. The factor models of Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) and Sadka (2010) are extended to allow Jensen’s alpha to be path dependent and 
evolve according to a first-order Markov process, the transition probabilities of which are 
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time-varying. The FX market indicators are incorporated as exogenous variables to identify 
the systematic variations in the transition probabilities. Managers of most hedge fund 
categories are found to experience significant structural breaks in their selection ability. They 
are able to deliver excess returns from time to time. FX liquidity is not associated with the 
state-dependent alpha, whereas FX volatility and FX return are factors that partly drive the 
structural breaks of alpha for certain hedge funds. For instance, higher FX volatility or lower 
FX return (or great loss) reduce the probability that these hedge fund managers will keep 
producing excess returns or increase the probability that they will switch to a state wherein 
they earn no excess return, consequently leading to poorer performances. In the meanwhile, 
FX liquidity (liquidity commonality) is found to be an important determinate and priced 
factor of hedge fund returns. In particular, higher FX liquidity commonality is associated 
with negative hedge fund returns. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that 
systematic liquidity risks impairing hedging strategies and diversification opportunities.   
In Chapter 7, how hedge fund managers deliver superior performance in relation to the FX 
market is summarised. In particular, successful hedge fund managers simultaneously possess 
timing skill regarding FX liquidity (market-wide liquidity), FX volatility and FX return under 
severe market conditions. Hence, they are able to adapt their funds’ FX exposures based on 
the forecasted future behaviour of these market indicators in order to deliver higher returns or 
fewer losses. In the meantime, hedge fund managers are able to deliver excess returns from 
time to time due to successful selection ability. FX volatility and FX return are important 
factors that impact on the selection ability of some hedge fund managers. From an asset 
management standpoint, the importance of incorporating FX liquidity (liquidity 
commonality) as a determinant and priced factor for hedge fund returns is highlighted. 
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Chapter 2  
Hedge Fund Performance and Liquidity 
Hedge funds often employ complex portfolio constructions, financial instruments and risk 
management techniques in order to maximise the return on investments. The question of 
whether professional investment managers are consistently able to provide superior 
performance has attracted tremendous research interest. In this chapter, an introduction to the 
characteristics of hedge funds and the risk factors commonly used to benchmark hedge fund 
returns is provided. The two sources of superior hedge fund performance, i.e. selection ability 
and timing skill, are also reviewed. In addition, the links between hedge fund performance 
and liquidity are discussed. Finally, the data applied in this thesis are defined, including 
hedge fund returns, hedge fund risk factors and FX liquidity. 
2.1 Hedge Fund 
Hedge funds are generally considered to be different types of privately organised investment 
vehicles that engage in a diverse range of markets and strategies. Hedge funds are 
administered by professional managers who invest on behalf of wealthy institutions and 
individuals. Individual investors include corporate and public pension funds, endowments 
and trusts (Fung and Hsieh, 1999; Rubin, Greenspan, Levitt and Born, 1999). Hedge funds 
are often structured as limited liability partnerships. They cannot be offered or sold to the 
general public but are made available to a limited number of accredited investors, who must 
have significant investment knowledge, earn a minimum income annually and have a net 
worth exceeding a certain amount. Investors are required to make a large initial minimum 
investment. According to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 
participants are limited to a maximum of 500 ‘qualified investors’, such as individuals 
investing at least $5 Million in hedge funds and institutional investors with capital of at least 
$25 Million (Brown and Goetzmann, 2001).  
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Hedge fund managers often have dynamic investment styles and use derivatives and 
leverages extensively in both domestic and international markets. Since hedge funds may 
have low correlations with the traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds, many institutional 
investors have recently included them as one segment of a well-diversified portfolio. 
Although the term ‘hedge fund’ seems to imply market neutral and low risk investment 
strategies, the primary goal of most hedge funds is to maximise the return on investments 
rather than to attempt to reduce risk (Brown and Goetzmann, 2001). Hedge funds are often 
classified according to their investment styles. Each strategy is constructed to take advantage 
of certain identifiable market opportunities. The diversity in the risk attributes and investment 
opportunities of hedge funds strategies help to achieve specific types of market exposure and 
set expectations for long-term performance. Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Brown and 
Goetzmann (2001) find that the cross-sectional variability of hedge fund returns can be partly 
attributed to the differences in their investment styles. Gibson and Gyger (2007) suggest that 
these can vary over time and differ from the initial style used. It is crucial that investors are 
able to use proper style analysis and management when making investment decisions in the 
hedge fund market (Brown and Goetzmann, 2001).  
2.2 Hedge fund performance  
The concept of ‘performance’ refers to the ability of a hedge fund manager to increase the 
portfolio return by successfully forecasting future security prices. Jensen (1968, 1972) breaks 
forecasting ability down into two components: (a) an ability to forecast the price movements 
of individual securities, which is also referred to as the manager’s security selection ability; 
(b) an ability to forecast the future behaviour of market prices, which is also referred to as the 
manager’s timing skill. Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross (1986) suggest that the 
superior hedge fund performance can be attributed to the manager’s timing skill, selection 
ability or a combination of both. Selection ability has been shown to be associated with the 
nature of information possessed by the managers and statistically independent from the return 
on other assets, whereas timing skill reflects how managers respond to that information in 
terms of investment strategies (Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986). This 
section provides an introduction to the two sources of the superior hedge fund performance. 
Selection ability is related to a manager’s ability to forecast future individual security prices 
and, consequently, to pick the best securities with a given level of risk (Fama, 1972; Merton, 
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1981; Henriksson and Merton, 1981). The asset pricing model states that any portfolio 𝑖𝑖’s 
realised return, 𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , is a linear function of its systematic risk, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , the market portfolio’s 
realised return, 𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, the risk free rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, and a random error term, ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as follows: 
𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                  (2. 1) 
where the random error term ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is assumed to have zero expectation. However, Jensen 
(1968) argues that ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is likely to be positive if the portfolio manager is a superior forecaster 
due to special knowledge not available to others. Hence, Jensen (1968) extends Eq. (2.1) to 
allow the potential existence of a non-zero constant, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 as follows: 
𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                             (2. 2) 
where the intercept, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, often referred to as Jensen’s alpha
1, represents the incremental rate of 
average return due to the manager’s security selection ability through forecasting future 
individual security prices (Jensen, 1968, 1972). Jensen (1968, 1972) and Fama (1972) 
indicate that if managers are able to pick the best securities with a given level of risk, then 
they possess effective selection ability. From the perspective of a risk-reward relationship, 
since alpha represents the abnormal rate of return above the beta adjusted market return, it 
measures selectivity. Henriksson and Merton (1981) also suggest that alpha is the expected 
excess return resulting from ‘microforecast’ and that it measures selectivity. 
In an efficient market, the expected value of alpha should be zero, implying that a fund has 
earned a return that justifies the risk taken. If otherwise, the investment has earned in excess 
of the reward (alpha is greater than zero) or too little (alpha is less than zero) for the assumed 
risk. Since hedge funds include various fees that compensate managers for their skills and 
many of them aim to achieve a positive return regardless of whether markets are rising or 
falling, hedge funds are assumed to maintain alphas greater than their fees 2 in order to 
provide positive gains compared to an index fund. Beginning with Jensen (1968), a few 
                                                 
1 Jensen’s interpretation of alpha is only valid under the condition that the time subscript from risk level 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is 
omitted and that 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be stationary, or 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is considered as a target risk level that the manager wishes 
to maintain on average through time (Jensen, 1968, 1972; Fama, 1972). If market timing skill is taken into 
account, then the alpha from a constant beta model would measure neither selection ability nor the combination 
of selection ability and market timing (Jensen, 1972). Therefore, in this chapter, the timing skill is neither 
considered nor incorporated. 
2 Hedge fund managers are compensated in two ways: (a) an annual fixed management fee, which would 
normally be 1%-2% of the total market value of the assets managed on behalf of the investors or (b) a 
performance-based incentive fee normally in the form of 5%-25% of the annual profit. Typically, the incentive 
fee is benchmarked at 0% of annual returns or against a chosen index such as the U.S. treasury rate (Edwards, 
1999). The incentive profit fee is paid once the fund has achieved a performance that exceeds a certain profit 
threshold (typically around 8%). 
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studies in the literature have examined the ability of investors to select funds. Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995) find that a Value-Weighted Equity Funds Index has a positive alpha that is 
slightly higher than that of an equally weighted index. Gruber (1996) examines the alpha of 
newly invested money in actively managed mutual funds and shows that many mutual fund 
managers possess selection ability. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) show that 
the managers of aggressive-growth mutual funds exhibit some selection ability in the timing 
of their portfolios’ weightings. Zheng (1999) also finds that investors are able to select funds 
by moving towards the good performers and away from the poor performers and that the 
alphas for funds with positive new money flow are significantly higher than those with 
negative new money flow over the short term. Romacho and Cortez (2006) evaluate 
Portuguese mutual fund performance. They find that fund managers who invest locally seem 
to display better stock selection performance that those who make international investments. 
Prather and Middleton (2006) also investigate the timing and selectivity of mutual fund 
managers. They find that decisions made by an individual or a team of decision makers lead 
to the same superior micro or macro forecasts and performance outcomes. 
Jensen (1968) emphasises that his interpretation of alpha as selection ability of fund 
managers is only valid on the condition that 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be stationary where the time 
subscript is omitted. However, in reality, hedge fund managers often adopt dynamic 
investment strategies and change their funds’ risk levels, for example, switching from less 
risky to more risky assets by shifting resources out of bonds and into equities (Fung and 
Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Patton and Ramadorai, 2013). The type of 
dynamic asset allocation strategy which adjusts a portfolio’s market exposure based on the 
manager’s forecast about the future changes in market conditions is referred to as ‘market 
timing’ (Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986; Chen, 2007; Chen and Liang, 
2007). Successful market timing skill allows managers to increase (decrease) their portfolios’ 
market exposure prior to a market rise (fall). Hedge fund managers have advertised 
themselves as skilled market timers and have been found to be equipped with good market 
timing skill (Chen, 2007; Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov and 
Novikov, 2010). Park (2010) suggests that the superior timing skill of hedge fund managers 
contributes to hedge funds outperforming mutual funds. 
The academic investigations into mutual funds date back to research by Cowles (1933), and 
the findings on mutual funds have been inconclusive. Many studies have found that managers 
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of mutual funds exhibit no timing skill (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Merton, 1981; Henriksson 
and Merton, 1981; Kon, 1983; Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Henriksson, 1984; Admati, 
Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986; Lehmann and Modest, 1987; Grinblatt and Titman, 
1994; Graham and Harvey, 1996; Dnaiel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Becker, 
Ferson, Myers and Schill, 1999), whereas Ferson and Schadt (1996), Brown, Goetzmann and 
Kumar (1998), Busse (1999), Bollen and Busse (2001), Chance and Hemler (2001) and Jiang, 
Yao and Yu (2007) have found the reverse. To date, few studies in the literature have 
concentrated on investigating the market timing skill of hedge fund managers. Fung, Xu and 
Yau (2002) examine the performance of 115 global equity-based hedge funds with target 
geographical markets and conclude that the managers of these funds showed no market 
timing skill during the period between 1994 and 2000. Using the quadratic model of Treynor 
and Mazuy (1966), French and Ko (2007) find that the managers of long-short equity hedge 
funds do not show significant market timing skill after accounting for the illiquidity effect. 
Park (2010) divides hedge funds’ excess returns into three parts: factor timing, asset selection 
and risk premium, and he finds that hedge fund managers did not time the market during the 
period between 1994 and 2008. On the other hand, Chen and Liang (2007) find that hedge 
fund managers at both aggregate and individual level had the ability to time market return 
and market volatility in the bear and volatile market conditions during the period between 
1994 and 2005. Chen (2007) finds that convertible arbitrage funds can time the high yield 
bond market while global macro funds can time the non-U.S. bond market. Chincarini and 
Nakao (2011) and Chincarini (2014) also find evidence supporting the market timing skill of 
equity-oriented hedge fund managers. Recently, market liquidity has started to draw research 
attention in the area of market timing. In particular, Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) find that 
managers of equity-oriented hedge funds have the ability to adjust their funds’ equity market 
exposure based on the changes in liquidity of the equity market. Li, Luo and Tee (2016) find 
that managers of debt-oriented hedge funds have liquidity timing skill in the fixed income 
market, and some categories even show joint liquidity timing skill in both the fixed income 
and equity markets. 
Market timing models are constructed to describe the dynamic asset allocation based on a 
managers’ forecasts about future market conditions and to capture the time-varying market 
exposures. A general timing model based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) has the 
following form: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1,                                                                                            (2. 3) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 is the excess return for portfolio 𝑝𝑝 in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1 (𝑡𝑡 = 0,1, … ,𝑇𝑇 − 1); 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is 
the excess return of the market portfolio in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; and 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 is the market beta set in 
month 𝑡𝑡. The fund’s market exposure, represented by market beta 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡, is assumed to be time-
varying and is a linear function of the manager’s forecasts about market conditions in month 
𝑡𝑡 + 1 (Admati et al., 1986; Ferson and Schadt, 1996) as follows: 
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) ,                                                                                                               (2. 4) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 is the market condition in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is the information set available at time 
𝑡𝑡; and 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝 is the representative of timing skill. Inserting Eq. (2.4) into Eq. (2.3) yields the 
process followed by a market timer to generate portfolio returns as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                 (2. 5) 
In the literature, different market conditions have been investigated. Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) concentrate on the forecasts of market returns and define the market return timing 
model as a convex function of the market’s excess return as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+12 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                                        (2. 6) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  indicates a manager’ timing skill of portfolio 𝑝𝑝 . 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  is expected to be positive, 
indicating that the manager will increase (decline) the portfolio’s market exposure prior to an 
anticipated market increase (decline).  
Henriksson and Merton (1981) also focus on market return but assume managers’ forecasts 
about market conditions and switch their investments between cash and the equity market. 
They introduce an indicator function 𝑀𝑀{𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 > 0}, which equals one if market excess return 
at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1, is positive and equals zero otherwise. They define the market return 
timing model as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1∗ + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                                        (2. 7) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1∗ = 𝑀𝑀{𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 > 0} ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                                                                  (2. 8) 
where a positive 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  indicates that fund managers can successfully time market return by 
increasing (decreasing) a portfolio’s market exposure prior to a market rise (fall). 
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Busse (1999) studies the ability of mutual fund managers to time market volatility. He 
expresses the market beta as a linear approximation of the difference between market 
volatility and its time-series mean. His single-factor volatility timing model is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝�𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                            (2. 9) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the market volatility at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; and 𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚 is the average of market volatility. 
A significantly negative value of 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  indicates that the manager has the market volatility 
timing skill to increase (decrease) the portfolio’s market exposure prior to a fall (rise) in 
market volatility. Busse (1999) shows that the volatility timing term is an important factor for 
mutual fund returns and has led to higher risk-adjusted returns.  
Chen and Liang (2007) suggest that hedge fund managers could change their portfolios’ 
market exposure based on their forecasts about both market return and market volatility. They 
propose a model for jointly timing market return and volatility as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + �𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐾𝐾
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1)2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                       (2. 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1  are factors used to control the hedge fund’s excess return; the timing term (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1)2 is like the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, i.e. the ratio of expected 
excess return to the (conditional) standard deviation; and 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  measures the timing skill of 
managers who can forecast both the level of market return and market volatility. 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝  is 
expected to be positive as the timers should increase their market exposures with the expected 
Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Chen and Liang (2007) also provide an alternative 
approach based on Busse (1999) that linearly combines both the market return timing term 
and market volatility timing term as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + �𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐾𝐾
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+12 + 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝�𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 .               (2. 11) 
Hedge fund managers expecting a rise in market return may not enlarge a portfolio’s market 
exposure if the manager expects market volatility to increase and vice versa. 
Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) investigate whether hedge fund managers can time market 
liquidity as follows: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,              (2. 12) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the equity market liquidity level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is the average of equity 
market liquidity level, and 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 are factors that control hedge fund excess return apart from 
the equity market factor. A significantly positive value of 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝  indicates that hedge fund 
managers have the market-liquidity-timing skill to increase (decrease) their funds’ market 
exposure prior to the rise (fall) in market liquidity.  
2.3 Benchmark risk factors 
Using existing hedge fund indexes as benchmarks for hedge fund returns has several 
shortcomings. First, given that the hedge fund industry is relatively de-regulated and that the 
disclosure of hedge funds’ performance data and information is not strictly enforced, data 
underlying the performance of hedge funds is subject to bias (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). In 
particular, selection bias can occur if the sample of funds in the database is not a 
representative sample of all the hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). This is likely to happen 
because fund managers report information to databases on a voluntary basis and have less 
incentive to do so for both the top and bottom performing hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh, 
1997, 2000). Hedge fund data may also be plagued by survivorship bias. Hedge fund data 
sold by databases normally only includes information on hedge funds that are still operating 
(Fung and Hsieh, 2000), and the performance of disappearing funds is typically worse than 
that of a surviving fund (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992; Fung and Hsieh, 
2004). Ang, Rhodes-Kropf and Zhao (2008) and Denvir and Hutson (2006) state that 
disappearing hedge funds that are not reported in the lead up to liquidation are subject to 
liquidity bias and that funding bias occurs because hedge funds that do not receive funding 
can never be observed. However, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) claim that 
the effect of these biases is limited. Second, hedge fund returns have a relatively short 
history. Reliable data is only available from the 1990s and lacks transparency. Eling and 
Faust (2010), Stefanova and Siegmann (2012), Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) and Jylha, 
Rinne and Suominen (2014) emphasise that hedge fund samples should contain at least 24 
observations of monthly returns. Third, the absence of clearly specified portfolio targets 
makes it difficult to properly choose index weights. Fourth, the lack of performance-reporting 
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standards makes it hard to formulate expectations regarding hedge fund performance (Fung 
and Hsieh, 2004). 
Many studies have developed hedge fund risk models to benchmark hedge fund returns. 
Fama and French (1993) identify five common risk factors, including three stock market 
factors that relate to overall market size, firm size and book-to-market equity, and two bond 
market factors that relate to maturity and default risks. Carhart (1997) extends Fama and 
French’s (1993) factors by adding the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). Fung and Hsieh (2004) propose a seven-factor model based on arbitrage pricing 
theory. Since the seven asset-based style (ABS) factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004) can be 
directly observed from market prices, the model is free of the biases inherent in hedge fund 
databases. The seven-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) can explain about 80% of the 
return variations of diversified hedge fund portfolios and has been widely used in studies , for 
example, Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007), Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007), Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008), Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2008), Titman and Tiu 
(2011), Avramov, Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2011) and Brown, Gregoriou and Pascalau 
(2012). The seven ABS factors are: (1) the equity market factor (MKT-RF) of Fama and 
French (1993), proxied by Standard & Poor’s 500 index monthly total return; (2) the size 
spread factor (SMB) of Fama and French (1993), proxied by the difference between Russell’s 
2000 index monthly total return and Standard and Poor’s 500 monthly total return; (3) the 
bond market factor, also referred to as the term spread, proxied by the month-end to month-
end change in the U.S. Federal Reserve’s 10-year constant maturity yield; (4) the credit 
spread factor, proxied by the month-end to month-end change in the difference between 
Moody’s BAA rated bond yield and the Federal Reserve’s 10-year constant maturity yield; 
(5) the bond trend-following factor (B-LBS), proxied by the return of a portfolio of look-back 
straddles on bond futures; (6) the currency trend-following factor (FX-LBS), proxied by the 
return of a portfolio of look-back straddles on currency futures; and (7) the commodity trend-
following factor (COM-LBS), proxied by the return of a portfolio of look-back straddles on 
commodity futures.   
Fung and Hsieh (2001) suggest an additional emerging market risk factor (EMER), proxied 
by the emerging market index monthly total return. Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) propose 
four additional factors: (1) an equity market index, proxied by the Russell 3000 index; (2) a 
broad bond index, proxied by the Lehman Brothers bond index; (3) a broad based currency 
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index (FXF), proxied by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index 
that is published by the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System; and (4) a 
put option based on Agarwal and Naik (2004), proxied by the negative portion of the S&P 
500 index. Kessler and Scherer (2011) also suggest four additional factors, namely, the high-
minus-low book-to-market value factor, the one year momentum factor of Carhart (1997), the 
look-back straddle on fixed income and the look-back straddle on equity. Sadka (2010) 
suggests different risk factors when investigating the selection ability of hedge fund 
managers. Since the change in the term spread and the change in the credit spread are non-
traded factors, the regression intercepts of Fung and Hsieh’s (2004) seven-factor model 
cannot be interpreted as excess returns. Sadka (2010) replaces these two factors with the 
returns of tradable portfolios. In particular, the term spread (∆Term) is mimicked with the 
return spread of 7-10 year Treasury Index (Barclays Capital indices) minus the short-term 
rate and the credit spread (∆Credit) is mimicked with the return spread of the BAA rated 
corporate bond index minus the 7-10 year Treasury Index. 
2.4 Hedge funds and liquidity 
Liquidity is defined as the ability to buy or sell large quantities of an asset rapidly at low cost 
(Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam, 2005) without changing its price (Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003). Amihud (2002) suggests that illiquidity represents the impact of market 
order flows on the asset price. It instigates the discount a seller offers or the premium a buyer 
pays during the execution of a market order, which mainly results from the inventory cost and 
the adverse selection costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
Calvo (2011) suggests that liquidity creates wealth. When capital flows to a given economy 
rise sharply relative to their recent past and stay high for a considerable period of time, the 
liquidity of some of the receiving economy's assets will be enhanced. Consequently, larger 
flows and higher asset prices will be fostered. On the other hand, a sudden cessation in 
liquidity may cause a meltdown in asset prices and welfare loss in some sectors of the 
economy. For instance, a ubiquitous temporary reduction in market-wide liquidity was 
associated with the international stock market crash of October 1987 (Roll, 1988). Many 
studies in the literature have shown that liquidity can decline or even disappear under severe 
market conditions (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; 
Lee, 2011). Sizeable downward market liquidity shocks occurred during the Asian financial 
crisis in October 1997, the failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 
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1998 and the burst of the dot-com bubble in April 2000 (Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). 
There have also been several liquidity crises as the shock waves of the shocking events that 
occurred during the recent financial crisis. The most notable are the Quant liquidity crisis of 
summer 2007, which marks the beginning of a volatile period in market liquidity, the peak 
being the negative liquidity shock of September 2008. These liquidity crises correspond to 
the beginning of the financial crisis in summer 2007, Bear Stearns’ eminent demise in March 
2008 and the peak of the financial crisis, i.e. Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 
2008 and the consequent freefall of the global economy (Melvin and Taylor, 2009; Sadka, 
2010; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). 
2.4.1 Liquidity management of hedge fund  
Since the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, liquidity risk 
management and its crucial impact on hedge funds have drawn much attention (Aragon and 
Strahan, 2012; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). Hedge funds are known to have an appetite 
for illiquid assets (Kessler and Scherer, 2011; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013), adopt an 
unconstrained multi-asset-class approach to investments and use sophisticated financial 
instruments. For instance, hedge funds often invest in assets with low liquidity, such as those 
that require investors to keep their money in the funds for a lock-up period of at least one 
year, only withdrawing it at certain intervals, i.e. quarterly or bi-annually, or those that are 
treated as an illiquid investment due to the restrictions imposed on investor redemptions 
(Aragon, 2007). If high costs induced by long-lasting shocks in liquidity occur, investors will 
require compensation at a premium on their investments (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; 
Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2013). Managers are thought to be averse to 
unexpected liquidity shocks because of the higher trading costs, such as the cost of 
rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006). Hedge funds typically use prime brokers who provide 
financing and leverage to back their trades. A requirement for additional cash or liquidation 
of positions is triggered when the net asset value or return falls below the threshold set for 
risk management control. However, in a liquidity-constrained environment, cash is not an 
easy option, so liquidation normally occurs. Since positions are unwound in an illiquid 
market, liquidation is likely to cause a cascade of worsening performance. In the meantime, 
liquidation of positions in illiquid markets will move prices further than would normally 
occur, and some funds would prefer to invoke clauses that block the redemptions. Therefore, 
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the risk aversion of managers who fear getting stuck with investments with no liquidity 
available will grow as the liquidity conditions worsen (Melvin and Taylor, 2009).   
Many studies in the literature have shown that liquidity is an important composition and 
attribution of the superior performance of hedge funds. Liang (1999) and Aragon (2007) 
suggest that hedge fund returns are related to the stringent liquidation conditions of hedge 
fund investors. Hedge funds with lockup restrictions have been found to have annual excess 
returns 4–7% higher than those without. Sadka (2010) finds that hedge funds significantly 
loading on liquidity outperform the low-loading funds. Kessler and Scherer (2011) show that 
hedge fund returns are strongly linked to a global liquidity risk factor, which is derived from 
the liquidities of major asset classes, i.e. equities, fixed income, FX and commodities. Cao, 
Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) and Li, Luo and Tee (2016) suggest that the severe market 
liquidity conditions during the financial crisis are associated with the great losses of many 
funds. Moreover, if the managers of these hedge fund managers had been able to correctly 
forecast the deteriorations in market-wide liquidity and make appropriate adaptations to their 
funds’ exposure, some loss may have been abated.  
Two aspects of liquidity have been shown to be crucial for hedge funds. One of them is 
market-wide liquidity. This captures the aggregate ease of transacting a large quantity of 
assets in a short time without incurring high costs (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005). The other is liquidity commonality. A wealth of empirical evidence 
indicates that liquidity is more than just an attribute of a single asset. Instead, individual 
liquidity measures co-vary with each other through time (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 
2000; Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Dtambaugh, 2003). Many studies in the literature have 
focused on liquidity and individual microstructure phenomena in the assumption that they 
have common underlying determinants. These studies have shown that liquidity fluctuations 
have a systematic market-wide component. The co-movement of asset liquidities within a 
market that leads to periods when the entire market is systematically illiquid or liquid is 
defined as liquidity commonality. It has been thought to be a priced risk factor that impairs 
hedging strategies and diversification performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006). In particular, trading costs are expected to be equilibrated in 
properly functioning markets (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1996). However, liquidity commonality will induce shocks in trading costs, have an 
unanticipated varying impact upon individual securities, become one of the sources of non-
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diversifiable priced risk and expose investors to the systematic liquidity risk (Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; and Lee, 2011). Therefore, it is an 
important determinant of hedging strategies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
2.4.2 Hedge fund and FX liquidity   
Hedge funds often trade and use derivatives and leverages globally, and hedge fund managers 
often hold assets and employ investment strategies across a wide variety of markets. 
Therefore, it is expected that FX liquidity is associated with hedge fund performance. Take a 
hedge fund manager in the U.S. who holds portfolios in the GBP as an example. If the 
manager is suddenly in need of the USD but the GBP/ USD exchange rate is at a low level, 
he or she cannot liquidate the portfolio into the USD quickly at low prices. But if the manager 
also invests in assets in a third currency, such as the AUD, which tends to appreciate against 
the USD, he or she can choose to liquidate the AUD portfolio into the USD instead. In this 
way, the manager is able to hedge against and diversify the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of the 
GBP by taking advantage of imperfect (low or even negative) correlations of currencies 
liquidities movements in international markets. However, if the liquidity of the GBP and the 
AUD significantly co-move with the market and decline simultaneously due to certain severe 
market conditions, then the manager can liquidate neither the GBP nor the AUD into the 
USD quickly at a low cost and the hedging strategies are impaired. In addition, short-term 
money market positions are extensively funded via the FX market. A decline in FX liquidity 
affects funding costs, increases rollover risks and impairs hedging strategies. More 
importantly, a high exposure to systematic FX liquidity risks will substantially impair the 
ability to diversify liquidity risks and consequently influence the hedge fund’s performance. 
The majority of studies in the literature explore the role of the equity and bond markets in 
hedge fund performance, whereas few have focused on the FX spectrum. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on investigating the associations between hedge fund performance and FX liquidity. 
2.5 Liquidity commonality 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) empirically document significant liquidity 
commonality in the equity market. They find that liquidity measures for equities, i.e. quoted 
spreads and effective spreads, co-move with market-wide and industry-wide liquidity. 
Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) explore the cross-market liquidity dynamics of 
the equity and bond markets. They find that primitive factors, such as returns and volatility, 
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generate order flows in both markets and induce correlated movements in liquidity. Taking a 
global perspective, Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2012) examine how liquidity commonality for 
equities at firm-level varies across countries and over time. They find that liquidity 
commonality is greater during times of large market decline and high market volatility, 
greater presence of international investors and more correlated trading activity. Other 
influential articles include Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978), Hasbrouck (1991), 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001) for the equity market and 
Fleming and Remolona (1999), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Krishnamurthy (2002) and 
Fleming (2003) for the bond market. Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti (2013) examine 
liquidity commonality in the commodity futures market and find significantly different 
strengths of liquidity commonality during two sample periods, i.e. 1997-2003 and 2004-2009. 
They show strong liquidity commonality in 16 agricultural, energy, industrial metal, precious 
metal and livestock commodities when commodity prices are relatively stable during the 
boom. Many studies in the literature have documented significant liquidity commonality in 
the FX market. For instance, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) find pervasive 
liquidity commonality among currencies with similar interest rates. Kaul and Stefanescu 
(2011) find pervasive commonality in currency liquidities, which is affected by market’s 
trends, volatility and market-wide trading activity. Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer 
(2013) conducted a systematic study of liquidities in the FX market. They provide ample 
evidence of significant temporal and cross-sectional variations in the currency liquidities and 
find that market-wide liquidity drops when the funding liquidities of traders decrease. 
Karnaukh, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2015) show strong co-movement of currency liquidities in 
distressed markets, especially when funding is constrained, volatility is high or the FX 
speculators incur losses.  
The adjusted R-squared of market-model-type regressions has been widely used to measure 
liquidity commonality. In their pioneering work, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) 
propose the basic idea that commonality can be measured with a simple market model that 
the change in an individual liquidity is regressed on the change in market liquidity and 
control variables, as expressed in the following regression: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ �𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,       𝑖𝑖 =  1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 ,                (2. 13) 
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where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the change in liquidity 𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 =  1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁) at time 𝑡𝑡; ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the change in 
market liquidity calculated as an equally weighted average of liquidities, excluding the 
liquidity in question; and 𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑡𝑡 (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻𝐻) represents the control variables. The average 
adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 and average sum market beta coefficients ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)1𝑘𝑘=−1  measure how liquidities 
co-move at a cross-sectional level. The majority of studies have since measured liquidity 
commonality based on the adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 statistic. 
Recent studies have attempted to develop the time variation in liquidity commonality by 
constructing time-series of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2. In particular, Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) 
and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2012) employ a two-stage approach to measure liquidity 
commonality. First, Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) run the filtering regression to 
adjust daily liquidities for deterministic time-series variation as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 = ∑ 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 ,                                                                                                   (2. 14) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑  denotes the dummy variables, including day of week dummies, month 
dummies, a dummy for trading days around holidays, tick dummies for the changes in the 
tick decimal system and year dummies. The regression residual is termed the adjusted 
liquidity 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑. Then changes in daily 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 for each stock 𝑖𝑖 within month 𝑡𝑡, ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡, is 
regressed on changes in daily adjusted market spreads ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 as follows: 
∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                            (2. 15) 
The adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  statistics from Eq. (2.15) for each stock 𝑖𝑖  represents the portion of the 
variation in liquidity 𝑖𝑖  due to the market–wide liquidity movement in each month 𝑡𝑡 . The 
equally weighed average of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  represent liquidity commonality in month 𝑡𝑡.  
Inspired by Roll (1988), Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2012), 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) employ a different approach to adjust liquidity. They 
run the filtering regressions using data on day 𝑑𝑑 within month 𝑡𝑡 for each stock 𝑖𝑖 to obtain the 
daily innovations as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑−1,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡6
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                             (2. 16) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 includes day of week dummies (Monday to Friday) and a dummy for trading 
days around holidays; 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑−1,𝑡𝑡  is one-lag daily liquidity, which is included to take the 
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innovations in daily liquidity. The daily adjusted liquidity for each stock 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑑𝑑 within 
month 𝑡𝑡  from Eq. (2.16), 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 , is used in Eq. (2.17) to regress on one-day lagging, 
contemporaneous and leading daily adjusted market spreads 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                               (2. 17) 
Finally, the equally weighed average of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  across individual stocks in each month 𝑡𝑡 
is used to measure the strength of liquidity commonality in month 𝑡𝑡. This process is repeated 
for every month within the sample period to construct a monthly liquidity commonality time-
series of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2. It is worth noticing that Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) and 
Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2012) use at least 15 valid daily observations in the above individual 
regressions to yield the adjusted 𝑅𝑅2  for all the stocks in each month 𝑡𝑡 . Karolyi, Lee and 
Dijk’s (2012) procedure to measure liquidity commonality, the time-varying adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2, is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 The process of constructing the time-varying adjusted 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 
 𝑡𝑡 = 1,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡  
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,1,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,1 … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷1,1, … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡  
 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,1,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,1 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷1,1, … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
2          𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
2         𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
2  
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2.6 Data 
2.6.1 Hedge fund  
The hedge fund data applied in this thesis is obtained from the database of the Hedge Fund 
Research Incorporated (HFRI). HFRI indices are utilised by numerous hedge fund managers 
as a benchmark for their own hedge funds. HFRI includes over 2000 hedge funds with a track 
record of 24 months or assets under management worth a minimum of $50 million. HFRI 
constructs equally weighted monthly indices in order to present a more general picture of the 
performance of the hedge fund industry. Any bias towards the larger funds created by 
alternative weightings is greatly reduced, especially for strategies that encompass a small 
number of funds. The classification system applied by the HFRI supports 5 primary 
strategies: Equity Hedge indices (EHI); Event-Driven indices (EDI); Macro indices (MI); 
Relative Value indices (RVI); and Fund of Funds (FOFs). Each strategy has multiple sub-
strategies 3. HFRI also constitutes the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index (FWCI), which 
indicates the average of all the single-manager funds that report to the HFR Database, and the 
Emerging Markets Indices (EMI), which are selected according to their regional investment. 
This thesis focuses on investigating the FWCI, the five broad categories and the EMI. Table 
A in Appendix C gives a detailed description of the strategies investigated in this thesis.    
                                                 
3 The sub-categories are: Equity Hedge indices (Equity Market Neutral, Fundamental Growth, Fundamental 
Value, Quantitative Directional, Sector - Energy/Basic Materials, Sector - Technology/Healthcare, Short-Biased 
and Multi-Strategy); Event-Driven indices (Activist, Credit Arbitrage, Distressed/Restructuring, Merger 
Arbitrage, Private Issue/Regulation D, Special Situations and Multi-Strategy); Macro indices (Active Trading, 
Commodity – Agriculture, Commodity – Energy, Commodity – Metals, Commodity – Multi, Currency 
Discretionary, Currency Systematic, Discretionary Thematic, Systematic Diversified and Multi-Strategy); 
Relative Value indices (Fixed Income-Asset Backed, Fixed Income-Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income-
Corporate, Fixed Income – Sovereign, Volatility, Yield Alternatives – Energy Infrastructure, Yield Alternatives 
– Real Estate and Multi-Strategies); and Fund of Funds (Conservative, Diversified, Market and Strategic). 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Variables 𝑁𝑁 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Panel A: Summary of the broad strategies of HFRI hedge funds returns 
FWCI 174 -6.920 5.150 0.338 1.716 
FOFs  174 -6.690 3.320 0.180 1.415 
EMI 174 -14.530 9.620 0.594 3.263 
EH 174 -9.540 6.370 0.293 2.320 
ED 174 -8.270 4.740 0.405 1.857 
MI 174 -2.920 5.580 0.345 1.425 
RV 174 -8.110 3.930 0.383 1.241 
Panel B: Summary of average returns in the FOFs category 
Conservative FOFs 174 -6.060 2.420 0.147 1.107 
Diversified FOFs 174 -6.680 2.860 0.181 1.369 
MD FOFs 174 -3.270 4.800 0.230 1.440 
Strategic FOFs 174 -7.740 4.250 0.202 1.824 
      Panel C: Summary of average returns in the EMI category 
 Asia ex-Japan Index 174 -11.100 10.290 0.687 3.532 
Global Index 174 -12.360 8.030 0.471 2.593 
Latin America Index 174 -14.610 10.290 0.224 3.859 
Russia/Eastern Europe Index 174 -25.900 12.780 0.768 5.189 
Panel D: Summary of average returns in the EDI category 
 Distressed/Restructuring Index 174 -8.010 5.550 0.467 1.812 
Merger Arbitrage Index 174 -3.050 2.770 0.245 0.891 
Panel E: Descriptive statistics of the hedge fund risk factors 
 MKT-RF 174 -17.230 11.350 0.487 4.369 
SMB 174 -6.540 6.860 0.255 2.542 
B-LBS 174 -26.630 50.500 -2.861 14.739 
FX-LBS 174 -30.000 69.220 -0.454 19.444 
COM-LBS 174 -24.650 42.870 -0.165 14.825 
∆Term 174 -1.000 0.980 -0.017 0.278 
∆Credit 174 -0.890 1.380 0.004 0.288 
Emerging market 174 353.370 2213.540 1390.338 591.841 
FXF 174 3.970 6.650 0.028 1.364 
Term spread  174 -1.110 0.650 -0.017 0.221 
Credit spread 174 -0.990 1.450 0.003 0.214 
Note: Panel A summarizes the average monthly returns (fees deducted) on the broad strategies of HFRI hedge 
funds. Panel B-D summarizes the average monthly returns on the sub-categories of the FOFs, EMI and EDI 
respectively. The returns are in percentage per month. The returns are based on U.S. dollar and are excess of 
risk-free rate. Panel E summarizes the risk factors used to benchmark hedge fund performance in this thesis. 
∆Term and ∆Credit are the term spread and credit spread of Sadka (2010), whereas “Term spread” and “Credit 
spread” refer to the term spread and credit spread of Fung and Hsieh (2004). 𝑁𝑁  denotes the number of 
observations during the sample period. 
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Table 2.2 provides a statistical summary of the hedge fund returns. Data starts in July 2001 
and ends in November 20154. The FWCI has an average monthly return of 0.338% and a 
standard deviation of 1.716. Among the broad strategies, the most notable is the EMI, which 
has the highest average return (0.594%) and the highest uncertainty (standard deviation of 
3.263). On the other hand, FOFs has the lowest average return (0.180%). This may be 
because the blending of different strategies and asset classes not only diversifies away part of 
the risk but also sacrifices part of the return. Overall, all categories have positive average 
monthly returns over the sample period. 
Table 2.2 also provides a statistical summary of the risk factors for hedge funds. In this thesis, 
the hedge fund risk models applied to benchmark the hedge fund returns are those of Fung 
and Hsieh (2001, 2004), Sadka (2010) and Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010). The MKT-RF, 
SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh (2004) and the EMER of Fung 
and Hsieh (2001) are included, and data can be found through the link shared by David 
Hsieh5. The three-month Treasury bill rate is used as the risk free rate and is obtained from 
the Kenneth R. French data library6. The term spread and credit spread of Fung and Hsieh 
(2004)7 are replaced with ∆Term and ∆Credit of Sadka (2010). The data is obtained from the 
Thomson Reuters Database and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System8. The 
FXF of Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) is added to account for the profound liquidity risk. 
Data is obtained from DataStream. Data starts in July 2001 and ends in November 2015. 
2.6.2 FX liquidity 
Different liquidity measures are used in the literature. Most of them are derived from daily 
return and volume data as proxies for investors’ liquidity and transaction costs. Commonly 
used liquidity measures are summarized in Table B in Appendix D. Goyenko Holden and 
Trzcinka (2009) find that low-frequency measures can usefully capture high-frequency 
benchmarks. The most commonly used measure for currency liquidities is the proportionally 
quoted spread as follows: 
𝑆𝑆 = (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵)/𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ,                                                                                                           (2. 18)              
                                                 
4 The choice of duration is affected by the measure for liquidity commonality, more details will be provided in 
the following section.     
5 http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm 
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
7 We also apply the ∆Term and ∆Credit of Fung and Hsieh (2004) as robust check.  
8 https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10 
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where 𝑆𝑆  denotes spread; 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴  and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵  are the quoted ask price and bid price; and 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀  is the 
midpoint of the quoted bid and ask prices. In this thesis, the currency liquidity is measured 
with the proportionally quoted spread.  
In the FX context, the currencies applied in this thesis include those of the Group of Ten 
(G10), namely, the Australian Dollar (AUD), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Swiss Franc (CHF), 
Euro (EUR), United Kingdom Pound (GBP), Japanese Yen (JPY), Norwegian Krone (NOK), 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD), Swedish Krona (SEK) and United States Dollar (USD). The 
G10 currencies are ten of the most heavily traded currencies in the world. Regular buying and 
selling by traders culminate in minimal impact on their international exchange rates. Among 
the G10 currencies, the AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, GBP, JPY are the six major currencies that 
comprise the US Dollar Index. The index was created in March 1973 after the dismantling of 
the Bretton Woods system. It is designed to measure the value of the USD relative to a 
number of foreign currencies. In certain banking circles, reference is made to the G11 
currencies, which are the G10 currencies plus the Danish Krone (DKK). In order to preserve 
a sufficiently large cross-section of currencies within the FX market, the actively traded 
Singapore Dollar (SGD) is also included. The currency pairs are in the form of domestic 
currency versus USD. Table 2.4 reports the distribution of over-the-counter FX turnover for 
the currencies. Triennial data is reported from 1998 to 2016. 
Table 2.2 Currency distribution of OTC FX turnover 
Year 1998 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
 
2010 
 
2013 
 
2016 
 
Currency Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank 
USD 86.8 1 89.9 1 88 1 85.6 1 84.9 1 87 1 87.6 1 
EUR NA NA 37.9 2 37.4 2 37 2 39 2 33.4 2 31.4 2 
JPY 21.7 2 23.5 3 20.8 3 17.2 3 19 3 23 3 21.6 3 
GBP 11 3 13 4 16.5 4 14.9 4 12.9 4 11.8 4 12.8 4 
AUD 3 6 4.3 7 6 6 6.6 6 7.6 5 8.6 5 6.9 5 
CAD 3.5 5 4.5 6 4.2 7 4.3 7 5.3 7 4.6 7 5.1 6 
CHF 7.1 4 6 5 6 5 6.8 5 6.3 6 5.2 6 4.8 7 
SEK 0.3 10 2.5 8 2.2 8 2.7 9 2.2 9 1.8 11 2.2 9 
NZD 0.2 14 0.6 16 1.1 13 1.9 11 1.6 10 2 10 2.1 10 
SGD 1.1 7 1.1 12 0.9 14 1.2 13 1.4 12 1.4 15 1.8 12 
NOK 0.2 14 1.5 10 1.4 10 2.1 10 1.3 13 1.4 14 1.7 14 
DKK 0.3 10 1.2 11 0.9 15 0.8 16 0.6 22 0.8 21 0.8 21 
Note: this table summarizes the net-basis percentage shares of average daily turnover in April. Sources come 
from the Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2013 
(https://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf) and Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 
2016 (http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16fx.pdf). 
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Since 1999, the FX market has been affected by significant structural changes, including the 
introduction of the EUR, the trend towards concentration among market players and the 
increasing role of electronic broking9. The average daily turnover in the global FX and 
related markets was growing continuously. In April 2004, total average daily turnover 
amounted to $1.9 trillion, which at constant exchange rates was about 36% greater than in 
April 200110. This rise was mainly a result of the increased activity of institutional investors, 
the leveraged investor community and corporate treasurers. Among the G11 currencies, the 
triumvirate currencies of the world's three leading economic blocks, i.e. the U.S., Japan and 
the EU, have been the most traded (G3 currencies). The USD has been the world’s dominant 
vehicle currency, followed by the EUR as the second most important currency worldwide. 
Strong turnover growth was also found in the AUD (98%) and NZD (152%) since April 
2001. By April 2007, average daily turnover had grown to $3.2 trillion11 (a growth by an 
unprecedented 69% since April 2004), with more than 50% of the increase attributed to 
transactions between reporting dealers and non-reporting financial institutions. This increase 
was mainly due to the increased investment of trending exchange rates, more internationally 
diversified portfolios and a substantial development in technical trading. Although the USD, 
EUR, JPY and GBP remain the four most traded currencies, the currency composition of 
turnover has become more diversified. For instance, the AUD and NZD have attracted 
attention from investors due to being high-yielding currencies. CHF, NOK and SEK have 
also experienced significant increases in their share of aggregate turnover.  
In April 2010, the average daily turnover had reached 3.98 trillion12, $1.5 trillion of which 
was spot transactions and $2.5 trillion of which was traded in outright forwards, swaps and 
other derivatives. Declines in turnover have been found in the USD due to a low interest rate 
and low growth prospects, in the EUR due to the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2010, such 
as the severe fiscal situation of Greece and the downgraded debt of Portugal, and in the JPY 
due to a constant low interest rate13. Despite the weakened trends, the USD continued to play 
a dominant role in the FX transactions with a share of 84.9% alongside the euro (39.1%) and 
JPY (19%). In comparison, currencies with high interest rates and high growth prospects 
have become stronger, for example, the AUD, which closely tracked the iron ore price, and 
                                                 
9 The 70th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements 
10 2004 Triennial Central Bank Survey and market commentary 
11 2007 Triennial Central Bank Survey - Foreign exchange and derivatives market activity in 2007 
12 2010 Triennial Central Bank Survey, coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements 
13 G3 currencies versus the rest of the world The US dollar, the euro and the yen have been weak in recent 
months. By John Hardy. Published Sunday, April 11, 2010 
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the CAD, which tracked the oil price. FX trading in the UK was the highest in the world, 
accounting for 36.7% of the total, followed by the U.S., which accounted for 17.9%, and 
Japan at 6.2%14. In April 2013, the FX daily turnover reached $5.3 trillion15, increasing about 
35% over the previous three years. The USD accounted for 87% of the total turnover and 
continued to play a dominant role in international trading, followed by other key currencies 
used internationally, such as the EUR (34%), JPY (23%) and GBP (11.8%). Among the most 
actively traded advanced economy currencies, the AUD and NZD kept increasing their share 
of global FX trading, accounting for over 50% of the global transactions conducted in the UK 
and the U.S.16. For the first time, Singapore (5.7%) surpassed Japan (5.6%) and became 
Asia’s biggest foreign-exchange centre with an average daily FX trading volume of $383 
billion.   
As of April 2016, average daily trading in the FX market declined to $5.1 trillion17. Daily 
turnover of the most actively traded instruments, FX swaps, further increased to $2.4 trillion. 
This was mostly attributed to the increased trading of FX swaps involving the JPY. The USD 
remained the world’s dominant vehicle currency, accounting for 87.6% of the total FX 
market turnover. Although the EUR (31.4%) and JPY (21.6%) lost some market share, their 
roles as the second and third most important currencies worldwide remained unchallenged. 
The AUD and CAD were weakened due to a huge dent in the balance sheet of net exporters 
of resources under pressure from a strong USD and ebbing global demand18. The UK, the 
U.S., Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan continued to intermediate 77% of FX trading.   
Recently, the currencies of several major emerging markets have become increasingly 
important due to shares in global FX trading. In April 2007, emerging market currencies were 
involved in almost 20% of all transactions.  In April 2013, the trading volume of the Mexican 
peso (MXN) reached $135 billion, raising its share to 2.5%, and it ranked as one of the 
world’s 10 most actively traded currencies ahead of the well-established currencies, such as 
the NZD and SEK. In April 2016, the Renminbi (CNY) doubled its share to 4% and raised its 
rank to the world’s eighth most actively traded currency and the most actively traded 
emerging market currency, overtaking the MXN. This was mainly due to the increase in its 
                                                 
14 2010 Triennial Central Bank Survey - Foreign exchange and derivatives market activity in April 2010 
15 Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2013: preliminary global results.  
16 “Forex Market Overview.” Gofores.net.N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2013 
17 2016 Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2016  
 
18 Frank Talk, 5 World Currencies That Are Closely Tied to Commodities November 18, 2015 
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trading against the USD (as much as 95%).   However, the share of these emerging market 
currencies is small in magnitude during most of the sample period. They can be considered to 
be the residual of aggregate turnover minus turnover in identified industrialised economy 
currencies. Considering that the 11 actively traded currencies and the USD represent the most 
economically important currencies across the FX market over the sample period, the 
emerging market currencies are not considered in this thesis. 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics of the currency spreads 
Currency  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
AUD 4433 1.24 19.26 5.77 3.10 1.84 3.95 
CAD 4433 0.62 7.94 4.34 1.59 -0.39 -0.67 
CHF 4433 0.82 17.78 6.01 1.55 1.30 4.98 
DKK 4433 0.66 9.53 3.34 1.07 1.47 3.23 
EUR 4433 0.73 10.54 2.93 1.12 1.50 3.12 
GBP 4433 0.48 6.88 2.75 1.07 1.09 2.64 
JPY 4433 0.84 9.65 3.79 1.31 1.16 2.07 
NOK 4433 1.89 28.11 7.65 1.88 2.30 13.15 
NZD 4433 1.48 43.32 8.39 4.72 1.94 4.45 
SEK 4433 0.96 21.73 6.95 2.35 1.43 2.04 
SGD 4433 0.58 14.70 4.86 1.11 2.11 12.15 
Note: This table provides the statistical summary of daily currency spreads based on which monthly currency 
spreads are calculated. N denotes the number of observations during the sample period. Spreads are denoted in 
the basis point that one basis point is equal to 0.01% (0.0001) as unit of measure. 
Figure A in Appendix E plots the monthly market spread and individual spreads. Table 2.5 
provides a statistical summary of the liquidities of the 11 currency pairs. In this thesis, the 
commonly used proportionally quoted spread is employed as the measure for currency 
liquidities. The data of bid and ask prices used to calculate the spreads are sourced from the 
“WM/Reuters Closing Spot Rates” in DataStream. The data is built with data directly sourced 
from market transactions. The starting point of the currency spreads is January 1999 when the 
Euro was introduced so as to achieve a time-series of data with as many observations as 
possible. The end point is December 2015. All time-series are provided on a daily basis. After 
data pre-screening, there are 4433 observations for each currency. Since the currency spreads 
are small in magnitude, one basis point equalling 0.01% was adopted as the unit of measure. 
Among the currency spreads, the most notable are the GBP and EUR, which have the lowest 
average spreads of 2.75 and 2.93, respectively. This is consistent with the common wisdom 
that high trading volumes lead to high liquidity. The monthly market spread is calculated as 
the equally weighted average of all the currency spreads.  
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2.7 Conclusions  
In this chapter, a brief introduction to hedge funds and the two sources of superior hedge fund 
performance, i.e. selection ability and timing skill, are reviewed. On the one hand, selection 
ability represents a manager’s ability to pick the best securities with a given level of risk by 
‘microforecasting’ their price movements and identifying which are undervalued or 
overvalued relative to assets in general (Fama, 1972; Merton, 1981; Henriksson and Merton, 
1981). On the other hand, timing skill is characterised by an informed manager’s ability to 
‘macroforecast’ the future behaviour of the market as a whole (Fama, 1972; Merton, 1981). It 
reflects how an informed manager responds to the information he or she obtains (Jensen, 
1972; Fama, 1972; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986).  
In addition, the crucial impact of FX liquidity risk on hedge funds is discussed. Hedge funds 
often trade and use derivatives and leverages globally, and hedge fund managers often hold 
assets and employ investment strategies across a wide variety of markets. Therefore, it is 
expected that FX liquidity is associated with hedge fund performance. Specifically, when the 
market liquidity conditions are severe, hedge fund managers are averse to unexpected 
liquidity shocks due to higher trading costs, such as the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 
2006).  
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Chapter 3  
Methodologies 
Markov-switching models are commonly used to address the modelling issue that a switch 
occurs in a regression equation from one regime to another. Markov-switching model is 
considered a general approach to capturing discrete shifts and endogenous structural breaks. 
On the other hand, the state-space model is a general approach to deal with dynamic time-
series that involve unobserved state variables; Kalman filter is typically applied to make 
statistical inference in a state-space framework.  
This chapter first outlines the estimation procedure of the time-varying-parameter model and 
Kalman filter which will be  applied in chapter 4 to derive the Beta index. Then it follows by 
the estimation procedure for a two-state, first-order Markov-switching model applied in 
chapter 5 to address the structural breaks in timing skill. Finally, this chapter describes and 
reviews the Markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities of Diebold 
and Weinbach (1994) and Filardo (1994) applied in chapter 6 to investigate the structural 
breaks in selection ability. 
3.1 State-space model 
In the literature, many studies suggest time-varying betas and investigate various econometric 
testing methods (Fabozzi and Francis, 1978; Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge, 1988; 
Brooks, Faff and McKenzie, 1998). In empirical analysis, forecasting time-varying betas is of 
great importance to investors due to their close link to systematic risk and to corporate 
financial managers because of their role in the capital structure decision and investment 
appraisal (Choudhry and Wu, 2008). It is known that the state-space model and the GARCH 
model are closely related: if both the GARCH and the state-space model are applied with the 
Kalman filter to estimate the time-varying beta, the former is able to apply conditional 
variance information to construct the conditional beta series, while the latter recursively 
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estimates the beta series from an initial set of priors and generates a series of conditional 
alphas and betas in the market model (Choudhry and Wu, 2008).    
State-space models were originally developed to characterise dynamic systems that involve 
unobserved (latent) variables. A typical state-space model is composed of:  
(a) A measurement equation that describes the relation between observed data and 
unobserved state variables, as shown in the following general form: 
𝐲𝐲𝐭𝐭 = 𝐇𝐇𝐭𝐭𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 + 𝐀𝐀𝐳𝐳𝐭𝐭 + 𝐞𝐞𝐭𝐭,     𝐞𝐞𝐭𝐭~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖. 𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝐑𝐑) ,                                                                                              (3. 1) 
where 𝐲𝐲𝐭𝐭  is an 𝑛𝑛 × 1  vector of variables observed at time t; 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭  is an 𝑘𝑘 × 1  vector of 
unobserved state variables; 𝐇𝐇𝐭𝐭  is an 𝑛𝑛 × 𝑘𝑘 matrix that links the observed 𝐲𝐲𝐭𝐭 vector and the 
unobserved 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭; 𝐳𝐳𝐭𝐭 is an 𝑟𝑟 × 1 vector of exogenous or predetermined observed variables; 𝐞𝐞𝐭𝐭 is 
a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 error term; and 𝐑𝐑 is a 𝑘𝑘 × 𝑘𝑘 covariance matrix of the measurement errors. 
(b) A state equation that describes the state variable’s dynamics; it has the form of a first-
order difference equation in the state vector as follows: 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 = 𝛍𝛍� + 𝐅𝐅𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 + 𝛝𝛝𝐭𝐭,     𝛝𝛝𝐭𝐭~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝐐𝐐) ,                                                                                              (3. 2) 
where 𝛍𝛍� is a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector, 𝛝𝛝𝐭𝐭  is a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 process noise vector, and 𝐐𝐐 is a 𝑘𝑘 × 𝑘𝑘  covariance 
matrix of the process noise vector. 
When 𝐇𝐇𝐭𝐭  is taken as a matrix of exogenous or predetermined variables, i.e. 𝐇𝐇𝐭𝐭 =[1   𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡     𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡    …   𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡], the state-space model has the special form of time-varying-parameter 
model. More specifically, consider a simple regression as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,      𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) .                           (3. 3) 
The regression intercept 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 and coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are time-varying and are assumed to follow 
random walks as follows: 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,     𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2) .                                                                                                   (3. 4) 
where 𝐸𝐸(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑡𝑡  and 𝑠𝑠 ; 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are predetermined or exogenous variables ( 𝑖𝑖 =0,1,2, … ,𝑘𝑘) . If a (𝑘𝑘 + 1) × 1  vectors is defined as 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 = [𝛽𝛽0𝑡𝑡    𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡    𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡    …   𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡]′ , 𝐯𝐯𝐭𝐭 =[𝜗𝜗0𝑡𝑡    𝜗𝜗1𝑡𝑡     𝜗𝜗2𝑡𝑡    …   𝜗𝜗𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡]′ , and 1 × (𝑘𝑘 + 1)  vector 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭 = [1   𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡    𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡    …   𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡] , then the 
simple regression can be written in the form of the following measurement equation: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                                       (3. 5) 
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where 𝛃𝛃𝑡𝑡 is a vector of unobserved state variables. The dynamics of the state variables are 
expressed in the following transition equation: 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 = 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 + 𝐯𝐯𝐭𝐭 ,                                                                                                                   (3. 6) 
with 
𝐸𝐸(𝐯𝐯𝐭𝐭𝐯𝐯𝐭𝐭′) = 𝐐𝐐 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝜎𝜎0
2   0    0   ⋯    00    𝜎𝜎12   0   …    00    0   𝜎𝜎22    ⋯    0
⋮     ⋮      ⋮      ⋱     ⋮0    0    0   …   𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘2⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
  .                                                                                                             (3. 7) 
The Kalman filter is an algorithm that is widely used to estimate the unobserved state-vector 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 at time 𝑡𝑡 based on all the available information up to time 𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇). The Kalman 
filter consists of two steps: prediction and updating.  The associated smoothing algorithm 
provides a more accurate inference on  𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭  based on all the available information in the 
sample through time 𝑇𝑇. Let 𝛙𝛙𝐭𝐭 denote the information set at time 𝑡𝑡; 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 denote 𝐄𝐄[𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝛙𝛙𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏], 
i.e. the expectation of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭  conditional on information up to 𝑡𝑡 − 1 ; 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏  denote 𝐄𝐄[(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 −
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏)(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 − 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏)′], i.e. the covariance matrix of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 conditional on information up to 𝑡𝑡 − 1; 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 denote 𝐄𝐄[𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝛙𝛙𝐭𝐭], i.e. the expectation of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 conditional on information up to 𝑡𝑡; 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 denote 
𝐄𝐄[(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 − 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭)(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 − 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭)′], i.e. the covariance matrix of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 conditional on information up to 𝑡𝑡; 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 denote 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] = 𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏, i.e. the forecast of 𝐲𝐲𝐭𝐭 given information up to time 𝑡𝑡 −1 ; 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1  denote 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 , i.e. the prediction error; 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1  denote 𝐸𝐸[𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−12 ] , i.e. the 
conditional variance of the prediction error; 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐓𝐓 denote 𝐄𝐄[𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝛙𝛙𝐓𝐓], i.e. the expectation of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 
conditional on information up to the whole sample; 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐓𝐓 denote 𝐄𝐄[(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 − 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐓𝐓)(𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 − 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐓𝐓)′], 
i.e. the covariance matrix of 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭  conditional on information up to 𝑇𝑇. The Kalman filter is 
described by the following steps: 
(a) Prediction: at the beginning of time 𝑡𝑡, 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 is calculated in order to form an optimal 
estimate 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1: 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 = 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 ,                                                                                                               (3. 8)                                                                             
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 ,                                                                               (3. 9) 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭′ + 𝜎𝜎2 ,                                                                                                                                  (3. 10) 
𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 = 𝐈𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏𝐈𝐈′ + 𝐐𝐐 ,                                                                                                  (3. 11) 
where 𝐈𝐈 is a (𝑘𝑘 + 1) identity matrix.  
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(b) Updating: the prediction error 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 is calculated as 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 once 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is observed at the 
end of time 𝑡𝑡. As 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 contains new information about 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 (information up to time 𝑡𝑡) beyond 
that contained in 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 , a more accurate inference on 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭  is made as 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 = 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 + 𝐊𝐊𝐭𝐭 ×
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1, where 𝐊𝐊𝐭𝐭 is the weight assigned to new information contained in 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1: 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 = 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 + 𝐊𝐊𝐭𝐭𝛈𝛈𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 ,                                                                                                  (3. 12) 
𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 = 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 − 𝐊𝐊𝐭𝐭𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 ,                                                                                               (3. 13)  
where 𝐊𝐊𝐭𝐭 = 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭′𝐟𝐟𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏−𝟏𝟏  is the Kalman gain. 
(c) Smoothing: the initial values of 𝛃𝛃𝐓𝐓|𝐓𝐓 and 𝐏𝐏𝐓𝐓|𝐓𝐓 for the smoothing are obtained from the last 
iteration of the Kalman filter. A more accurate inference on  𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭 based on all the available 
information in the sample through time 𝑇𝑇 is run backward recursively for 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇 − 1,𝑇𝑇 −2, … ,1 as follows: 
𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐓𝐓 = 𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 + 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭𝐈𝐈′𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏−𝟏𝟏 (𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭+𝟏𝟏|𝐓𝐓 − 𝐈𝐈𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                        (3. 14) 
𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 = 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭 + 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭𝐈𝐈′𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏−𝟏𝟏 (𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭+𝟏𝟏|𝐓𝐓 − 𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭+𝟏𝟏|𝐭𝐭)𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭+𝟏𝟏|𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 ′𝐅𝐅𝐏𝐏𝐭𝐭|𝐭𝐭′  ,                                                      (3. 15) 
 
The parameter matrices 𝐐𝐐 and 𝐑𝐑 are usually unknown and need to be estimated first, upon 
which  𝛃𝛃𝐭𝐭, 𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇 can be estimated conditional on these parameters. The maximum 
likelihood estimation method is applied to obtain estimators of state-space models. Assume 
that  𝛃𝛃𝟎𝟎  and {𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇  follow a Gaussian distribution, then 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  conditional on 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1  also 
follows a Gaussian distribution. Given that the magnitude of the likelihoods can be very 
small, the likelihood value is given in logarithm in order to convert these small numbers to 
larger negative values and make it numerically more stable so that a finite precision machine 
can handle it better. The log likelihood function is evaluated from observation  𝜏𝜏 + 1 (𝜏𝜏 is large enough): 
ln 𝐿𝐿 = −12 � ln ( 2𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=𝜏𝜏+1
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1) − 12 � 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1′𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=𝜏𝜏+1
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 .                                          (3. 16) 
The logarithm is a monotonic function, and hence optimising a function is the same as 
optimising the logarithm of it. Considering the conventions in optimisation theory and that 
optimisers in statistical packages usually work by minimising the result of a function, a minus 
sign is added to the log-likelihood function in order to minimise ‘negative log-likelihood’, 
which is equivalent to maximising the corresponding likelihood function. 
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3.2 State-dependent Markov-switching models 
Regime-switching models are introduced in econometrics by Hamilton (1989) and have been 
widely applied in finance. Existing studies suggest multiple regimes in the financial markets 
and regime-switching models can be effective in capturing these discrete shifts. Hamilton 
(1989) applies a univariate regime-switching model to analyse the U.S. Gross National 
Product and predict business cycles of the U.S. economy. Later studies incorporate Markov-
switching processes to investigate various economic problems, such as exchange rates (Engel 
and Hamilton, 1990), interest rates (Gray, 1996; Ang and Bekaert, 2002b), commodity 
indices (Fong and See, 2001) and stock returns (Rydén, Teräsvirta and Åsbrink, 1998; Turner, 
Startz and Nelson, 1989; Whitelaw, 2001). Hamilton and Lin (1996) further adopt a bivariate 
model for stock returns and growth in industrial production. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 
(2000) apply bivariate regime-switching models to stock market portfolios, tracking either 
country indices or portfolios based on market capitalisation. Using a Gaussian Markov-
switching model, Ang and Bekaert (2002a) identify a bear regime (negative returns, high 
volatilities and correlations) and a bull regime (positive mean, low volatilities and 
correlations) for international returns. Similar results in relation to interest rates can be found 
in Ang and Bekaert (2002b, 2004) and Guidolin and Timmermann (2006a, 2006b). Ang and 
Bekaert (2002a) and Guidolin and Timmermann (2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) reveal further 
insights into the number of regimes and the corresponding interpretation.   
One of the most important implications of the Markov switching technique is to capture the 
time-varying nature of the relationships. For instance, Pelletier (2006) breaks the covariances 
between multiple time series down into correlations and standard deviations, allowing the 
correlation matrix to follow a regime switching model, where the correlations are constant 
within a regime but different across regimes. Incorporating the ARMACH model of Taylor 
(1986) and Schwert (1989), this regime-switching dynamic correlation model no longer 
suffers from the problem of dimensionality and allows analytic computation of multi-step 
ahead conditional expectations of the covariance matrix. This model is shown to outperform 
the dynamic conditional correlation model of Engle (2002). Prajogo (2011) considers two-
dimensional return series consisting of the S&P500 and the agricultural sector in the U.S. 
stock market. He also allows investors to identify the characteristics of correlations under 
different regimes by estimating the covariance matrix in each regime. Bae, Kim and Mulvey 
(2014) replace the static mean–variance model with a regime switching model to optimise 
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portfolios invested in stock, bonds and the commodity market, which is an improvement on 
helping portfolios avoid risk during left-tail (down market) events. 
A general model with structural breaks in the parameters has the following form: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 ) ,                                                                                                  (3. 17) 
where  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  are dependent on an unobserved state variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0 or 1): 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                       (3. 18) 
𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒02 (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒12 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                               (3. 19) 
The Markov switching technique has also been shown to be effective in capturing long-run 
variance dynamics, such as the heteroskedasticity of low-frequency data. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity can invalidate statistical tests of significance that assume joint normality 
and linearity, resulting in biased tests of changes in correlations and estimates of the 
variances of the coefficients. Biased standard errors will further cause biased inference and 
possibly incorrect hypothesis test results. The dynamics in the conditional variance of the 
forecast error may come from two sources: time-varying parameters and changing 
uncertainty due to future random shocks (changing conditional variance in the disturbance 
term (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡)). Ignoring the former form of heteroskedasticity will lead to failure to incorporate 
the learning process of economic agents and ignoring the latter will result in an inappropriate 
use of new information when priors are updated in the Kalman filter (Kim and Nelson, 1999). 
Kim and Nelson (1999) argue that there are two types of heteroskedasticity: (a) ARCH-type 
conditional heteroskedasticity, which has been shown to have constant unconditional 
variance and govern the short-term variance dynamics; and (b) Markov-switching 
heteroskedasticity, which has an unconditional variance subjected to abrupt shifts and 
governs long-run variance dynamics (Hamilton and Susmel, 1994). Many researchers have 
found that when applying both ARCH and regime-switching models to low frequency data, 
the ARCH effect dies out and regime shifts dominate. 
For instance, a two-state Markov-switching intercept with heteroskedastic disturbances has 
the following form: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 � .                                                                                          (3. 20) 
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where 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  and  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
2  are dependent on an unobserved variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0 or 1)  
𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                  (3. 21) 
𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒02 (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒12 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                                                              (3. 22) 
Under regime 0 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0), the parameters are given by 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝜎𝜎02, and under regime 1, the 
parameters are given by 𝛽𝛽1  and 𝜎𝜎12 . If the evolvement of the discrete-valued variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
depends on 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 , then 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  follows a two-state first-order Markov-switching process. Its 
transition probabilities are denoted by:  
𝑃𝑃 = � 𝑝𝑝00 1 − 𝑝𝑝111 − 𝑝𝑝00 𝑝𝑝11 � ,                                                                                                                                 (3. 23) 
where 
𝑝𝑝11 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1] = 𝐿𝐿 ,                                                                                                                 (3. 24) 
𝑝𝑝00 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] = 𝑝𝑝 .                                                                                     (3. 25) 
In this section, the estimation procedures of the State-dependent Markov-switching models 
are outlined. Let 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 denote the information set up to time 𝑡𝑡. The recursive procedure for the 
estimation of the unobservable state variable is described by the following steps19: 
(1) At the beginning of time step 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] ( 𝑖𝑖 = 0,1) is given. The probability 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] ( 𝑗𝑗 = 0,1) is calculated as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] = �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]1
𝑖𝑖=0= �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖]1
𝑖𝑖=0
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] ,                                        (3. 26) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖] (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖 = 0,1;  𝑗𝑗 = 0,1) are the transition probabilities.  
(2) At the end of time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  is observed and hence the information set 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡  becomes 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 ={𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡}. Then, the probability is updated as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡] = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡] = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)
= 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]
∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]1𝑗𝑗=0  .                                           (3. 27) 
                                                 
19 Please see Kim and Nelson (1999) for details. 
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The joint distribution 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 and the unobserved state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡( 𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇) is first 
obtained through the product of the conditional density 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) and the marginal 
deistribution 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) for given 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1, as follows: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) .                                                            (3. 28) 
Then the marginal density of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡: 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) is obtained by adding up all the possible values 
of 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , as a weighted average of the conditional densities given 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0  and 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1 , 
respectively. Consequently, the unobservable state variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is integrated out of the above 
joint density as following: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) = � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)1
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=0
= � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)1
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=0= 1
�2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎02 exp�− �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,0𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 �22𝜎𝜎02 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]+ 1
�2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎12 exp�− �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 �22𝜎𝜎12 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] .                  (3. 29) 
For the two-state Markov-switching intercept with heteroskedastic disturbances, the marginal 
density is a function of the two states of intercept 𝛼𝛼0, 𝛼𝛼1, two states of disturbance variance  
𝜎𝜎0
2,𝜎𝜎12 , and transition probabilities 𝑃𝑃 as follows: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1) = � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)1
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=0
= � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)1
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=0= 1
�2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎02 exp�− �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼0 − ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 �22𝜎𝜎02 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]+ 1
�2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎12 exp�− �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼1 − ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 �22𝜎𝜎12 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1] .           (3. 30) 
The log likelihood function is given by: 
ln 𝐿𝐿 = � ln{� 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1)𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1]1
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=0
}𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 .                                                              (3. 31) 
In general, statistical inference for a Markov-switching model consists of: (a) estimating the 
parameters of the model by maximizing the log likelihood function, and (b) inference for the 
unobservable state variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇). In the classical approach, inference on the 
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state variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is usually drawn conditional on the parameter estimates of the model with a 
recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimate of the unobserved-state. Depending 
on the amount of information (information set) used in inference on 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , the problem can be 
clarified as filtering and smoothing problems, corresponding to filtered probabilities or 
smoothed probability respectively. Filtered probabilities refer to inference about 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
conditional on the information available up to t, i.e. 𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡, whereas smoothed probabilities refer 
to inference about 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 conditional on all the available information in the sample through time 
T, i.e. 𝛹𝛹𝑇𝑇. Considering that the smoothed 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡|𝑇𝑇 uses more information and provides a more 
accurate estimate of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡, the smoothed probabilities are reported in this thesis. 
The Goodness-of-Fit Statistics applied for the maximum likelihood estimated time-varying-
parameter models in chapter 4 and the state-dependent Markov-switching models in chapter 5 
is the likelihood ratio index 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀2  of McFadden (1974). It is analogous to the R-squared in the 
linear regression model and bounded by 0 and 1, which is calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2 = 1 − ln𝐿𝐿
ln𝐿𝐿0
  ,                                                                                                                 (3. 32) 
where ln 𝐿𝐿 is the maximum of the log-likelihood function and ln 𝐿𝐿0 is the maximum of the 
log-likelihood function when all coefficients, except for an intercept term, are zero. 
3.3 Time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) 
Recent development of Markov models allows dynamics in state transition probabilities that 
are nonlinear and more flexible. For instance, Diebold and Weinbach (1994) and Filardo 
(1994) allow time-varying transition probabilities to evolve as logistic functions of leading 
economic fundamentals; Durland and McCurdy (1994), Filardo and Gordon (1998) and Lam 
(2004) consider durations of the state; Otranto (2008) suggest lagged latent variable 
depending on the same state variable. Compared with fixed transition probability (FTP) and 
standard linear time series models, the Markov-switching model with TVTP can better 
capture the phase that alpha is in and characterise the dynamics of alpha with its extra 
flexibility. Being able to identify systematic variations in the transition probabilities both 
before and after turning points, TVTP can test whether a particular phase has occurred and 
whether a turning point is imminent and predict more accurately the switch between phases. 
This extra flexibility may capture more complex temporal persistence than FTP model. Both 
the FTP and TVTP models can distinguish between two sources of business-cycle 
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persistence. One source is a result of the autoregressive (AR) parameters, and the other is the 
result of the persistence of the phase over time. The latter source is gauged by the transition 
probability matrix. Allowing the transition probabilities to vary expands the nature of the 
persistence that can be identified. 
Take the two-state Markov-switching intercept with heteroskedastic disturbances as an 
example. Assume that (a) the states of both alpha and disturbance variance cannot be 
observed nor deduced indirectly but evolving according to a first-order Markov process 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡; 
and (b) the likelihood of regime switches is affected by economic fundamentals 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 =[𝑍𝑍1𝑡𝑡   𝑍𝑍2𝑡𝑡  … 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡]. In this case, the state transition probabilities can be described as functions 
of 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭. The two-state stochastic process on the discrete-valued, two-state Markov-switching 
variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1) can be summarized by the following transition probability matrix:  
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = �𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡� = � 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) � ,                                                        (3. 33) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                      (3. 34) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                               (3. 35) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                      (3. 36) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) .                                                               (3. 37) 
Diebold et al. (1994) and Filardo (1994) reparameterise the transition probabilities with a 
logistic function and map the information variables 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 into the open interval (0, 1), thereby 
guaranteeing a well-defined log-likelihood function, as in the following functional 
specification for the characterisation of the probabilities associated with changes of regime:  
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = exp�𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 �1 + exp�𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 � ,                                                                       (3. 38) 
𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = exp�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 �1 + exp�𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 � .                                                                       (3. 39) 
If the restriction that 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘 = 0, for 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0 is satisfied, this model collapses to a FTP 
model. Tests of time variation in transition probabilities are tests of the statistical significance 
of the coefficients on the information variables 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 ,𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁.  
The Markov-switching model with TVTP is jointly tested for the appropriateness of the 
Markov-switching intercept with heteroskedastic disturbances and the functional form of the 
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time-varying probabilities using the likelihood-ratio test. In particular, under the null 
hypothesis of constant intercept with homoscedastic disturbances (no transition probabilities 
or time variation in the transition probabilities), the model is not accepted if: 
 𝛹𝛹 = 2 × [𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃) − 𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅)] > 𝜒𝜒𝐾𝐾1+𝐾𝐾2,𝛼𝛼2  ,                                                                             (3. 40) 
where 𝐾𝐾1 + 𝐾𝐾2  is the number of restrictions. Maximum likelihood (ML) methods for 
mixtures of normal are employed to jointly estimate the parameters of the switching model 
and the Markov process on the states 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . Kim’s (1994) algorithm, which encompasses 
Hamilton’s (1989) filter and the Kalman filter, is used to classify the observations into the 
two unobserved states and to jointly estimate the approximate maximum likelihood 
estimators. Kiefer (1978) shows that for an individual independent distribution switching 
model, if the second derivatives of the likelihood function are non-singular at the true 
parameter value, the negative of the inverse of the matrix of second partial derivatives of the 
likelihood function at the true parameter value is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix of the parameter values. 
For this reason, in order for the standard likelihood-ratio tests of the restrictions to be valid, 
both tests for the significance of the switching model parameters and the joint test for the 
significance of TVTP coefficients will assume that functions of the significance of the 
restrictions are twice differentiable around the true parameters and the gradient of the 
functions are of full rank in the neighbourhood of the true parameters. Denote (1 × 𝑘𝑘) 
exogenous variables vector 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭 = [𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡    𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡    …   𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡] ; ( 𝑘𝑘 × 1)  regression constant 
coefficients vector 𝛃𝛃 = [𝛽𝛽1    𝛽𝛽2  … 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘]′; and the conditional joint density-distribution 𝑓𝑓, the 
conditional density 𝑓𝑓∗ . The Markov-switching parameters in 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭𝛃𝛃 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  and the 
transition probability parameters in 𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭]  are jointly estimated. The 
conditional density 𝑓𝑓∗ is  
𝑓𝑓∗(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡| 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡,  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) = �  � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1=0
1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=0= �  � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1)1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1=0
× 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−11
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=0= 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) × 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏) .                                               (3. 41) 
The log-likelihood function is 
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ln 𝐿𝐿 (𝜃𝜃) = � ln [𝑓𝑓∗(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡| 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡,  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡;𝜃𝜃)]𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 .                                                                                      (3. 
In this way, the transition probabilities 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) are explicitly linked to the 
estimation method and tests; information in other dependent variables  𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭 is linked to the log 
likelihood through the normal density 𝑓𝑓; the lag of  𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭:  𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏 is linked to the log likelihood 
indirectly through the information provided about the past states 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏,  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏); 
and  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭  is linked directly to the transition probabilities 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)  and 
indirectly to the distribution of the states 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏,  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭−𝟏𝟏). 
In this TVTP model, both the information contained in  𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭 and 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 is used to identify the states 
that have occurred. The inferred probability of the state at time 𝑡𝑡 : 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)  is 
calculated by integrating out the effects of the past states in the joint density-distribution: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = �  � 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1=0
1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=0= �  � 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)
𝑓𝑓∗(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡| 𝐗𝐗𝐭𝐭,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1=0
1
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=0
 .                                     (3. 43) 
Time variation in the transition probabilities 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)  impact on the 
inference about the state through the density distribution, 𝑓𝑓. When 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭  are not informative 
about the evolution of the state, the TVTP model becomes FTP model. In order to justify 
Hamilton (1990) filter for maximum likelihood estimation, the information variables are 
required to be related to the switches between states but conditionally independent with latent 
variables indicating states. Normal options are lagged informative variables or artificial 
variables, such as leading indicators considered to be useful business-cycle predictors used by 
Filardo (1994) when investigating the phases of the business cycle, the time-varying 
durations of the state adopted by Durland and McCurdy (1994), Filardo and Gordon (1998), 
Lam (2004), and the lagged latent variable depending on the same state variable in Otranto 
(2008) as information for the transition probabilities.  
The type of ‘news’ contained in the 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 variables can be inferred from the movements in 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 
and 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭). The TVTP coefficient  𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝 corresponds to the transition probabilities 𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡 
while 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝  corresponds to the transition probabilities 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡 . According with one’s 
economic intuition of how a useful indicator would fluctuate, the transition probabilities 𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 
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and 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡 are expected to move in the opposite directions when 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭fluctuates. FXI information 
can generally be interpreted in the form of ‘good’ news and ‘bad’ news in the TVTP 
specifications. The statistically significant coefficient values on variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭  alone are not 
sufficient to assess the marginal contribution of the TVTP model in finding structural breaks. 
The inferred probabilities of the state are normally presented to verify that different 
performance is being captured and reveal turning-point information. 
3.4 Conclusions  
In this chapter, the econometric methodologies used in this thesis are reviewed and described. 
First, the state-space model is considered to characterise dynamic systems that involve latent 
variables, and Kalman filter is typically applied to draw statistical inference in a state-space 
framework. One of its special forms, the time-varying-parameter model, has been widely 
used to capture and forecast the time-varying systematic risk, and will be applied in chapter 4 
to derive the Beta Index. Next, Markov-switching models are a general approach to capturing 
discrete shifts and endogenous structural breaks. A two-state, first-order Markov-switching 
model will be applied in chapter 5 to address the structural breaks in timing skill, and a 
Markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities of Diebold and Weinbach 
(1994) and Filardo (1994) will be applied in chapter 6 to investigate the structural breaks in 
selection ability. 
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Chapter 4  
Liquidity Commonality in the FX Market 
The adjusted R-squared of market-model-type regressions has been widely used to measure 
liquidity commonality. However, several limitations have been raised. First, in the 
multivariate analysis of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), the R-squared statistic 
does not represent the liquidity changes arising from the exposure to the general market 
liquidity movement, instead it accounts for the explanatory power of all the regressors, 
including both market liquidity and control variables such as return and volatility. Second, 
the construction of R-squared time-series requires a higher frequency data to be divided into 
subsamples of a lower frequency, and then the adjusted R-squared is estimated for each 
subsample. Consequently, the number of observations can be limited.  
Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2012) use daily liquidity data within each calendar month to run the 
regressions and calculate the adjusted R-squared in each month 𝑡𝑡. The sample size is from 15 
up to a maximum of 23 due to the number of trading days per month. However, this is barely 
the optimal size for a sample. Grounded in the 95% confidence intervals, the general rule of 
thumb for sample size suggests 10 to 20 observations per parameter estimated in order to 
detect reasonable size effects with reasonable power (Harrell, 2015). An undersized sample 
can abate the power of tests for the hypothesis in regression models. More importantly, if 
higher frequency data is not accessible, the 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 time-series cannot be constructed. Third, there 
are no standard criteria that determine the level of commonality, for instance, beyond what 
threshold R-squared defines high commonality. With these considerations, a new measure for 
time-varying liquidity commonality is proposed. This chapter proposes and discusses a new 
measure to evaluate liquidity commonality in the FX market.  
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4.1 Introducing Beta Index 𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝒕𝒕 
Building on Markowitz’s portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1991), the ‘general equilibrium 
model’ CAPM makes an exact prediction about expected return on risky assets based on its 
equilibrium relationship with the underlying risks as follows: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) ,                                                                                                          (4. 1) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is return of asset 𝑖𝑖; 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk-free interest rate; and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market return. 
On the Security Market Line (SML), the expected return of asset 𝑖𝑖: 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) consists of two 
components: (1) the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡, that compensates investors for costs of capital by 
placing money over a time period; and (2) the market risk premium adjusted for specific 
security, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡), that compensates investors for undertaking additional risks. In 
the market risk premium component, the Beta coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 of asset 𝑖𝑖 is a risk measure that 
relates the expected return of assets to the market premium (market return in excess of the 
risk-free rate). 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 reflects how risky an asset is compared to the market portfolio of all assets. 
Therefore, it measures the systematic risk (undiversified risk) of asset 𝑖𝑖 arising from exposure 
to general market movement. 
A time-varying parameter model is able to capture the dynamic characteristics underlying 𝛽𝛽. 
The market model of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) is extended to a more flexible 
framework that captures the dynamics of the market beta coefficients as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ �𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,      𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖2 � ,     (4. 2) 
where the regression coefficients 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)  and 𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  are assumed to be time-varying and 
following random walks. The commonly used Kalman filter is applied to draw statistical 
inference on the time-varying regression coefficients as follows: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                          (4. 3) 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1(𝑚𝑚) + 𝜔𝜔𝛽𝛽,𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                   (4. 4) 
𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝜔𝜑𝜑,ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                  (4. 5) 
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔,𝑖𝑖2 � .                                                                                                        (4. 6) 
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the change in liquidity 𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 =  1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁) at time 𝑡𝑡; ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the change in 
market liquidity, which is calculated as the equally weighted average of liquidities excluding 
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the liquidity in question; and 𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑡𝑡 (ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻𝐻) represents the control variables included. In 
this thesis, the beta coefficient that describes the sensitivity of individual liquidity change to 
market liquidity movement is denoted as market beta 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
(𝑚𝑚). The market beta coefficients of 
the change in individual liquidity on contemporaneous changes of market liquidity 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) , 
lagging changes of market liquidity 𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)  and leading changes of market liquidity 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) 
represent the individual liquidity’s exposure to the systematic liquidity risk in the concurrent, 
previous and next trading period 𝑡𝑡 respectively.  
If all individual liquidity changes are significantly influenced by market liquidity movements, 
this may lead to a scenario wherein the entire market is systematically illiquid or liquid, 
implying liquidity commonality. It is on this level that the sum market betas measure 
liquidity commonality. In particular, the summation of market betas across individual 
liquidities is averaged as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁�(𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚))𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1
𝑁𝑁
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 .                                                                 (4. 7) 
The equally weighted average of time-varying market betas across assets measures liquidity 
commonality. It describes, on average, to what extent the individual currency liquidity 
changes are exposed to the risk of systematic liquidity movement. In this thesis, it is termed 
Beta Index and denoted as 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡. In comparison with the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 performs better in 
measuring commonality and determining if high liquidity commonality exists.  
First, unlike the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2, whose threshold of high commonality is often ambiguous, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is 
able to clearly indicate the level of liquidity commonality. In the CAPM, a market beta of 1 
indicates that the individual return theoretically experiences the same degree of change as the 
market return and moves in tandem with the market, whereas a beta greater (less) than 1 
indicates the individual return is theoretically more (less) volatile than the market return. 
Similarly, a greater than 1 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 indicates that changes in individual liquidities on average are 
more volatile than market liquidity movements and they co-move with market liquidity in the 
same direction. When all the liquidity changes on average are substantially driven by the 
movements in market liquidity, this implies strong liquidity commonality. On the other hand, 
a positive less than 1 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 indicates that changes in individual liquidities on average are less 
volatile than market liquidity movements and individual liquidities on average partially co-
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move with market liquidity, this implies weak liquidity commonality. In particular, a zero 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 indicates that individual liquidity changes on average are not significantly driven by 
market liquidity movements. There are two possible scenarios of particular interest: 
individual liquidities are stable or their movements are not significantly correlated with 
market liquidity movements. In this case, individual liquidities do not co-move with market 
liquidity and thus do not show any liquidity commonality. Table 4.1 presents the scale and 
interpretation of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 in measuring liquidity commonality. 
Table 4.1 Scale of Beta Index and its interpretation 
Range of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  
Strengthen of 
commonality 
Interpretation 
(1, +∞) High Currency liquidity changes on average are higher than market liquidity movements and tend to go up when market liquidity movement goes up. 
The idea that all liquidity changes are significantly driven by the market-
wide liquidity changes implies strong liquidity commonality. 
(0,1] Low Currency liquidity changes on average are lower than market liquidity movements. The idea that all liquidities on average partially co-move 
with market liquidity implies weak liquidity commonality. 
(−∞, 0] Low Currency liquidity changes on average have a negative relationship with market liquidity changes. Currency liquidity changes on average are not 
significantly driven by market liquidity movements, and therefore, there 
is no significant commonality. 
The indicative direction of the market beta has important implications for application. No 
matter what the behavioural patterns of the individual liquidities are, if on average, they do 
not show significant co-movement, they will not impair the diversification strategies. This is 
different from the case of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2. The R-squared statistic lies between 0 and 1. If the R-
squared is high for all the individual regressions but some of the liquidities change to the 
opposite direction, the sum of the R-squared values of these individual regressions will be 
high. In this case, the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 cannot reflect the low liquidity commonality.  
Second, in a multivariate context where the control variables are taken into consideration, the 
R-squared statistics describe the explanatory power of all the independent variables, 
including the control variables. In comparison, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  is able to capture the association 
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between individual liquidity changes and market liquidity movement without any interference 
from the control variables. This is different from the case of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 too.  
Third, unlike the adjusted R-squared approach, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 does not suffer from the problem of 
small sample size because it is derived from all the observations in the entire sample. More 
importantly, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  is no longer constrained by data frequency and can be constructed at the 
frequency of the original data it sampled. An important implication is the construction of high 
frequency commonality time-series. High-frequency trading using proprietary algorithms to 
rapidly trade securities in multiple markets has gained great popularity and contributed to 
great trading volume in the past decade. Thanks to advances in data recording and storage 
technology, high-frequency data sets are increasingly accessible. High-frequency traders 
often move in and out of positions in fractions of a second and require sub-second responses 
from computer systems. Consequently, the analysis of high frequency data becomes 
important (Engle, 2000). For instance, high-frequency brokers can use computerised 
algorithms to work their orders into the FX market, split large orders into smaller pieces and 
execute orders over a short period of time at different times to different buyers in order to get 
the best possible price. One of the risks is that once liquidity is suddenly in short supply, the 
price is likely to move against them, and they will not be able to move out of short-term 
positions at high volumes and high speeds. Although the idiosyncratic liquidity risk can be 
diversified by taking advantage of the imperfect correlations of currency liquidities, any 
increase in currency liquidity commonality will expose investors to greater systematic 
liquidity risk. In this context, high-frequency traders will be interested in the high-frequency 
commonality of currency liquidities, which represents the systematic liquidity risk level, and 
consider it to be an aspect of their algorithms.  
Take as an example of the ultra-high-frequency financial data. Tick-by-tick data is the 
minimum increment which shows the price of every print from trade to trade, and it does not 
allow any observations within each tick to estimate the value of adjusted 𝑅𝑅-squared at every 
tick. Hence, the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2  cannot be used to construct tick-by-tick commonality time-
series. In comparison, by carrying out a state-space model through applying the Kalman filter 
to draw inference for tick-by-tick time-varying market betas 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑚𝑚)  (𝑘𝑘 = −1,0,1), which 
represent individual liquidities’ exposure to contemporaneous, leading and lagging market 
liquidity at each tick. In this way, the tick-by-tick data can be applied to measure tick-by-tick 
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commonality directly. The 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 that measures tick-by-tick liquidity commonality 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡 
is constructed by taking the equally weighted average of all currencies’ daily sum market 
betas as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑇𝑇)𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁�(𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑚𝑚) )𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1
𝑁𝑁
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 .                                  (4. 8) 
In this way, a tick-by-tick Beta-Index 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑇𝑇)𝑡𝑡  is able to measure tick-by-tick liquidity 
commonality and provide a new perspective for high-frequency traders. 
4.2 Monthly Liquidity Commonality 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝒕𝒕 
There are several options for the construction of low frequency commonality using the R-
squared approach if different types of higher frequency data are available. For instance, daily 
data, hourly data and even tick-by-tick data can be used to estimate the adjusted R-squared 
statistics in each month. This holds true for 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 as well. In this section, how to estimate the 
monthly Beta Index, denoted by 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, using daily and monthly data is demonstrated. In the 
rest of this thesis, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 estimated using daily data is denoted by 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡, and that estimated 
using monthly data is denoted by 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡. 
When estimating 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 using monthly data, daily observations are averaged into monthly 
data first. Then monthly data are applied to estimate the market betas 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) (𝑘𝑘 = −1,0,1) in 
each month 𝑡𝑡 as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ �𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,     𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2) .       (4. 9) 
The unobserved state variables 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  are assumed to be time-varying on the 
monthly basis. The inference is drawn as Eq. (4.3) to Eq. (4.6). The average of monthly sum 
betas ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)1𝑘𝑘=−1  (𝑘𝑘 = −1,0,1) across individual currencies is 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁�(𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚))𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1
𝑁𝑁
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 .                                      (4. 10) 
Figure 4.1 presents a flow chart for the estimation process of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡.  
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Figure 4.1 The process of constructing the Beta Index 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑴𝑴)𝒕𝒕 based on monthly data. 
 
  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡        𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇 
𝑡𝑡 = 1,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) ,𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚),𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁��𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)�𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
𝑡𝑡 = 1,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ��∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑�𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
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On the other hand, when estimating 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  using daily data, daily liquidities are first 
adjusted for the deterministic time series variation, i.e. the day-of-week effect on liquidity as 
documented by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000). This is carried out by regressing 
the daily liquidities 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 within each month 𝑡𝑡 on day-of-the-week dummies (𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡) for 
Monday through Thursday and holiday dummies (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡) as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡4
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 ,                                (4. 11) 
The regression residuals give the daily adjusted liquidities 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡  which are applied to 
estimate the market betas 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)  (𝑘𝑘 = −1,0,1) on each day 𝑑𝑑 as follows:  
∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ �𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 ,                                 (4. 12) 
The unobserved state variables 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 and 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 are assumed to be time-varying on the daily 
basis. The inference is drawn as Eq. (4.3) to Eq. (4.6). The sum market betas ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)1𝑘𝑘=−1  
represent individual liquidity’s exposure to systematic liquidity on the concurrent, next and 
previous days. The average daily sum betas across assets represent the daily Beta Index 
estimated using daily data 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑 as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑 = 1𝑁𝑁�(𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) )𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1
𝑁𝑁
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 .                                     (4. 13) 
It is at this stage that daily Beta Index is averaged into monthly levels as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                                                                     (4. 14) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 days represents the total number of days within month 𝑡𝑡. Figure 4.2 presents a flow 
chart for the estimation process of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡. 
One of the most important differences between 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 lies in the how they 
identify the changes in the long term trends. This is of great importance for forecasting. In 
order to demonstrate this, Eq. (4.9) and Eq. (4.12) are rearranged to compare how they differ 
when identifying long-term trends shown on their right-hand-side. 
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Figure 4.2 The process of constructing the Beta Index 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑫𝑫)𝒕𝒕 based on daily data. 
  
 ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,1,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,1 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷1,1, … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡  
𝑑𝑑 = 1,∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 
𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ,𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ,𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)  
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑 + 1 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑 = 1𝑁𝑁��𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚)�𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,1,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,1 … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷1,1, … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,2,𝑡𝑡 … ,∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡  
𝑑𝑑 < 𝐷𝐷 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 + 1 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡        𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇 
𝑡𝑡 = 1,𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑  
𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 = 1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 �(𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 
 
 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑        𝑑𝑑 = 1,2, …𝐷𝐷 
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Specifically, Eq. (4.9) of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 is expanded to put the monthly liquidities into the form of 
average daily liquidities in each month 𝑡𝑡 as follows: 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 � 𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1
𝑑𝑑=1
+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                  (4. 15) 
On the other hand, the left-hand-side of equation Eq. (4.12) is written in the form of average 
daily liquidities. The right-hand-side of Eq. (4.12) is arranged to represent how the regression 
processes are aggregated on a daily basis in each month 𝑡𝑡 as follows20:  1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑−1𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+1𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 ,       (4. 16) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗∗  represents the time-varying intercept attributed to the day-of-week effect and 
holiday effect. As shown in Eq. (4.15) and Eq. (4.16), the main difference between the two 
measures is their focus on the length of the trends and adjustments for the lagged 
commonality. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 is adjusted for the daily dynamics of the market betas in previous 
day  𝑑𝑑 − 1 , concurrent day 𝑑𝑑  and next day 𝑑𝑑 + 1 , whereas 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡  is adjusted for the 
monthly dynamics of the market betas in previous month 𝑡𝑡 − 1, concurrent month 𝑡𝑡 and next 
month 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Thus 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 is more focused on the long-term (monthly basis) sensitivity of 
currency liquidity changes to market liquidity movements.  
 
The ability of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 to identify long term trends is advantageous in terms of forecasting 
low frequency commonality time-series, and this is of great importance to long-term 
investors. In the rest of this section, the performances of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡  and 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  in measuring the variation of individual liquidity changes explained by market 
liquidity movements in the FX context21 are compared.  
                                                 
20 See details reported in Appendix A 
21 Considering when control variables are included, the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 represents the liquidity risk arising from not 
only the exposure to the general market-wide liquidity movement, but also from the control variables which is 
undesirable, a simple market model where no control variables are considered is applied in this section. 
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Figure 4.3 Plots of 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐, 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑫𝑫)𝒕𝒕 and according smoothed series 
 
Note: The graph on the left presents monthly adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and MA(13) of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2, the graph on the right presents the monthly 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 and MA(13) of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡. The 
monthly adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 are estimated using daily data for eleven currencies throughout the sample period: 1999.01-2015.12. Plots have duration from 1999.07-
2015.06, the first 6 and last 6 data are missing due to calculation of MA(13).  
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Figure 4.4 Plots of 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑫𝑫)𝒕𝒕 and 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑴𝑴)𝒕𝒕, and standardized MA(13) of 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 and 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑫𝑫)𝒕𝒕  
 
Note: The graph on the left plots the standardized MA(13) of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and MA(13) of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡. The monthly adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 are estimated using daily data for eleven 
currencies throughout the sample period: 1999.01-2015.12. Plot has duration from 1999.07-2015.06, the first 6 and last 6 data are missing due to calculation of MA(13). The 
graph on the right presents monthly Beta-Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 estimated using daily data and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 estimated using monthly data throughout the sample period: 1999.01-
2015.12. Graph has duration from 1999.03-2015.11, where the first two and last data are missing due to taking first difference in spreads, one lead and one lag in market 
spreads when calculating 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 using monthly data. 
57 
 
Table 4.2 Pearson correlation coefficients of the monthly adjusted 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 and 𝑴𝑴𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩(𝑫𝑫)𝒕𝒕 
Smooth order 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 and 
smoothed adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 
 Smoothed 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 
and adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 
 Smoothed adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 
and smoothed  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 
Raw  .508a  .508a  .508a 
MA(2)  .630a  .491a  .636a 
MA(3)  .632a  .484a  .650a 
MA(4)  .703a  .490a  .712a 
MA(5)  .713a  .487a  .719a 
MA(6)  .741a  .498a  .759a 
MA(7)  .739a  .492a  .764a 
MA(8)  .743a  .491a  .789a 
MA(9)  .734a  .484a  .792a 
MA(10)  .737a  .491a  .809a 
MA(11)  .734a  .489a  .811a 
MA(12)  .740a  .483a  .821a 
MA(13)  .744a  .472a  .825a 
Note: This table summarizes the time-series correlations of the raw and smoothed monthly adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 . Smoothed method is moving average with order form 1 to 13.  a means that the correlation is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Figure 4.3 depicts the graph of monthly adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡. Appendix B explores the 
relationship between 𝑅𝑅2  and 𝛽𝛽  in a simple linear regression framework. The adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 
shows significant time-variations throughout the sample period. The highly volatile pattern 
reflects strong short-term fluctuations. This may be a result of random variation due to the 
small sample size when using daily observations in each month for estimation. Since this 
random variation over-shadows the underlying trend or any cyclic components, a commonly 
used method, Moving Average (MA)22 is applied to filter out noise and provide a clearer 
view of the underlying long-term trends. Figure 4.3 also depicts the MA(13) of the adjusted 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
2  and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡23 and table 4.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient for the two 
measures. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 and MA(13) of the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 exhibit the highest significant correlation 
of 0.744. The smoothed series for both measures show even higher correlation, with the 
highest being the MA(13) series at 0.825. Even the raw 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 and raw adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 series 
display a correlation as high as 0.508. These moderately high correlations demonstrate a 
strong relationship between the measures constructed from the R-squared statistics and 
                                                 
22 Please note that moving average of order 1 is the raw time-series itself. 
23 The adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2  is compared with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  because both are estimated using daily data, any difference 
introduced by different data frequency, such as those arising between the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡, is avoided.   
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market betas, implying the feasibility of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 in measuring liquidity commonality and further 
supporting the notion that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is an alternative to the adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2. 
Figure 4.4 depicts the graph of monthly 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 . A strong correlation of 
0.727 is found between the two measures. This high correlation suggests that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 estimated 
with low frequency data is a good alternative to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  estimated with high frequency data. 
Another important improvement is made to computational efficiency, which is especially 
important when dealing with big data. In the empirical example, the market betas 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 of 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  are time-varying on a daily basis and inference of 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  is iterated 4431 times 
between January 1999 and December 2015 for each currency. On the other hand, the market 
betas 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡 vary on a monthly basis and inference of 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is iterated only 201 
times, about 1/30 of that of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 . Given that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡  can capture the important 
variations of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 , the computational effort put into applying high frequency data is 
simply not worth it, and  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡  has an additional advantage in that it improves 
computational efficiency when dealing with big data. 
4.3 Liquidity commonality in the FX market 
In this section, liquidity commonality in the FX market with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡  is empirically 
measured. In particular, all the factors that have long been shown to be associated with 
liquidity are included in the regression to remove any spurious dependence as follows: 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ � 𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
ℎ=−1+ 𝜑𝜑2,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,     𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖2 � ,                                          (4. 17) 
where ∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the change in spread 𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,11)  in month 𝑡𝑡 ; ∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  (𝑘𝑘 = 0,1,−1) 
represent the contemporaneous, one lead and one lag of the changes in market spread, 
excluding the currency spread in question; and 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 , (𝑘𝑘 = 0,−1) represents the one lead, 
contemporaneous and one lag of the equally-weighted market return, excluding the currency 
spread in question. The spread measures are functions of the transaction price, and the 
changes in spreads are functions of changes in price that imply returns (Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000). The inclusion of market returns allows us to remove any spurious 
dependence induced by an association between returns and spread measures.  ∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
represents the changes in individual volatilities (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008). Volatility is 
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calculated as the standard deviation of the daily return in each month. Inference for time-
varying (on monthly basis) coefficients 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is drawn as Eq. (4.13) to Eq. (4.16). 
Then the monthly liquidity commonality time-series in the FX market, denoted by 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, is derived by taking the equally weighted average of the sum market betas in 
each month 𝑡𝑡 of all the eleven currencies as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 111�(𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚))11
𝑖𝑖=1
= 111� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 .                                      (4. 18) 
Table 4.3 presents the equally weighted average time-varying-coefficients across all 
currencies in the sample. Consistent with the previous literature, we find a positive 
association between change in spread and change in volatility, as indicated by Stoll (1978), 
who states that high adverse selection and inventory risk induced by high return volatility will 
positively affect bid-ask spreads. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) suggest that a decline in 
price increases financial leverage and its subsequent volatility, indicating that bid-ask spreads 
are negatively affected by return, which is consistent with our finding of negative coefficients 
on contemporaneous market return.  
Table 4.3 Estimates of the coefficients from the Beta Index model 
Estimates 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 % positive 
(negative) 
 % significantly 
positive (negative)  
Intercept (𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡)  0.000  0.000  {77.114}  {5.292} 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖  (𝛽𝛽−1)  0.011  0.014  {57.350}  {11.714} 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (𝛽𝛽0)  0.678  0.735  80.145  21.167 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖  (𝛽𝛽1)  -0.012  0.004  {55.224}  {3.121} 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖  (𝛾𝛾−1)  -0.001  0.000  56.536  9.091 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (𝛾𝛾0)  0.000  0.000  {48.168}  {8.141} 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖  (𝛾𝛾1)  -0.001  -0.001  53.822  10.086 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  (𝛾𝛾5)  0.000  0.000  57.078  15.106 
Note: This table summarize the time-series of coefficients. The first two columns of the table show the mean 
and median of time-series coefficients across the sample currencies. The third column shows the mean 
percentage of positive {negative} coefficients across eight currencies. The final column shows the mean 
percentage of significantly positive {negative} coefficients estimated at the 5% level (one-tailed) across eight 
currencies.
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Figure 4.5 Plot of liquidity commonality in the FX market.  
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Figure 4.5 plots FX liquidity commonality measured with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,,𝑡𝑡24. Plots of the sum 
market betas for individual currencies are reported in Appendix F. It is worth noting that 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2 
and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡 estimated with daily data fail to pick up the variations of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,,𝑡𝑡. This 
may be attributed to the short-term pattern being mixed and certain long-term trends and 
information cancelling one another out. It can be observed from Figure 4.5 that the most 
pronounced surges in liquidity commonality coincided with the recent financial crisis. The 
starting point of crisis is normally considered to be July 2007 when BNP Paribas announced 
that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialized in the U.S. mortgage debt. 
The fixed income markets and the equity markets were the first to feel considerable stress and 
experience remarkable volatilities, whereas the crisis in the FX market due to contagion from 
other asset classes came relatively late (Melvin and Taylor, 2009). Therefore, liquidity 
commonality in the FX market did not respond immediately after the crisis began. There was 
a surge in commonality since April 2008, and this had accelerated by the peak of the financial 
crisis in September 2008 at the time of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the 
consequential freefall of the global economy. This trend reached a turning point in April 2009 
at the time of the London G20 summit, where a $5tn fiscal expansion to help the International 
Monetary Fund and other global institutions boost jobs and growth and to reform the banks 
was agreed upon. Yet, commonality reached a local maximum again in June 2010 when large 
quantities of trading executed by automated high-frequency trading caused a flash crash 
which led to large financial losses around the globe. At this time, solvency became a 
government issue, especially for Greece. This high level of liquidity commonality in the FX 
market persisted throughout the whole timeline of the financial crisis up until January 2012. 
Strong commonality during periods of crisis reflects the increasingly similar reactions of 
individual liquidities to market liquidity movement under severe market conditions. In 
addition, as underscored by the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when market liquidity 
                                                 
24 In the original formulation of the Kalman filter, it is assumed that the initial value of the state has a known 
mean value and variance. However, in practice, the Kalman filter needs to be initialized with an initial guess. It 
is standard practice that the initial values of the estimates are set as zero and the initial state error co-variance 
matrix of the estimates as a diagonal matrix. Such a setting only affects the transient phase and the convergence 
rate, namely, how quickly the estimation error will converge to zero. Practically, the co-variance matrix of the 
initial state estimates is chosen to have very large eigenvalues so that the estimates converge rapidly and that the 
influence of the initial guess will soon become negligible (Solonen, Hakkarainen, Ilin, Abbas and Bibov, 2014). 
In this empirical research, the initial guess of the co-variance matrix is set as one thousand times the identity 
matrix. Considering that in the transient phase, the estimates may not be accurate in terms of mean squared error, 
the estimated 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶,,𝑡𝑡 later than the start point, specifically, July 2001, is applied in this and the following 
sections and chapters. The end point is November 2015, where the estimates for December 2015 are missing due 
to taking one lead of market spread and market return.  
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deteriorates, many investors exit the market simultaneously. In this case, more liquidation 
was caused and that further reduced market liquidity through so-called liquidity spirals. 
Such a high degree of synchronisation among currency liquidities can also be observed in the 
recession of the early 2000s when many developed countries, especially the U.S., the 
European Union and Japan, suffered from a decline in economic activity. This high 
commonality in the recession of the early 2000s can also be explained from the perspective of 
a low money supply. In order to protect the economy from the overvalued stock market, the 
Federal Reserve successively increased the interest rate in 2000 and 200125. A high interest 
rate indicates a lower money supply. A decline in money supply induced by low interest rates 
worldwide is more likely to trigger liquidation across many asset classes in different 
currencies, consequently causing synchronisation among individual liquidities and raising 
liquidity commonality. The quick spike from 2004.04 to 2004.06 was the result of a similar 
situation. During this time, many governments maintained a low interest rate for fear of 
bursting the housing ‘bubble’. 
High commonality was observed between September 2004 and December 2004 when higher 
oil and other commodity prices caused capacity constraints, reduced incomes of importers 
and tighter monetary policy in the U.S. Along with large U.S. public and current-account 
deficits, this led to increased confidence in other economies26. The consequential constant 
appreciation of many currencies, such as the EUR, GBP, JPY and CAD, against the USD, 
induced a massive liquidation of assets in those currencies and the buying of assets in the 
USD for potential arbitrage opportunities, leading to high liquidity commonality. The high 
commonality between January 2013 and December 2013 is likely to be associated with the 
sharp shrinks in FX trading.  In December 2013, the average daily trading volumes at ICAP, 
the world’s biggest interdealer broker, experienced a decline of 23% compared to December 
2012, falling to $71 billion, the lowest level since 200627, reflecting investors’ reluctance to 
take risks. This was the case for many ‘systematic’ currency hedge funds, especially after 
experiencing the impaired correlations between asset classes and models ineffectiveness, 
mainly due to the progressive QE. Lower trading volume in the FX market indicates higher 
spreads (low liquidity) across many different currencies, and high liquidity risk is likely to 
                                                 
25 Ruddy, Christopher (January 31, 2006). Alan Greenspan's Real Legacy. Newsmax. Retrieved on July 8, 2009. 
26 https://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-growth-Year-In-Review-2004 
27 https://www.ft.com/content/f20f4284-77a3-11e3-afc5-00144feabdc0 
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induce liquidity commonality by affecting the funding liquidity of financial intermediaries 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) or the degree of correlated trading by institutional 
investors (Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2012).     
On the other hand, Figure 4.5 shows a major decline in liquidity commonality from April 
2004 to June 2006, during which time trading volume constantly increased. Average daily 
turnover amounted to $1.9 trillion in April 2004, which increased rather than reversed the fall 
in global trading volumes between 1998 and April 2001 (Galati and Melvin, 2004). This 
coincidental major decline is consistent with the expectation of Mancini, Ranaldo and 
Wrampelmeyer (2013) that high turnover should liquidate the FX market and reduce market-
wide currencies’ exposure to systematic liquidity risk. Several factors contribute to this surge 
in FX trading. One of the most important factors is the development of technology, such as 
the introduction of electronic brokers, Internet trading and electronic execution, which have 
substantially changed the structure of the FX market and the game played between the market 
participants (Rime, 2003). For instance, unlike voice brokers, who are relatively regional in 
their coverage, electronic brokers in the interbank market are able to effectively aggregate 
dispersed information because they do not see geographical borders at all and can attract 
liquidity more easily over large distances. Moreover, in comparison with the direct market, 
electronic brokers allow more dealers to trade with informed traders. This improved 
information aggregation ability has been shown to contribute to increased interbank spot 
trading and to improve liquidity (Rime, 2003).   
The FX market was primarily reliant on phone-based technology through the mid 1990s. The 
first electronic brokers system, Dealing 2000-2, introduced by Reuters in April 1992, and the 
second, EBS (Electronic Broking Services), introduced in September 1993 to deal in the FX 
market, dominated interbank trading flows by the late 1990s and accounted for about 90% of 
interbank trading in most major currency pairs (Barker, 2007). These electronic portals are 
able to significantly: (a) reduce dealers’ operation costs28 by reducing the time and labour 
required to process an order due to being highly automated (Ding and Hiltrop, 2010); (b) 
reduce the cost of holding inventory by matching dealers and executing transactions faster 
and more accurately (e.g. Pagano and Roell, 1996; Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan, 1999; 
Ding and Hiltrop, 2010); (c) reduce the cost of acquiring information by providing real-time 
                                                 
28 The Foreign Exchange Committee, 1997, A Survey Assessing the Impact of Electronic Broking on the 
Foreign Exchange Market, http://www.ny.frb.org/fxc/fxc.html. 
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quotes (a live price stream that displays the highest bids and lowest offers posted on the 
system) to the market and increasing pre-trade transparency (Shyy and Lee, 1995; Ding and 
Hiltrop, 2010). What is more, the diverse selection of execution venues and lower costs 
attract greater participation from many customer types 29 , especially ‘other financial 
institutions’, including smaller banks, mutual funds, money market funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds, hedge funds, currency funds and central banks (King and Rime, 
2010). This lower cost and additional transparency consequently attracts order flows, 
increases trading volume and narrows spreads, thus improving liquidity.  
Electronic trading can be divided into two main types: (i) manual, where instructions are 
executed by humans on an electronic trading platform; and (ii) automated, where instructions 
are executed by computer algorithms, with little or no human intervention (though still 
subject to human monitoring30. The advances in information technology and the spread of 
electronic trading have allowed for auto-trading, which made high-frequency trading increase 
in popularity, jumping from 2% in 2004 up to 45% in 201031. Since the early 2000s, many 
equity hedge funds have switched their algorithmic models and strategies developed for 
trading equities, especially those intended for high liquidity to FX, in order to take advantage 
of the FX market’s very deep liquidity, broad participation, ease of access and arbitrage 
opportunities. For instance, switching to liquidity-providing (or liquidity-redistributing) 
strategies which aim to detect order book imbalances for a particular currency pair and 
pricing discrepancies across trading platforms allows managers to earn a spread by 
arbitraging these differences. In this context, the constantly growing trend to contribute prices 
(through high-frequency trading) to trading platforms helps to distribute liquidity across the 
decentralised market and narrow spreads32. 
Figure 4.5 also shows an overall declining trend in liquidity commonality during the period 
from April 2009 to September 2012 despite the fact that commonality stayed at a high level 
during the crisis. This may partly be attributed to several rounds of Quantitative Easing (QE). 
QE is an unconventional form of monetary policy that aims to increase the money supply and 
                                                 
29 Markets Committee, 2011. High-frequency trading in the foreign exchange market. Bank for International 
Settlements, Markets Committee Publications 
30 Markets Committee, 2011. High-frequency trading in the foreign exchange market. Bank for International 
Settlements, Markets Committee Publications 
31  "Anatomy of the Forex Market". Pepperstone. Retrieved 22 April 2013. 
32 Markets Committee, 2011. High-frequency trading in the foreign exchange market. Bank for International 
Settlements, Markets Committee Publications 
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stimulate the economy through central banks’ purchasing government bonds or other 
financial assets when standard monetary policy has become ineffective (Bullard, 2010; 
Lyonnet and Werner, 2012). A central bank normally implements QE by buying financial 
assets from commercial banks and other financial institutions, thus raising the prices of those 
financial assets and lowering their yields, while simultaneously increasing the money supply 
(Ganley, 2010). The QE programmes undertaken since the financial crisis across main 
currencies have mitigated some of the economic problems (Feldstein, 2011). 
The U.S. Federal Reserve implemented several rounds of QE. The first of these was from late 
November 2008 to October 2010 and aimed to maintain a high level holding bank debt, 
mortgage-backed securities and Treasury notes by buying in mortgage-backed securities33 
and two-year to ten-year Treasury notes. The second round of QE was from November 2010 
to June 2011 and involved buying $600 billion of Treasury securities34. The third and final 
round was from September 2012 to October 2014 and aimed to maintain the federal funds 
rate near zero and accumulate $4.5 trillion in assets by October 201435 by buying in $40 
mortgage-backed securities (open-ended bond). This figure was raised to $85 billion later in 
December 2012 then reduced every month until September 2013 to $65 billion 3637. The Bank 
of England started buying gilts from financial institutions, along with a smaller amount of 
relatively high-quality debt issued by private companies38 in total amounting to £375 billion 
from March 2009 to October 2009 in order to encourage business to raise capital 39  by 
depressing interest yields on government bonds and similar investments and to encourage 
banks to loan money to higher interest-paying and financially weaker financial companies by 
reducing interbank overnight interest rates. At the beginning of 2013, the European Central 
Bank started buying €60 billion per month of euro-area bonds from central governments, 
agencies and European institutions, with the target holding reaching €1.1 trillion, and an 
expanded asset purchase programme was announced in January 201540. In early October 
                                                 
33 Federal Reserve 2008 Monetary Policy Releases. 
34 Censky, Annalyn (3 November 2010). "QE2: Fed pulls the trigger". CNNmoney.com. Retrieved 10 August 
2011. 
35 Appelbaum, Binyamin (29 October 2014). "Federal Reserve Caps Its Bond Purchases; Focus Turns to Interest 
Rates". The New York Times. 
36 Zumbrun, Joshua (13 September 2012). "Fed Undertakes QE3 With $40 Billion MBS Purchases Per Month". 
Bloomberg News. Retrieved 13 September 2012 
37 Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement". Federal Reserve Board. 12 January 2012. Retrieved 1 January 2013. 
38 Quantitative Easing explained (PDF). Bank of England. pp. 7–9. ISBN 1-85730-114-5. Retrieved 20 July 
2010. 
39 Bean, Charles (July 2009). "Ask the Deputy Governor". Bank of England. Retrieved 12 July 2010. 
40 ECB: ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme". europa.eu. 
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2010, the Bank of Japan announced a purchase of $60 billion in assets in an attempt to push 
down the value of the yen against the US dollar to stimulate the domestic economy by 
making Japanese exports cheaper41. An expanded asset purchase programme of 60 to 70 
trillion yen a year was announced in April 201342, aiming to bring Japan out of deflation and 
targeting an inflation rate of 2%. 
The large amount of money supply in different currencies following these QE programmes 
may break down the previous co-movements between asset classes. For instance, FX 
Concepts, once the world’s biggest currency hedge fund collapsed in the autumn of 201343, 
thus rendering many ‘systematic’ currency hedge funds ineffective and causing a reduction in 
liquidity commonality. The increased money supply induced by the strong economic 
environment contributed to the quick decline of commonality in 2003 and 2005. After the 
bear equity market and massive corporate scandals and fears of deflation in 2002, the world's 
equity markets44 rebounded in 2003, for example, the 42.6% increase in the U.S. NASDAQ, 
32.1% increase in Germany's DAX and 15.5% increase in Japan's Nikkei, and this was 
accompanied by economic growth and additional money supply. In the early half of 2005, 
benign interest rates and a low-inflation environment around the world45 contributed to strong 
economic strength and resilience compared to 2004. Similar to the impact of QE, an 
additional money supply in different currencies may break down the previous correlations 
between asset classes and render many ‘systematic’ currency hedge funds ineffective, thus 
causing a reduction in liquidity commonality.  
Another instrumental factor since the early 2000s has been the growing importance of FX as 
an asset class by central banks and institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance 
companies and mutual funds (Galati and Melvin, 2004). Although the effect of constantly 
increasing trading volume was suppressed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the high average 
daily turnover (e.g. $4 trillion in April 2010, which was 20% higher than in 2007 and double 
that of 2004) still contributed to the major decline in liquidity commonality from February 
2009 to February 2010. 
                                                 
41 Quantitative Easing – A lesson learned from Japan. Oye Times. 
42 https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/qqe.htm/ 
43 Strauss, D. “Forex trading shrinks sharply in dismal end to 2013”. Financial Times. 7 January 2014.   
44 http://www.sonic.net/~schuelke/EconomicEvents2003.html 
45 https://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-growth-Year-In-Review-2005 
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In the following section, various market conditions and their impact on liquidity commonality 
are empirically examined. 
4.4 Effects of capital market conditions on liquidity commonality  
Many studies have documented the instrumental factors underlying liquidity commonality. 
The overall capital market conditions, characterised by the market return and volatility, have 
been shown to impact on commonality through various channels, such as by affecting the 
funding liquidity of financial intermediaries (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) or the degree 
of correlated trading by institutional investors (Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2012). Recent studies 
have revealed an interesting phenomenon, which is that liquidity commonality seems to be 
higher during the periods of large market declines and high market volatility as compared to 
positive market movements and low market volatility (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Gromb and 
Vayanos, 2002; Morris and Shin, 2004, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed, Kang, 
and Viswanathan, 2010; Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2012). The focus of these studies is the equity 
market. They explain this asymmetric reaction as arising from the coincidence of binding 
funding constraints and the loss in collateral values that force financial intermediaries to 
reduce the supply of liquidity for many assets concurrently. In comparison, few studies have 
focused on liquidity commonality in the FX market and no significant evidence in support of 
these asymmetric reactions in the FX market has been documented. This section empirically 
examines whether liquidity commonality of the FX market exhibits a similar asymmetric 
reaction to capital market conditions. 
Model (I) investigates the general impact of the market return and volatility of the FX market 
on currency liquidity commonality46 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                      (4. 19) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market return; and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market volatility calculated as the standard 
deviation of market return in month 𝑡𝑡. The results are reported in table 4.4.  
  
                                                 
46 𝑅𝑅2 lies in the interval [0,1], when investigating liquidity commonality, the 𝑅𝑅2 time-series is not suitable to use 
as dependent variable, the logistic transformation of the 𝑅𝑅2 measures, ln [𝑅𝑅2/(1 − 𝑅𝑅2)] is often taken (Morck et 
al, 2000, and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2012). In comparison, 𝛽𝛽 range between negative infinity and positive 
infinity, so does Beta-Index which can enter the regression directly.  
68 
 
Table 4.4 Asymmetric reaction of liquidity commonality to market indicators 
Parameters  
 
Model (I) 
 
Model (II) 
 
Model (III) 
 
Model (IV) 
𝛼𝛼  0.566  0.600  0.600  0.606 
  (8.007a)  (8.307a)  (5.765a)  (5.862a) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚  -34.763    -34.887   
  (-1.474)    (-1.462)   
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒     49.769    50.697 
    (1.103)    (1.095) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙     -59.614    -58.499 
    (-1.627)    (-1.579) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒     -86.416    -86.594 
    (-1.865c)    (-1.849c) 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚   43.437  31.820     
  (3.133a)  (2.129b)     
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷       -10.535  -9.957 
      (-0.076)  (-0.072) 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒       35.729  30.849 
      (1.560)  (1.348) 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ       41.935  30.683 
      (2.913a)  (1.987b) 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2  0.048  0.063  0.038  0.053 
Note: This table reports results of the time-series regressions of FX liquidity commonality 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  on 
various market-level time-series variables as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  denotes different level of market return and volatilities. In specific, large market decline 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 
is defined as negative market returns that are more than 1.5 standard deviation below the unconditional mean of 
market return, and zero otherwise; large market increase 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒  is defined as positive market returns that are 
more than 1.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean of market return, and zero otherwise; and small 
market returns 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is defined as market returns that are within 1.5 standard deviation of the unconditional 
mean of market return. High-level market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ  is defined as market volatilities that are more than 
1.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean market volatility, and zero otherwise; middle-level market 
volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒  is defined as market volatilities that are within 1.5 standard deviation of the unconditional 
mean of market volatility; low-level market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷  is defined as market volatilities that are more than 
1.5 standard deviation below the unconditional mean market volatility, and zero otherwise. Estimated 
parameters and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) 
level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively.  
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The second column in table 4.4 presents the coefficients of model (I). The coefficient of the 
market volatility is 43.437, significantly different from zero at 1% significance level, 
indicating a positive relationship with commonality. This is consistent with the standard 
inventory models, which suggest that an increase in volatility lowers liquidities in general as 
soon as market makers hold undesired inventories (Stoll, 1978). On the other hand, the 
coefficient on the market return is not significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% or 10% 
significance level, indicating that the market return has no impact on liquidity commonality.  
In line with the studies of Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk 
(2012), whether liquidity commonality arises specifically during large market downturns, as 
opposed to the periods of small or large positive market movements, is examined in model 
(II). Large market decline 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 is defined as negative market returns that are more 
than 1.5 standard deviation below the unconditional mean of the market return and zero 
otherwise; large market increase 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 is defined as positive market returns that are more 
than 1.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean of the market return and zero 
otherwise; and small market returns 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 are defined as market returns that are within 1.5 
standard deviation of the unconditional mean of the market return. Liquidity commonality is 
regressed on the three levels of market return. FX market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is also included as 
a control variable as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .     (4. 20) 
Despite the insignificant result of the overall market returns in model (I), large market decline 
has a coefficient significantly different from zero (-86.416) at 10% significance level. A 
decline in negative market return 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 indicates that the market return has declined 
even further. Such a large decline will induce a significant increase in commonality 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡. On the other hand, large market increase 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 and small market return 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  have insignificant coefficients. The great proportion of total return that these two 
components account for may help to explain why the overall market return does not show a 
significant relationship with commonality. 
Model (III) examines whether liquidity commonality responds differently to various levels of 
market volatility. High-level market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ is defined as market volatilities that 
are more than 1.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean market volatility and zero 
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otherwise; middle-level market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 is defined as market volatilities that are 
within 1.5 standard deviation of the unconditional mean of market volatility; low-level 
market volatility 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷  is defined as market volatilities that are more than 1.5 standard 
deviation below the unconditional mean market volatility and zero otherwise. Liquidity 
commonality is then regressed on these three levels of market volatility. Market return is also 
included as a control variable as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .          (4. 21) 
The results in table 4.4 show that only high market volatility has a significant relationship 
with commonality (41.935) at the 1% significance level. The results indicate that liquidity 
commonality arises specifically during high market volatility as opposed to the periods of 
lower market volatility.  
Model (IV) includes different levels of the market return and market volatility as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 
                                +𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷  + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .                           (4. 22) 
Similar results are obtained as those from model (II) and model (III). Large market decline 
and high volatility are found to induce increase in liquidity commonality. These results help 
to explain the spikes in 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 at the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. The 
large market decline and high market volatility that occurred during the financial crisis had a 
negative impact upon the wealth and collateral of traders and financial intermediaries, leading 
to an increase in liquidity commonality (Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan, 2010).  
4.5 Effects of semi-variance on liquidity commonality 
The commonly used measure for volatility is the standard deviation of return. It treats both 
large upward and downward market return movements as a great uncertainty and interprets 
both as an undesirable risk. It assumes that investors are equally anxious to eliminate both 
extremes of the return distribution (Markowitz, 1959). However, in reality, investors have 
very different concerns about the downside losses versus the upside gains (Ang, Chen and 
Xing, 2006). They are often more concerned about minimising possible losses and make 
decisions based on the primary criterion of reducing losses below-target mean returns 
(Markowitz, 1959). For instance, stock returns have been found to reflect a downside risk 
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premium. Agents with downside risk demand additional compensation for holding stocks 
with high sensitivities to downside market movements (Ang Chen and Xing, 2006).  
The concept of semi-variance has been introduced and applied to distinguish the downward 
extremes of return distributions from the upside gains. The left-hand tail 47 of the return 
distribution represents the downside risk. We follow Markowitz (1952), Harlow (1991) and 
Nawrocki (1999) and measure semi-variance for the downside risk as the returns below the 
mean return as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�[𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥(0, (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑))]2𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 ,                                                                                                 (4. 23) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 is the FX market return (mean currency returns) in day 𝑑𝑑 during month 𝑡𝑡; 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is the 
total number of days in month 𝑡𝑡; 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 is the expected mean return of the FX market in month 𝑡𝑡; 
and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥 indicates that the formula will square the greater value between 0 and (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑). In 
the spirit of downside risk, we also calculate the upside risk as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 = 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�[𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥(0, (𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡))]2𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                                                                                                      (4. 24) 
In model (V), 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  is regressed on both the downside risk and upside risk to 
examine the hypothesis that liquidity commonality arises specifically in response to downside 
risk as opposed to upside risk in model (5) as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .                                                          (4. 25) 
The overall market return is included as control variables. The results of model (V) in table 
4.5 show that only downside risk has a significant relationship with liquidity commonality, 
whereas upside risk has no impact on commonality.  
In model (VI), the three levels of market return instead of the overall market return are 
included as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 +𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽53𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .                          (4. 26) 
Similar results are found for downside semi-variance. Interestingly, the strong negative 
relationship between large market downturn and commonality demonstrated in model (II) and 
                                                 
47 The probability of under-achieving a threshold return. 
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model (IV) disappears after semi-variances are taken into account. This is because the 
downside semi-variance has a sense of direction marking the left-tail of return distribution, 
which overlaps with market downturn. Liquidity commonality significantly responds to 
downward market movement in the form of downward semi-variance rather than the 
downside return. These results indicate that the impact on liquidity commonality cast by large 
market decline is merely a reflection of that cast by the downside risk. 
In model (VII) and (VIII), semi-variance is further defined at different levels to examine their 
potentially different impact on liquidity commonality. Specifically, high-level downside 
(upside) semi-variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ  ( 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ ) is defined as downside (upside) semi-
variance that is more than 1.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean downside 
(upside) semi-variance and zero otherwise; middle-level market downside (upside) semi-
variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒) is defined as downside (upside) semi-variance that is 
within 1.5 standard deviation of the unconditional mean of downside (upside)  semi-variance 
and zero otherwise; low-level downside (upside) semi-variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷  (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 ) is 
defined as downside (upside) semi-variance that is more than 1.5 standard deviation below 
the unconditional mean downside (upside) semi-variance and zero otherwise. In model (VII) 
and model (VIII), liquidity commonality is then regressed on these three levels of downside 
and upside semi-variances Eq. (4.27) and Eq. (4.28), respectively, as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 
                                +𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ  + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .                 (4. 27) 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 
                                +𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 
                                +𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ  + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 .                                            (4. 28) 
The results in table 4.5 indicate that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is only affected by high-level downside 
semi-variance. These results indicate that liquidity commonality increases during periods of 
high downturn risk, whereas the other scenarios, i.e. the other levels of downside risk and 
upside semi-variance, will not induce movement in liquidity commonality. An increase in 
liquidity commonality is induced by a high degree of synchronisation among currency 
liquidities, and the response from liquidity commonality to only high downside risk reflects 
the reluctance to tolerate the downside risk of investors underlying their asset allocation 
process. This finding is consistent with that of Tee (2009).  
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Table 4.5 Asymmetric reaction of liquidity commonality to semi-variances 
Parameters   Model (V)  Model (VI)  Model (VII)  Model (VIII) 
Intercept  0.605  0.625  0.640  0.630 
  (8.233a)  (8.415a)  (5.920a)  (5.820a) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚  -28.784    -33.370   
  (-1.215)    (-1.375)   
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒     43.252    29.159 
    (0.955)    (0.601) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙     -54.452    -50.158 
    (-1.482)    (-1.337) 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒     -71.116    -71.199 
    (-1.495)    (-1.483) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  113.495  88.504     
  (2.443b)  (1.821c)     
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝  -62.906  -49.437     
  (-1.184)  (-0.924)     
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙       103.691  111.455 
      (0.319)  (0.342) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙       -55.853  -44.669 
      (-0.276)  (-0.220) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒       57.132  51.849 
      (0.972)  (0.875) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒       -19.009  -14.010 
      (-0.319)  (-0.234) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒       114.075  95.895 
      (2.359b)  (1.917c) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒      -62.209  -54.319 
      (-1.128)  (-0.981) 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2  0.060  0.068  0.056  0.057 
Note: This table reports results of the time-series regressions of FX liquidity commonality 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  on 
various market-level time-series variables as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  denotes different level of market return and semi-variance. In specific, high-level downside (upside) 
semi-variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ) is defined as downside (upside) semi-variance that are more than 1.5 
standard deviation above the unconditional mean downside (upside) semi-variance, and zero otherwise; middle-
level market downside (upside) semi-variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒  (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 ) is defined as downside (upside) 
semi-variance that are within 1.5 standard deviation of the unconditional mean of downside (upside) semi-
variance, and zero otherwise; low-level downside (upside) semi-variance 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) is defined as 
downside (upside) semi-variance that are more than 1.5 standard deviation below the unconditional mean 
downside (upside) semi-variance, and zero otherwise. Estimated parameters and t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
reported. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively.   
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4.6 Conclusions  
In this chapter, a new measure for liquidity commonality, Beta Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, was developed. It 
was constructed from the time-varying market betas which characterise the exposure of 
currency liquidities to market liquidity movements. As an alternative of the commonly used 
adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 was able to capture the time-variation of commonality without the constraint 
of data frequency. It allowed for clear indications of high liquidity commonality, which has 
important implications for hedging strategies and diversification opportunities. The monthly 
liquidity commonality in the FX market was measured with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 and examined to see how it 
evolved over time.  
Significant increases in liquidity commonality were found during the periods of financial 
turmoil and crisis. In particular, liquidity commonality in the FX market increased during 
periods of high downside risks but did not react to lower market downside risk, upside risk 
and market return movements. This might be because large market declines and high 
downside risks induce binding funding constraints, which in turn force investors to liquidate 
their positions simultaneously (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). The consequent high 
degree of synchronisation among currency liquidities would lead to higher liquidity 
commonality. When spreads were already high (especially the case before 2004), the impact 
of large downside risk was amplified due to the ‘spread spiral’ and ‘loss spiral’, which would 
further tighten the funding constraints of investors (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). For 
instance, as underscored by the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when the market liquidity 
condition deteriorations occurred, many investors exited the market at the same time, which 
caused more liquidation that further reduced market liquidity through so-called liquidity 
spirals. These results suggested that liquidity commonality responds asymmetrically to 
different levels and directions of market uncertainties. The findings also revealed significant 
declines in liquidity commonality during the periods of high trading volume due to the 
increasing popularity of high-frequency trading, increasing use of the FX as an asset class 
and a few episodes of quantitative easing. 
 
75 
 
 
Chapter 5  
Hedge Fund Performance: Liquidity-Timing Skill 
One source of the superior performance of hedge fund managers is their market timing skill 
(Jensen, 1968, 1972; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986). Successful managers 
are anticipated to employ dynamic strategies and have the skills to time market conditions 
and adapt their funds’ market exposure from time to time (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001; Cao, 
Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013; Patton and Ramadorai, 2013). Hedge funds often invest in assets 
with low liquidity or these are treated as an illiquid investment due to the restrictions imposed 
on investor redemptions (Aragon, 2007). In addition, hedge funds often employ strategies 
that involve global trading and making use of derivatives and leverages across a wide variety 
of markets. Therefore, it is expected that hedge funds will be exposed to FX liquidity risk 
(Sadka, 2010; Kessler and Scherer, 2011). In this chapter, the FX liquidity-timing skill of 
managers is investigated. 
The attitude of market timers to risk has been shown to affect their funds’ market exposure 
and management (Admati, Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1986). The risk aversion theory of 
liquidity preference proven by Tobin (1958) and Hawawini (1983) further justifies the 
examination of timing skill from the perspective of liquidity. Recent studies in the literature 
suggest time-variation in the market timing skill of hedge fund managers. For instance, Cao, 
Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) and Li, Luo and Tee (2016) find different strengths of timing skill 
using sample periods before, including and after the financial crisis. This chapter further 
investigates the structural breaks in the FX liquidity-timing skill of hedge fund managers. 
5.1 FX liquidity timing model  
Market timing models describe dynamic asset allocations based on managers’ forecasted 
future market conditions. Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) define equity market exposure as a 
linear function of managers’ forecasted equity market liquidity in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1 as follows: 
76 
 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡+1),                                                                                  (5. 1) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the equity liquidity level at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚  is the average equity liquidity 
level; and 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡+1 is the forecast noise at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1. They specify their equity-liquidity-timing 
model as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                (5. 2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the excess return for fund 𝑖𝑖 in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1  is the excess return of 
equity market return in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽𝐽) are all factors except for the equity 
market factor; 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1  is the FX liquidity level at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 ; and 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚  is the average FX 
liquidity. In this chapter, the liquidity-timing model of Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) is 
modified to investigate whether hedge fund managers have FX-liquidity-timing skill. In 
particular, hedge fund managers are assumed to be able to adjust their funds’ exposure to the 
FX market based on their forecasted future FX liquidity conditions. A FX market factor, 
denoted by 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, is included in the model. It is constructed as the FX factor of Boyson, 
Stahel and Stulz (2010) multiplied by (-1)48. Two aspects of liquidity shown to be important 
in applications are investigated, i.e. aggregate market-wide liquidity and liquidity 
commonality (the systematic component of market-wide liquidity).  
In model (I), the market-wide FX liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is examined. It is assumed that the fund’s 
FX market exposure is adapted based on the manager’s forecast about the market-wide FX 
liquidity in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1                      +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) ,                                           (5. 3) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is calculated as the equally weighted average of the minus proportional quoted 
spreads for the eleven currencies49; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) are the risk factors that benchmark 
the hedge fund returns, including the MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of 
Fung and Hsieh (2004), ∆Term and ∆Credit of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh 
                                                 
48 The FX factor of Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) is proxied by the change in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index. It is expected to have negative relationships with hedge fund returns. Li, Luo and Tee 
(2016) add a minus sign to it so that its coefficient can be positive and the sign of timing coefficients can be 
interpreted without any interference from the sign of the FX factor. In the same spirit, the ‘negative monthly 
change’ in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index is applied as the FX market factor in this thesis.  
49 Spreads measure illiquidity. In this chapter, a minus sign is added to spreads of currencies so that a higher 
magnitude of average minus spreads indicates better liquidity condition.  
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(2001); and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 measures market-wide-liquidity-timing skill and is expected to be positive. 
It indicates that hedge fund managers have the skill to increase (decrease) their fund’s FX 
market exposure prior to the rise (fall) of the market-wide FX liquidity level. 
In model (II), commonality in FX liquidities is examined. It is assumed that the fund’s FX 
market exposure is adapted based on the manager’s forecast about FX liquidity commonality 
in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚����������������� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) ,                         (5. 4) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 measures commonality, the systematic component of market liquidity; 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚���������������� is the mean of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 measures liquidity-commonality-timing 
skill. A high 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 indicates strong co-movement among currencies liquidities and is 
interpreted as poor market liquidity condition.  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 is expected to be negative. It indicates 
that hedge fund managers have the skill to decrease (increase) their fund’s FX market 
exposure prior to the rise (fall) of FX liquidity commonality.  
In order to capture the structural breaks in liquidity-timing skill, in model (I) and (II), 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is 
assumed to switch according to a first-order Markov process and can be characterised by a 
two-state discrete-valued Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1})  as follows: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                             (5. 5) 
The stochastic process on 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  can be summarised by the following transition probability 
matrix:  
𝑃𝑃 = �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]� = �𝑝𝑝00 𝐿𝐿10𝑝𝑝01 𝐿𝐿11� .                                (5. 6) 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 𝜆𝜆0 is less than 𝜆𝜆1. A test of two distinct timing 
coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is test of the statistical significance of the difference between 𝜆𝜆1  and 𝜆𝜆0  
which is denoted by ∆𝜆𝜆 as follows: 
∆𝜆𝜆 = 𝜆𝜆1 − 𝜆𝜆0 .                                                                                                                     (5. 7) 
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Let 𝛌𝛌 be an (2 × 1) vector of the ML estimates of the timing coefficients [?̂?𝜆1,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ?̂?𝜆0,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿]T, Cov(𝛌𝛌�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) be the covariance matrix of 𝛌𝛌, Cov(∆?̂?𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) be the covariance matrix of ∆𝜆𝜆 and 𝑔𝑔(. ) 
be the transformation of 𝛌𝛌 into ∆𝜆𝜆. Then the ML estimate of ∆𝜆𝜆 is obtained as follows: 
∆?̂?𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 = ?̂?𝜆1,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − ?̂?𝜆0,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ,                                                                                                       (5. 8) 
Cov�∆?̂?𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿� = �𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔�𝛌𝛌�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝛌𝛌 �Cov�𝛌𝛌�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿� �𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔�𝛌𝛌�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�𝜕𝜕𝛌𝛌 �𝑇𝑇 = [1 −1]Cov�𝛌𝛌�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�[ 1−1] .             (5. 9) 
The t-statistic is applied to statistically test the significance of ∆𝜆𝜆 . If ∆𝜆𝜆  is significantly 
different from zero, then the hypothesis that the timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  are the same in the 
two states ( 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆0 ) can be rejected. Tests for the existence of two distinct timing 
coefficients gauge whether structural breaks exist for the timing skill. The inferred 
probabilities of the states are presented to verify that structural breaks are captured. In this 
thesis, a ‘timing’ state is characterised by a timing coefficient 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  that is significantly 
different from zero, whereas a ‘non-timing’ state is characterised by a timing coefficient 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  
that is not significantly different from zero.  
Model (III) is constructed to test the hypothesis that the managers jointly time FX market-
wide liquidity and liquidity commonality as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1+ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚����������������� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) ,                                                            (5. 10) 
where inference of states 0 and 1 is based on the assumption that 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 
simultaneously switch between states according to the same economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}). 
In the following sections, the FWCI, which represents the average of all single-manager 
funds that report to the HFR Database, and the six broad categories are investigated. The sub-
categories of the broad strategies with significant results are then further examined, i.e. the 
FOFs, which invests with multiple managers through funds or managed accounts and has 
close relationships with the FX market, the EMI, which is selected according to their regional 
investment focus in specific geographic areas, and the EDI, which often requires high 
turnover and is sensitive to liquidity. 
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5.2 FWCI and the broad strategies  
5.2.1 Empirical results  
HFRI Indices are designed to capture the breadth of hedge fund industry performance across 
all strategies and regions. All single-manager HFRI Index constituents are included in the 
FWCI, which accounts for over 2000 funds listed on the internal HFR Database. The results 
of models (I), (II) and (III) of the FWCI are reported in table 5.1. A significant positive beta 
coefficient is found on the equity market factor MKT-RF at 1% significance level in the three 
models, indicating significant positive exposure to systematic equity market risk. Another 
important risk factor is the FX market factor 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1. A negative shock in 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 indicates 
that there is an increase in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index50. Significantly 
positive beta coefficients at 1% significance level are found in three models, indicating 
significant exposure to risk arising from the FX market. 
Column 2 and column 3 in table 5.1 report the results of model (I). The t-statistic for ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 
rejects the hypothesis that it is zero and indicates that there is a significant difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 at 1% significance level. The timing coefficients (𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) appear 
to differ significantly from each other across both regimes. The results verify that the timing 
coefficient is subjected to switches and that there are significant structural breaks in the 
managers’ timing skill. In particular, the point estimate of the market-wide-liquidity-timing 
coefficient of the FWCI in state 1, 𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is statistically significantly positive at the 1% level 
(1.09), soundly rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. State 0 represents a phase 
of significant state-dependent timing coefficient and therefore is categorised as the ‘timing’ 
state, in which hedge fund managers on average have the skill to reduce their funds’ FX 
market exposure prior to market-wide liquidity deteriorations. On the other hand, the 
coefficient in state 0, 𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞is not significantly different from zero, and state 0 represents a 
phase of an insignificant state-dependent timing coefficient and therefore is categorised as 
‘non-timing’, a phase in which hedge funds managers on average do not time FX market-
wide liquidity.  
                                                 
50 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 represents the negative monthly change and is calculated as the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange 
rate index at time 𝑡𝑡 subtracts the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
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Column 4 and column 5 in table 5.1 report the results of Model (II). At 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, both liquidity-commonality-timing coefficients  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  are not 
significantly different from 0. The t statistic for the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 (0.00) 
cannot reject the hypothesis that it is different from zero and further verifies that the two 
timing coefficients are insignificantly different from each other. Model (III) jointly times 
market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality and shows consistent results, just as model 
(I) and model (II) do. These results show that the managers on average do not time liquidity 
commonality or adapt their funds’ FX exposure based on the forecasted commonality 
condition. The results are robust to the FWCI denominated in the CHF, EUR, GBP and JPY 
(see the details reported in Appendix H). 
The commonly used rule is adopted to determine that regime 1 (‘timing’ state) was in force at 
the time t if 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡] ≥ 0.5 (in this case, the regime indicator is set to equal one), while 
regime 0 (‘non-timing’ state) was in force at the time t if 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡] < 0.5 (in this case, 
the regime indicator is set to equal zero). In this context, a greater estimate of the 𝑃𝑃00 than 
that of 𝑃𝑃11  is found. This finding can be interpreted intuitively in terms of the expected 
durations of both regimes in our Markov-switching framework, which are given by 1/(1 −
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) for 𝑗𝑗=0,1. Since 𝑃𝑃00 > 𝑃𝑃11 implies 1/(1 − 𝑃𝑃00) > 1/(1 − 𝑃𝑃11), the ‘non-timing’ regime 
on average is more persistent than the ‘timing’ regime (regime 1).  
 
Figure 5.1 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the FWCI 
Figure 5.1 depicts the time path of a regime indicator of the smoothed probabilities51 of the 
‘timing’ state of model (I). It reveals more details about the switches of FX market-wide-
                                                 
51 Considering that smoothing (𝜷𝜷𝒕𝒕|𝑻𝑻) provides a more accurate inference on 𝜷𝜷𝒕𝒕 since it uses more information 
than the basic filter, the smoothed probabilities are reported in this thesis.  
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liquidity-timing skill. It shows that hedge fund managers on average stayed in the ‘non-
timing’ state for most of the sample period. However, they jumped to the ‘timing’ state when 
the liquidity crisis occurred. There were several liquidity crises as the shock waves of the 
shocking events that occurred during the recent financial crisis. The most notable was the 
Quant liquidity crisis of summer 2007, which marked the beginning of a volatile period in 
market liquidity, which reached a peak in September 2008 with a negative liquidity shock. 
These liquidity crises correspond with the beginning of the financial crisis in summer 2007, 
Bear Stearns’ eminent demise in March 2008 and the peak of the financial crisis, i.e. Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008 and the consequent freefall of the global economy 
(Melvin and Taylor, 2009; Sadka, 2010; Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). This time-varying 
timing skill of all hedge funds that tends to switch between the ‘timing’ state under severe 
market conditions and the ‘non-timing’ state in good market conditions is consistent with 
Chen and Liang (2007), who find that hedge fund managers at aggregate level have market 
timing skill, especially in bear and volatile market conditions.  
The findings also shed some light on the inconclusive results on the hedge fund managers’ 
market timing skill. The majority of the studies that have found that hedge fund managers 
have insignificant market timing skill seem to have chosen a sample period under good 
market conditions when timing skill remains in the non-existent (insignificant) state. For 
instance, Fung, Xu and Yau (2002) conclude that managers of 115 global equity-based hedge 
funds with target geographical markets did not show market timing skill during the period 
between 1994 and 2000; French and Ko (2007) find limited evidence of the market-timing 
skill of managers of 157 long-short equity hedge funds after accounting for the illiquidity 
effect from 1996 to 2005; and Park (2010) finds that hedge fund managers did not time the 
market between 1994 and 2008 after dividing hedge funds’ excess returns into factor timing, 
asset selection and risk premium. In contrast, when the period with the severe market 
conditions is included in the sample period, existing (significant) timing skill is more likely to 
show up. For instance, Cao et al. (2013) find that equity-oriented hedge fund managers have 
the skill to time equity market liquidity by adjusting hedge funds’ portfolios based on the 
changes in equity market liquidity during the sample period between 1994 and 2009. 
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Table 5.1 Estimates of the liquidity timing models for the FWCI, FOFs, EDI and MI 
  Model (I) Timing Market Liquidity  
Model (II) 
Timing Liquidity Commonality  
Model (III) 
Timing Both 
Parameter
s  FWCI FOFs EDI MI  FWCI FOFs EDI MI  FWCI FOFs EDI MI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06       0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.37 
  (0.12) (-1.24) (-0.57) (-0.66)       (1.02) (-0.26) (-0.73) (-1.71
c) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   1.09 1.20 1.24 0.39       3.54 4.81 1.45 0.18 
  (4.32a) (5.58a) (5.78a) (2.71a)       (4.67
a) (5.45a) (7.65a) (2.52b) 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.14  1.12 0.25 1.01 -0.06 
       (0.10) (-0.05) (-0.01) (-1.36)  (1.42) (0.27) (4.36a) (-0.70) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.27  0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.22 
       (0.36) (0.67) (-0.01) (2.44
b)  (0.78) (0.37) (-0.80) (1.62) 
𝜎𝜎  0.76 0.84) 0.75 1.13  0.82 0.88 0.86 1.13  0.76 0.86 0.71 1.11 
  (17.76a) (17.75a) (17.53a) (18.81a)  (18.91a) (17.17a) (18.95a) (18.62a)  (17.84a) (18.30a) (17.06a) (18.88a) 
𝛼𝛼  0.35 0.09 0.63 0.63  0.38 0.09 0.49 0.70  0.39 0.10 0.62 0.68 
  (2.24b) (0.54) (3.98a) (2.72a)  (2.29b) (0.49) (2.83a) (3.03a)  (2.50b) (0.55) (4.08a) (3.00a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.293 0.20 0.25 0.13  0.27 0.16 0.25 0.11  0.26 0.16 0.24 0.11 
  (15.96a) (9.67a) (13.01a) (4.70a)  (14.53) (7.73a) (12.77a) (4.20a)  (14.94a) (7.96a) (12.52a) (4.37a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.082 0.05 0.12 0.02  0.07 0.04 0.10 0.02  0.07 0.04 0.12 0.02 
  (3.09a) (1.79c) (4.48a) (0.54)  (2.58a) (1.23) (3.48a) (0.43)  (2.81a) (1.25) (4.56a) (0.63) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02  -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01  -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (0.18) (-0.39) (-0.64) (2.25b)  (-0.21) (-1.10) (-1.30) (2.04b)  (-0.26) (-1.15) (-0.84) (2.18b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (1.82c) (1.65c) (0.02) (3.98a)  (1.07) (1.40) (0.15) (4.46a)  (1.49) (1.40) (-0.10) (4.22a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
  (0.68) (0.54) (-0.90) (3.06a)  (-0.03) (0.27) (-1.48) (2.83a)  (0.21) (0.35) (-1.00) (3.06a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
  (-1.33) (-0.33) (-2.34b) (-1.69c)  (-1.34) (-0.07) (-1.63) (-1.75c)  (-1.41) (-0.09) (-2.50b) (-1.91c) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   0.25 0.20 0.32 0.28  0.26 0.19 0.30 0.26  0.23 0.18 0.31 0.34 
  (4.88a) (3.46a) (6.15a) (3.61a)  (4.82a) (3.33a) (5.37a) (3.15a)  (4.49a) (3.22a) (6.19a) (3.81a) 
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𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.31 -0.51 -0.44 -0.76  -0.10 -0.26 -0.17 -0.12  -0.20 -0.26 -0.50 -0.25 
  (-0.86) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.42)  (-0.29) (-0.72) (-0.48) (-0.26)  (-0.62) (-0.73) (-1.62) (-0.53) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   -0.65 -0.84 -1.32 -0.25  -0.69 -1.02 -1.25 0.42  -0.90 -1.01 -1.30 0.24 
  (-1.82c) (-2.30b) (-3.73a) (-0.44)  (-2.02b) (-2.82a) (-3.50a) (0.87)  (-2.65a) (-2.74a) (-3.84a) (0.49) 
𝑃𝑃00  0.95 0.95 0.89 0.99  0.96 1.00 0.85 0.99  0.98 0.98 0.88 0.99 
  (25.59a) (25.70a) (14.08a) (60.13a)  (0.03) (28.82a) (0.01) (69.21a)  (46.84a) (64.64a) (15.21a) (84.97a) 
𝑃𝑃11  0.47 0.57 0.18 0.95  0.78 0.51 0.86 0.99  0.00 0.00 0.18 0.99 
  (2.08b) (2.62a) (1.05) (15.78a)  (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (68.60a)  (0.00) (0.00) (1.03) (136.59a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)  (4.23a) (5.72a) (5.77a) (2.67a)       (4.60a) (5.46a) (7.61a) (2.42b) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀)       (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (2.72a)  (-1.37) (-0.25) (-4.43a) (1.75c) ln 𝐿𝐿  -216.19 -237.43 -219.62 -280.61  -220.10 -242.90 -229.27 -281.28  -214.73 -234.80 -216.33 -277.27 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2   0.36 0.22 0.38 0.12  0.34 0.20 0.34 0.10  0.34 0.23 0.37 0.13 
Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics for the FWCI, FOFs, EDI and MI. Each fund in the sample has at least 174 
monthly returns. In model (I) and model (II), the liquidity-timing model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and 
Hsieh (2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the liquidity level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is the average liquidity level. In model (I), the FX market liquidity 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market-wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , whereas in 
model (II), it is the liquidity commonality measured with monthly Beta-Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is characterized by the two distinct phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} and measures the 
state-dependent timing skill as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . 
In model (III), the timing skill of both market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality are estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
The coefficients, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 measures the market-wide-liquidity-timing skill, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  measures the liquidity-commonality-timing skill, both are assumed to simultaneously switch 
between states 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡. The transition probability matrix of the two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of 
∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 . 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 . 
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5.2.2 How do the managers reduce losses by displaying liquidity-timing skill  
This section explains how managers reduce losses from the FX market under severe FX 
liquidity conditions by displaying FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. An analysis based 
on the deduction process conducted by Jensen (1968) is provided.  
A multi-period CAPM derived independently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Treynor 
(1961) has the following form:  
𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1� = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1� ,                                                               (5. 11) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is any portfolio 𝑖𝑖’s return; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the market portfolio’s realised return; 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the 
risk free rate; and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 measures the systematic risk. The market model is given by: 
𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                              (5. 12) 
𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 ≅ 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                                           (5. 13) 
where 𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is any portfolio 𝑖𝑖’s realised return; 𝑅𝑅�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the market portfolio’s realised return; ?̃?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
is a random error term; 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖  approximately equals the risk measure 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ; and 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡  is an 
unobservable ‘market factor’ which influences all securities’ return to some extent. Jensen 
(1968) assumes 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  is the ‘target’ risk level the portfolio manager wishes to maintain on 
average through time by constraining 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑡𝑡 as a normally distributed random variable with zero 
expectation as follows: 
𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ,                                                                                                          (5. 14) 
where 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the vehicle through which the managers attempt to capitalise on any expectations 
they may have regarding the behaviour of the market factor. If managers correctly perceive 
that there is a high probability that 𝜋𝜋 will be negative in the next period (𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 < 0), they are 
able to reduce the losses on the portfolio by making 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 negative, consequently reducing 
the risk level. There are many ways to achieve this. For instance, the manager can change the 
distribution of the assets of the portfolio and switch from more risky to less risky equities, 
such as moving resources out of equities and into bonds.  
Analogical to Jensen’s (1968) ‘target’ risk, in the proposed market-wide-liquidity-timing 
model in Eq. (5.3), 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡 is treated as the ‘negative monthly change’ in the trade-weighted U.S. 
dollar exchange rate index: 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 , which has a positive relationship with hedge 
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fund returns. In this case, 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is assumed to be a function of the manager’s forecast about 
FX market-wide liquidity as follows: 
𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚�,                                                                                              (5. 15) 
and 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is defined as: 
𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚�.                                                               (5. 16) 
The corresponding values of risk level components are illustrated in table 5.2. If the managers 
correctly perceive that the market-wide liquidity condition will worsen and experience a 
decrease, in other words, 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1  will be negative, then a savvy reaction is to reduce the 
according risk level 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 on this FX market factor in order to reduce the losses caused by the 
FX market on their funds (𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is negative).  
Table 5.2 Forecasted movements in the FX market and the according risk level 
Variable Value Value 
Trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index 
Forecast to decrease Forecast to increase 
FX market factor 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 Positive Negative 
State 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 Non-timing Timing 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  0 ?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 0 ?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚) < 0 
Risk level 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + ?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚) < 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 
However, unlike Jensen’s (1968) normally distributed random variable 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 in which any 
change of assets distribution will work as long as the risk level is reduced, in the market-
wide-liquidity-timing model, the managers are generally expected to have the skill to decide 
especially on the reduction in 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, and consequently adapt their funds’ FX exposure based 
on the forecasted FX liquidity condition. When the FX market-wide liquidity is in the severe 
conditions �𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 < 0� , the managers will jump to the ‘timing’ state, where they 
make 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� < 0  and reduce their funds’ FX exposure in order to 
avoid more loss. On the other hand, results show that when the FX market-wide liquidity is in 
good condition, liquidity should not be a major concern of investors given that the FX market 
has the largest trading volume in the world. Therefore, the managers tend not to alter their 
funds’ FX exposure or increase their risk level 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  on 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 . They stay in the ‘non-
timing’ state and keep 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 at zero and 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 at a constant level 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 even when they perceive 
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that there is a high probability that the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index will 
decline ( 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 > 0 ). These results shed light on a potential ‘asymmetric liquidity 
phenomenon’, which indicates that hedge fund managers pay more attention to the FX market 
when market liquidity level is in a market downswing than in an upswing. This phenomenon 
might be attributed to their time-varying attitude towards liquidity risk. 
5.2.3 What triggers the FX liquidity-timing skill 
This section explains the potential sources that trigger the switching of 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  from the ‘non-
timing’ state to the ‘timing’ state during a financial crisis. The results are explained from a 
risk aversion standpoint in relation to the theory of ‘risk aversion towards liquidity risk’ of 
Admati, Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1986).  
This is illustrated with a simple factor model as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1,   𝑡𝑡 = 0,1, … ,𝑇𝑇 − 1 ,                                                 (5. 17) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 is the excess return for fund 𝑝𝑝 in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the excess return of the 
market portfolio in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; and 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 is the idiosyncratic risk. Admati, Bhattacharya 
and Pfleiderer (1986) construct 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡, incorporating time-varying market exposure as follows: 
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) ,                                                                                               (5. 18) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  is the information set available at time 𝑡𝑡  used by managers as a timing signal; 
𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)  denotes expected market return; 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)  denotes expected market 
variance; and 𝜃𝜃 is the risk aversion measure of Rubinstein (1973). This construction of beta 
describes how market timers incorporate their attitude towards risk into timing skill and fund 
management. Switching FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill may be further explained by 
hedge fund managers’ time-varying attitude towards liquidity risk. 
When the FX market is stable, given its high trading volume and role as the largest financial 
market in the world, FX liquidity should not be a major concern for hedge fund managers. In 
this case, hedge fund managers can expect and are willing to accept high return along with 
high risk and low return along with low risk52. In this case, the risk refers to all types of FX 
related risk, including market-wide liquidity risk. In this context, they are more likely to keep 
                                                 
52 The risk aversion theory of liquidity preference of Tobin (1958) and Hawawini (1983) indicate that risk-
averters will not be satisfied to accept more risk unless expected return is increased. 
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their preference for the FX market risk constant, 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , without altering it when 
liquidity changes, and they are willing to accept the expected return as compensation for the 
corresponding FX market risk level they take.    
On the other hand, during periods of liquidity crisis, unexpected market liquidity declines are 
more likely to occur. Hedge fund managers are likely to change their risk appetites and 
become averse to unexpected liquidity shocks because they will lead to higher trading costs 
(Sadka, 2006). Hedge funds typically use prime brokers, who provide financing and leverage 
to back their trades. A requirement for additional cash or liquidation of positions is triggered 
when the net asset value or return falls below the threshold under risk management controls. 
However, in a liquidity constrained environment, cash is not an easy option, and so 
liquidation normally occurs. Since positions are unwound in an illiquid market, liquidation is 
likely to cause a cascade of worsening performance. In the meantime, liquidation of positions 
in illiquid markets will further move prices more than would normally occur, and some funds 
would prefer invoking clauses that block redemptions. Therefore, the risk aversion of 
managers and investors who fear getting stuck with their investments with no liquidity 
available will grow and they will convert to being risk averters (from risk-lovers) or become 
more risk-averse to unexpected liquidity risk under the severe market liquidity conditions. 
This additional risk aversion is likely to cause a ‘flight to quality’ that involves moving away 
from risky investments and into low-risk investments (Melvin and Taylor, 2009; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). In particular, it triggers liquidity timing skill ?̃?𝜆𝑡𝑡  and 
further reduces funds’ FX exposure by ?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 in addition to the amount 
they would normally take under good market conditions, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 , making the total 
adaptation of FX exposure amount to �?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 . At this point, 
informed hedge fund managers start to respond to the foreseeable deterioration of FX market-
wide liquidity and consequently avoid FX related investments and the potential 
accompanying losses in two ways: (a) by reducing their funds’ FX exposure based on 
forecasted greater FX market risk as a whole, amounting to 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 ; (b) by further 
reducing FX exposure due to forecasts about greater market-wide liquidity risk, amounting to 
?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1, where ?̃?𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is significantly different from zero.  
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5.2.4 The broad strategies 
The EDI often invests in the securities of companies that are currently or prospectively 
involved in corporate transactions or capital structure adjustments based on corporate news, 
for example, the post-earnings-announcement drift. Managers of such an earnings momentum 
strategy normally require relatively high turnover. Therefore, they are expected to 
significantly load on liquidity and be averse to unexpected market liquidity declines that 
increase the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006). Kessler and Scherer (2011) also 
suggest that funds underlying EDI often adopt leveraged positions in various investment 
instruments of a company to arbitrage value differences caused by corporate transactions. 
Since the leveraged exploitation of value differences is highly sensitive to liquidity, the EDI 
is expected to be reliant on liquid markets.   
 
Figure 5.2 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the total EDI 
The results in table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that at the heart of the crisis in 2008 and 2009, 
the EDI managers possessed the timing skill to reduce their funds’ FX market exposure prior 
to the FX market-wide liquidity deteriorations (𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  is 1.24, significantly positive at 1% 
significance level). These results are consistent with common knowledge about this 
investment style and further support the link between the EDI and liquidity from the 
perspective of FX. On the other hand, weak links are expected between some sub-strategies 
and liquidity. For instance, acting as liquidity takers, merger arbitrage hedge funds provide 
liquidity to investors who want to sell companies involved in corporate transactions, making 
them less vulnerable to increased illiquidity than other hedge fund strategies (Mitchell, 
Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). 
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Table 5.1 also shows no apparent timing skill regarding FX market-wide liquidity or FX 
liquidity commonality throughout the sample period for the EMI, EHI and RVI. Therefore, 
the following sections do not further investigate the sub-categories of the EMI, EHI and RVI. 
The results of the EMI, EHI and RVI are reported in Appendix I. Interestingly, a weak 
relationship is expected between the MI and liquidity given that hedge funds underlying the 
MI normally trade in liquid futures markets and take outright directional market risks. 
However, timing skill regarding FX market-wide liquidity is found during the financial crisis 
in 2008 and 2009 as shown in Figure 5.3. It is shown in section 5.7 that the evidence on 
liquidity timing of the MI is merely a reflection of the managers' skill to time market return 
and volatility.  
 
Figure 5.3 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the total MI 
As shown in table 5.1, an overall significant positive exposure to systematic equity market 
risk is found for the total FOFs, MI and EDI. All strategies have significant positive beta 
coefficients on the equity market factor at 1% significance level (t-statistics of 4.7 or larger), 
indicating the strong systematic risk the strategies capture on average. Another important risk 
factor is the FX market factor, in which significant positive beta coefficients are found for all 
strategies at 1% significance level (-3.46 or less). An increase in the trade-weighted U.S. 
dollar exchange rate index will lead to a higher hedge fund return, indicating an overall 
significant exposure to risk arising from the FX market. In the following sections, the total 
and sub-categories of the FOFs are further investigated. 
5.3 FOFs and its sub-categories  
The FOFs allocates funds to numerous managers in multiple strategies to achieve 
advantageous diversification. The FOFs managers are expected to have the skill to time FX 
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liquidity because they often invest in diversified portfolios globally. The results are reported 
in table 5.3. The t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is 5.48, indicating that the timing coefficients differ 
significantly from each other across both regimes at 1% significance level. 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 of the total 
FOFs switches between the ‘non-timing’ state and ‘timing’ state (𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is 1.21). On the other 
hand, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 are insignificant and indifferent from each other (𝑡𝑡(∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀) is 1.24) across both 
regimes at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
 
Figure 5.4 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the total FOFs and Diversified FOFs. 
As shown in Figure 5.4, the ‘non-timing’ regime is found to be much more persistent than the 
‘timing’ regime and to dominate the sample period. When a liquidity crisis occurred in 
summer 2007 and fall 2008 and 2009, the managers of the total FOFs switched to the 
‘timing’ state and displayed significantly negative market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. These 
results suggest that under severe market conditions, they tend to be able to reduce their funds’ 
FX market exposure prior to deteriorations in FX market-wide liquidity, which captures the 
aggregate ease of transacting a large quantity of assets in a short time without incurring high 
costs, and focus less on the systematic component of FX market liquidity. 
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Table 5.3 Estimates of the liquidity timing models for the FOFs sub-categories 
   
Model (I)  
Market Liquidity 
 Model (II)  
Liquidity Commonality 
 Model (III) 
Joint Timing 
Parameter  
Conservati
ve FOFs 
Diversified 
FOFs MD FOFs 
Strategic 
FOFs  
Conservat
ive FOFs 
Diversifie
d FOFs MD FOFs 
Strategic 
FOFs  
Conservati
ve FOFs 
Diversified 
FOFs MD FOFs 
Strategic 
FOFs 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -0.07 -0.07 -0.70 -0.02       -0.06 -0.06 -0.50 -0.00 
  (-1.94c) (-1.35) (-3.01a) (-0.39)       (-1.71c) (-1.10) (-2.01b) (-0.03) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   1.50 1.24 0.12 1.32       1.59 1.59 0.13 2.62 
  (5.28a) (5.56a) (1.52) (4.78a)       (4.71a) (5.73a) (1.63) (4.48a) 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        -0.18 -0.21 0.00 -0.02  0.31 0.37 0.04 0.55 
       (-0.87) (-0.80) (-0.04) (-0.07)  (1.26) (1.67c) (0.40) (0.98) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        0.08 0.07 0.33 -0.02  0.03 0.07 0.26 -0.01 
       (1.72c) (1.00) (2.15b) (-0.07)  (0.70) (1.35) (1.80c) (-0.11) 
𝜎𝜎  0.62 0.83 1.22 1.01  0.62 0.85 1.24 1.11  0.62 0.81 1.21 1.02 
  (18.21a) (17.58a) (18.88a) (17.32a)  (17.54a) (17.43a) (18.64a) (18.85a)  (17.70a) (17.70a) (18.88a) (17.38a) 
𝛼𝛼  0.17 0.10 0.33 0.08  0.14 0.09 0.31 0.07  0.17 0.10 0.31 0.14 
  (1.31) (0.58) (1.33) (0.40)  (1.08) (0.50) (1.22) (0.31)  (1.33) (0.62) (1.25) (0.64) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.09 0.18 0.05 0.28  0.09 0.15 0.06 0.25  0.09 0.18 0.05 0.26 
  (6.31a) (8.98a) (1.93c) (11.45a)  (6.42a) (7.02a) (1.95c) (10.10a)  (6.32a) (9.51a) (1.99b) (10.75a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.08  0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07 
  (0.85) (1.81c) (0.15) (2.15b)  (1.04) (1.27) (-0.03) (1.53)  (0.91) (1.88c) (0.14) (2.00b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  (-1.42) (-0.38) (1.05) (0.02)  (-1.29) (-1.02) (0.92) (-0.43)  (-1.44) (-0.31) (1.03) (-0.50) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  (0.70) (1.87c) (3.65a) (0.99)  (0.86) (1.71c) (4.19a) (0.52)  (0.67) (2.07b) (3.91a) (1.24) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
  (-0.06) (0.43) (2.13b) (0.71)  (0.11) (0.29) (2.14b) (0.10)  (-0.06) (0.61) (2.27b) (0.28) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.48) (-0.29) (-0.76) (-0.36)  (-0.28) (0.02) (-0.42) (-0.20)  (-0.51) (-0.41) (-0.64) (-0.52) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   0.12 0.16 0.32 0.26  0.15 0.16 0.25 0.26  0.13 0.15 0.33 0.18 
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  (2.89a) (2.73a) (3.65a) (3.68a)  (3.25a) (2.52b) (2.62a) (3.66a)  (2.99a) (2.52b) (3.28a) (2.32b) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.60 -0.53 -0.06 -0.24  -0.67 -0.29 -0.06 -0.05  -0.59 -0.65 -0.12 -0.19 
  (-2.22b) (-1.47) (-0.11) (-0.51)  (-2.52a) (-0.81) (-0.12) (-0.11)  (-2.16b) (-1.84c) (-0.23) (-0.45) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   -1.35 -0.96 0.39 -0.81  -1.42 -1.20 0.45 -0.92  -1.34 -0.99 0.34 -1.10 
  (-5.02a) (-2.63a) (0.75) (-1.76c)  (-5.10a) (-3.08a) (0.86) (-2.02b)  (-4.94a) (-2.79a) (0.64) (-2.48b) 
𝑃𝑃00  0.97 0.95 0.99 0.95  0.96 0.98 0.99 0.86  0.97 0.96 0.99 0.97 
  (37.06a) (25.95a) (70.18a) (24.49a)  (9.84a) (19.12a) (51.32a) (0.01)  (31.32a) (32.53a) (70.54a) (39.08a) 
𝑃𝑃11  0.00 0.56 0.99 0.60  0.67 0.82 0.99 0.86  0.00 0.62 0.99 0.51 
  (0.00) (2.50a) (124.33a) (2.73a)  (2.16b) (2.37a) (63.27a) (0.03)  (0.02) (3.07a) (123.83a) (1.53) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)  (5.48a) (5.72a) (3.34a) (4.75a)       (4.87a) (5.84a) (2.42b) (4.45a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀)       (1.24) (1.04) (1.75c) (0.00)  (-1.14) (-1.31) (1.34) (-0.98) ln 𝐿𝐿  -188.32 -236.01 -294.53 -270.19  -197.75 -241.23 -295.61 -273.55  -187.95 -233.27 -292.60 -268.95 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2   0.21 0.20 0.08 0.24  0.20 0.20 0.07 0.23  0.25 0.20 0.08 0.23 
Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics for the sub- categories of the FOFs. Each fund in the sample has at least 174 
monthly returns. In model (I) and model (II), the liquidity-timing model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and 
Hsieh (2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the liquidity level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is the average liquidity level. In model (I), the FX market liquidity 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the market-wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , whereas in 
model (II), it is the liquidity commonality measured with monthly Beta-Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is characterized by the two distinct phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} and measures the 
state-dependent timing skill as follows: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . 
In model (III), the timing skill of both market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality are estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 , 
The coefficients, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 measures the market-wide-liquidity-timing skill, 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  measures the liquidity-commonality-timing skill, both are assumed to simultaneously switch 
between states 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡. The transition probability matrix of the two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of 
∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 . 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 . 
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The Diversified FOFs, Strategic FOFs and Conservative FOFs show similar results to the 
total FOFs. The Diversified FOFs encompasses a broad variety of strategies used by multiple 
managers and are expected to perform in a similar manner to the total FOFs, especially in 
terms of historical annual return and/or standard deviation (Gregoriou, 2011).  At a 1% 
significance level, 𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 in the ‘timing’ state is 1.24, significantly negative and slightly lower 
than 𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 of the total FOF. The Diversified FOFs shows the same inferred probabilities of 
the two states as the total FOFs, that the ‘non-timing’ state dominates the sample period but is 
interrupted by the ‘timing’ state during the liquidity crisis. The skill to reduce its FX exposure 
prior to an increase in FX market-wide liquidities may help to achieve its goal of showing 
minimal losses during down market periods. 
The Strategic FOFs has higher 𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  (1.32) than does the total FOFs (1.21) and the 
Diversified FOFs (1.24) for the ‘timing’ state that falls into the same period as shown in 
Figure 5.5. This may be because Strategic FOFs seeks superior returns. The managers often 
specialise in hedge funds with aggressive strategies and engage in more opportunistic 
strategies, such as Emerging Markets, Sector specific and Equity Hedge (Gregoriou, 2011), 
and therefore they display stronger timing skill and more intense reactions to deteriorations in 
FX market-wide liquidity. 
 
Figure 5.5 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the Strategic FOFs. 
Among all the FOFs subcategories, the Conservative FOFs shows the lowest 𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  in the 
‘timing’ state, which suggests that the strongest market-wide-liquidity-timing skill in the 
timing phase. What is more, the Conservative FOFs has the least persistent ‘timing’ state with 
only 1 or 2 months spent in the second half of 2008. This overall strong yet short-lasting 
timing skill reflects engagement in more ‘conservative’ strategies, such as Equity Market 
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Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage and Convertible Arbitrage, and seeking consistent but lower 
returns regardless of market conditions. 
 
Figure 5.6 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the Conservative FOFs. 
Unlike the total and other sub-categories, the MD FOFs shows different patterns in the 
evolvement of the timing coefficients. At a 1% significance level, the market-wide-liquidity-
timing coefficient in the ‘non-timing’ state, 𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 , is insignificantly different from zero, 
whereas 𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 in the ‘timing’ phase is significantly negative (0.70). The t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 
is 3.34, indicating two significantly different timing states.  
 
Figure 5.7 Regime indicator of the ‘timing’ state for the MD FOFs. 
Figure 5.7 shows that the MD FOFs stayed in the ‘non-timing’ state even during the recent 
financial crisis, switching to the ‘timing’ state later. In particular, in the ‘timing’ state, the 
managers increased their funds’ FX exposure prior to a deterioration of FX market-wide 
liquidities. This reverse adaption of the FX exposure reflects the primary goal of the MD 
FOFs, which is constructed to be negatively correlated with the returns of the general market 
benchmarks and standard asset classes (Gregoriou, 2011). Although significant liquidity-
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commonality-timing skill 𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 is found in model (2), it disappears when timing skill for both 
market-wide liquidity and commonality are considered in model (3), supporting the assertion 
that timing skill focus on aggregate market liquidity instead of the systematic component of 
market liquidity. 
5.4 Excluding the recent financial crisis period 
This section addresses the concern that strong timing skill under severe market conditions 
may overshadow other potential relatively weak but also significant phases during a non-
crisis period, given the great impact of leverage, funding constraints and investor redemptions 
during the financial crisis (Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo, 2013). The recent financial crisis from 
July 2007 to December 2009 is excluded and the sample period is then divided into two sub-
sample periods: pre-crisis from July 2001 to June 2007 and post-crisis from January 2010 to 
December 2015. Model (I) is applied to both subsamples separately. The results are reported 
in table 5.4 and table 5.5. Before the recent crisis, ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  of the FWCI and FOFs has t-
statistics of 0.00 and indicates that 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is not significantly different across the two states at 
1%, 5% or 10% significance level. In addition, no market-wide-liquidity-timing skill is found 
in both regimes. In this case, the timing coefficient should no longer be assumed to follow a 
Markov process. To address this issue, a linear regression is examined as follows:      
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ,             (5. 19) 
where the coefficient of timing skill 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be constant.  
The results in table 5.4 show the same consistency as before the crisis. The insignificant 
constant timing coefficients of the FWCI and FOFs indicate no market-wide-liquidity-timing 
skill between July 2001 and June 2007 before the financial crisis. The EDI has significant 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 at 10% significance level, which is consistent with the spikes of timing skill in 2002 
and 2003 (as shown in Figure 5.2) estimated using the whole sample period. After the recent 
crisis, the FWCI and FOFs showed similar results and no market-wide-liquidity-timing skill 
were found. In particular, the MD FOFs has a significantly positive constant timing skill 
coefficient 𝜆𝜆 at 1% significance level given a t-statistics of 3.043. This is consistent with the 
results from the overall sample period, which showed that the market-liquidity-timing 
coefficient switched to a ‘timing’ state in 2010.  
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Table 5.4 Estimates of the liquidity-timing models before the crisis 
 Markov-switching 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  Constant 𝜆𝜆 
Parameter FWCI FOFs 
Conser
vative 
FOFs 
Diversi
fied 
FOFs 
MD 
FOFs 
Strategi
c FOFs EDI MI 
 
FWCI FOFs 
Conser
vative 
FOFs 
Diversi
fied 
FOFs 
MD 
FOFs 
Strategi
c FOFs EDI MI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.17 0.16          
 (0.59) (0.14) (1.20) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (-1.25) (1.05)          
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.16          
 (0.70) (0.34) (1.20) (0.12) (0.21) (0.03) (1.96b) (1.06)          
𝜆𝜆          0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.36 
          (0.50) (0.69) (0.76) (0.82) (0.69) (0.63) (-0.51) (-1.19) 
𝜎𝜎 0.51 0.60 0.44 0.61 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.91          
 (11.99a) (11.97a) (11.99a) (11.96a) (12.00a) (11.98a) (10.81a) (12.00a)          
𝛼𝛼 0.01 -0.28 -0.01 -0.30 -0.16 -0.46 0.10 0.36  -0.28 0.01 0.08 0.24 0.33 -0.02 0.27 0.11 
 (0.05) (-1.60) (-0.05) (-1.72c) (-0.63) (-2.11b) (0.50) (1.29)  (-1.47) (0.04) (0.46) (1.50) (2.02b) (-0.11) (8.35a) (2.76a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 0.26 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.24 0.28 0.11  0.13 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.11 
 (12.37a) (5.30a) (3.85a) (4.95a) (1.04) (7.79a) (9.34a) (3.00a)  (4.89a) (11.39a) (11.05a) (11.10a) (11.26a) (11.25a) (4.96a) (2.18b) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.18 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.11  0.13 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 -0.01 0.02 
 (6.88a) (4.32a) (2.76a) (4.25a) (2.68a) (4.75a) (5.77a) (2.36b)  (3.97a) (6.34a) (6.29a) (6.38a) (6.36a) (6.30a) (-0.98) (2.21b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-0.04) (-0.53) (-1.50) (-0.73) (1.09) (-0.05) (-0.54) (2.40b)  (-0.49) (-0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.59) (1.66c) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
 (0.83) (1.27) (1.16) (1.28) (3.30a) (0.41) (-1.05) (1.81c)  (1.17) (0.76) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73) (0.75) (0.82) (3.21a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 
 (2.75a) (2.16b) (1.53) (1.89c) (2.39b) (2.37b) (1.35) (3.49a)  (1.99b) (2.53b) (2.46b) (2.46b) (2.50b) (2.53b) (1.07) (0.09) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.00  0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.23 -0.25 
 (2.40b) (3.18a) (1.84c) (3.19a) (1.72c) (3.53a) (1.19) (0.10)  (2.93a) (2.21b) (0.72) (0.56) (0.93) (0.71) (-2.36b) (-2.06b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.12 0.26 0.25  0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 1.01 1.65 
 (1.84c) (1.84c) (2.25b) (1.82c) (2.34b) (1.34) (2.94a) (2.24b)  (1.69c) (1.69c) (1.55) (1.56) (1.54) (1.59) (1.74c) (2.28b) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 -1.13 -1.20 -0.74 -1.28 -1.55 -1.29 -1.34 -1.65  -1.20 -1.13 -1.05 -1.06 -1.11 -1.18 -1.06 -0.71 
 (-2.94a) (-2.69a) (-2.27b) (-2.77a) (-2.29b) (-2.28b) (-2.45b) (-2.48b)  (-2.48b) (-2.71a) (-2.49b) (-2.52b) (-2.65a) (-2.76a) (-1.41) (-0.75) 
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𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -1.17 -1.15 -0.80 -1.36 -0.20 -1.45 -1.18 -0.71  -1.15 -1.17 -1.13 -1.15 -1.18 -1.28 -0.09 -0.16 
 (-2.37b) (-2.00b) (-1.92c) (-2.30b) (-0.24) (-2.00b) (-1.81c) (-0.82)  (-1.84c) (-2.18b) (-2.08b) (-2.12b) (-2.19b) (-2.33a) (-0.89) (-1.32) 
𝑃𝑃00 0.88 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.90 0.89 0.66 0.86          
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (2.18b) (0.06)          
𝑃𝑃11 0.84 0.78 0.86 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.18 0.86          
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.30) (0.01)          
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-2.27b) (0.00)          ln 𝐿𝐿 -53.98 -64.83 -42.34 -66.78 -94.87 -81.60 -77.91 -95.53          
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2  0.56 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.39 0.18          
Adjusted 
𝑅𝑅2         
 0.59 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.51 
Note: This table summarizes the timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics before the crisis during July 2001 to June 2007. Column 2-9 reports results of FX market-wide-
liquidity-timing model with Markov-switching timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  for the FWCI, FOFs (total and sub-categories), EDI and MI. Model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and 
Hsieh (2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 is the market-wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿������� is the average market-wide liquidity level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  is characterized by the two distinct phases 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} and measures the state-dependent timing skill as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
TraThe transition probability matrix of the two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. 
Column 10-17 reports results FX market-wide-liquidity-timing model with constant timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆. The model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a constant that measures the FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) 
level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞, i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞. 
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Table 5.5 Estimates of the liquidity-timing models after the crisis 
 Markov-switching 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  Constant 𝜆𝜆 
Parameter FWCI FOFs 
Conser
vative 
FOFs 
Diversi
fied 
FOFs 
MD 
FOFs 
Strategi
c FOFs EDI MI 
 
FWCI FOFs 
Conser
vative 
FOFs 
Diversi
fied 
FOFs 
MD 
FOFs 
Strategi
c FOFs EDI MI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.40 -0.08 0.04 -0.29          
 (-1.26) (-1.22) (-0.88) (-0.27) (-1.27) (-0.09) (0.18) (-0.32)          
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.40 -0.08 0.04 -0.29          
 (-1.25) (-1.44) (-2.28b) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-0.38) (0.30) (-0.30)          
𝜆𝜆          -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.40 -0.08 0.60 -0.29 
          (-1.53) (-1.69c) (-1.94c) (-1.79c) (-3.04a) (-0.89) (0.59) (-0.19) 
𝜎𝜎 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.58 1.06 0.68 0.62 0.93          
 (12.47a) (12.47a) (12.47a) (12.47a) (12.48a) (12.48a) (12.48a) (12.48a)          
𝛼𝛼 -0.90 -2.54 -1.50 -2.36 0.83 -3.54 -0.60 0.29  -0.90 -2.54 -1.50 -2.36 0.83 -3.54 0.23 0.22 
 (-1.15) (-2.90a) (-2.12b) (-2.69a) (0.52) (-3.38a) (-0.64) (0.21)  (-1.07) (-2.69a) (-1.96b) (-2.50a) (0.48) (-3.17a) (7.73a) (5.01a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.22  0.28 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.08 -0.09 
 (12.65a) (8.13a) (5.68a) (7.55a) (4.08a) (8.78a) (8.34a) (5.41a)  (11.73a) (7.54a) (5.26a) (7.00a) (3.78a) (8.14a) (1.92c) (-1.49) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.09  0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.01 
 (1.64) (0.54) (0.45) (0.20) (-2.00b) (1.24) (2.07b) (-1.60)  (1.52) (0.50) (0.42) (0.18) (-1.85c) (1.15) (-0.93) (1.28) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
 (-0.66) (-0.37) (-0.46) (-0.08) (1.01) (-0.73) (-1.00) (1.38)  (-0.61) (-0.34) (-0.43) (-0.08) (0.94) (-0.68) (0.94) (3.18a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (2.61a) (1.72c) (0.43) (1.67c) (2.87a) (1.60) (1.01) (3.43a)  (2.42b) (1.59) (0.40) (1.55) (2.66a) (1.49) (-2.88a) (0.85) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 
 (-2.33b) (-1.47) (-1.67c) (-1.16) (0.93) (-1.91c) (-3.11a) (0.92)  (-2.15b) (-1.37) (-1.55) (-1.07) (0.86) (-1.77c) (0.82) (-0.23) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.19 0.04 -0.02  0.05 0.13 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.19 -0.35 -0.11 
 (1.23) (2.90a) (2.23b) (2.70a) (-0.60) (3.34a) (0.89) (-0.25)  (1.15) (2.69a) (2.07b) (2.51b) (-0.56) (3.14a) (-4.77a) (-1.00) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.28 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.35 0.11  -0.28 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.23 0.15 -0.88 
 (4.91a) (1.92) (1.31) (1.00) (0.37) (3.04a) (5.15a) (1.08)  (-4.55a) (-1.78c) (-1.21) (-0.93) (-0.34) (-2.82a) (0.26) (-1.02) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 -0.20 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.07 -0.07 0.15 -0.88  0.20 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.95 0.91 
 (-0.45) (0.16) (0.80) (0.25) (0.08) (-0.11) (0.29) (-1.10)  (0.41) (0.15) (0.74) (0.23) (0.07) (0.11) (1.51) (0.97) 
99 
 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 1.45 -0.23 -0.95 0.91  -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 1.45 -0.23 -0.04 0.29 
 (-0.25) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.12) (1.46) (-0.36) (-1.63) (1.05)  (-0.23) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.11) (1.36) (-0.33) (-0.57) (2.51b) 
𝑃𝑃00 0.86 0.87 0.94 0.97 0.86 0.95 0.92 0.85          
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)          
𝑃𝑃11 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.86 0.65 0.82 0.86          
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)          
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) (-0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.04) (0.29)          ln 𝐿𝐿 -58.45 -67.36 -50.81 -67.49 -114.88 -80.65 -73.42 -104.77          
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2  0.55 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.10 0.41 0.45 0.17          
Adjusted 
𝑅𝑅2         
 0.86 0.72 0.61 0.66 0.30 0.78 0.82 0.39 
Note: This table summarizes the timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics after the crisis during January 2010 to December 2015. Column 2-9 reports results of FX market-
wide-liquidity-timing model with Markov-switching timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  for the FWCI, FOFs (total and sub-categories), EDI and MI. Model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and 
Hsieh (2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 is the market-wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿������� is the average market-wide liquidity level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  is characterized by the two distinct phases 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} and measures the state-dependent timing skill as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
The transition probability matrix of the two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. 
Column 10-17 reports results FX market-wide-liquidity-timing model with constant timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆. The model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a constant that measures the FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) 
level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞, i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞. 
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5.5 Robust check using different risk factors  
In the previous section, the term spread and credit spreads used to benchmark hedge fund 
returns are those of Sadka (2010). These are traded factors constructed with tradable 
portfolios. This section examines the robustness of the results to the term spread and credit 
spreads of Fung and Hsieh (2004). Other risk factors include the MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, 
FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh (2004) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001). 
The results are reported in table 5.6. The robust results based on Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s 
seven factors are consistent with those based on Sadka’s factors (2010). The FWCI, FOFs 
(total, Conservative FOFs, Diversified FOFs and Strategic FOFs) and EDI have state-
dependent market-wide-liquidity-timing coefficients that switch between a ‘non-timing’ state 
and a ‘timing’ state. In contrast, the MI and MD FOFs show the reverse of timing 
coefficients. Instead of decreasing, the managers increase their funds’ FX market exposure 
prior to a decline in market-wide currency liquidities.  
Table 5.6 Estimates of the liquidity-timing models using Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s factors 
Parameter FWCI Total FOFs 
Conservat
ive FOFs 
Diversifie
d FOFs 
MD 
FOFs 
Strategic 
FOFs EDI MI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.69 0.05 0.03 -0.05 
 (1.43) (0.44) (-1.03) (0.32) (-2.88a) (0.78) (0.57) (-0.58) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  2.14 4.24 1.01 4.47 0.15 2.54 0.98 0.47 
 (4.81a) (5.27a) (3.53a) (5.57a) (1.91c) (4.51a) (4.65a) (3.66a)  
𝜎𝜎 0.71 0.80 0.57 0.80 1.22 0.97 0.70 1.13 
 (17.63a) (18.44a) (18.22a) (18.52a) (18.90a) (17.47a) (16.51a) (18.86a) 
𝛼𝛼 0.37 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.34 0.09 0.57 0.64 
 (2.53b) (0.52) (1.05) (0.53) (1.36) (0.45) (3.82a) (2.76a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇  0.27 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.12 
 (16.46a) (8.38a) (5.81a) (7.72a) (1.49) (11.35a) (14.78a) (4.51a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.00 
 (3.12a) (1.06) (0.50) (1.10) (-0.26) (1.95c) (4.36a) (0.08) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (-0.43) (-1.08) (-1.74c) (-1.16) (1.45) (-0.62) (-0.98) (2.79a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 (3.04a) (2.15b) (1.57) (2.35b) (4.05a) (2.00b) (0.92) (4.43a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.71) (0.62) (0.18) (0.57) (2.12b) (0.75) (-0.72) (3.08a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 0.03 0.16 -0.15 0.13 0.30 0.16 -0.02 -0.51 
 (0.10) (0.48) (-0.56) (0.39) (0.58) (0.38) (-0.07) (-0.97) 
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𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  -1.84 -2.09 -2.15 -2.16 -0.50 -2.22 -2.35 -1.33 
 (-5.15a) (-5.21a) (-6.32a) (-5.44a) (-0.83) (-4.59a) (-6.42a) (-2.17b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 (-1.23) (0.04) (-0.14) (0.12) (-0.67) (-0.22) (-2.08b) (-1.63) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.18 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.31 0.16 0.28 0.26 
 (3.69a) (2.96a) (2.56a) (2.22b) (3.44a) (2.24b) (5.77a) (3.37a) 
𝑃𝑃00 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.87 0.99 
 (40.00a) (60.53a) (22.84a) (66.27a) (69.54a) (46.33a) (10.90a) (81.63a) 
𝑃𝑃11 0.32 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.99 0.48 0.20 0.96 
 (1.20) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (128.04a) (1.47) (1.08) (21.21a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) (4.66a) (5.24a) (3.63a) (5.54a) (3.33a) (4.40a) (4.43a) (3.38a) ln 𝐿𝐿 -203.19 -221.74 -171.46 -220.44 -294.16 -259.39 -204.97 -279.72 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2  0.40 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.42 0.12 
Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics for the FWCI, 
FOFs (total and sub-categories), EDI and MI. Each fund in the sample has at least 174 monthly returns. The 
liquidity-timing model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2 ) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including 
MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS, the term spread and credit spread of Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 is the market-
wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 ;  𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������  is the average market-wide liquidity level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  is 
characterized by the two distinct phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} and measures the state-dependent timing skill as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . 
The transition probability matrix of the two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by 
a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞. 
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5.6 Control for market return and volatility 
Mounting evidence shows that fund managers are able to time equity market returns and 
volatility. In Eq. (5.14), Admati, Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1986) show that a manager 
with market timing skill constructs beta 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 by incorporating information on expected market 
return and market variance. Specifically, funds’ betas should increase with expected market 
return, 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡), and decrease with expected market variance, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡). Chen and 
Liang (2007) also find that hedge fund managers at both aggregate level and individual fund 
level have the skill to time market return, market volatility and even jointly time them 
together, especially in the bear and volatile market conditions. Given that market liquidity is 
positively correlated with market returns and negatively correlated with market volatility, it is 
possible that the evidence on liquidity timing can be partially attributed to the fund managers' 
skill to time market return or market volatility. This section first examines whether hedge 
fund managers have the skill to adjust FX exposure based on their forecasts of future market 
return, volatility or both of these in the FX market. Market liquidity-timing models are 
modified to control for market return and market volatility to justify the examination of 
market-wide-liquidity timing skill. Four models are investigated to address this issue. 
Model (IV) is an extension of the return-timing model developed by Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) that allows for state-dependent return-timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹������ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 
+�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2� ,                        (5. 20) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the return of strategy 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the FX market return level at 
the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����� is the average market return level; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  measures state-dependent 
return-timing skill. In particular, a significantly positive value of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  indicates that the 
manager has sufficient market-return-timing skill to increase (decrease) the fund’s FX market 
exposure prior to the rise (fall) of market return level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  is characterised by two distinct 
economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑅𝑅 (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                            (5. 21) 
Model (V) is an extension of the volatility-timing model developed by Busse (1999) which 
allows for state-dependent volatility-timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  as follows:  
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𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 �𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹������ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2� ,                        (5. 22) 
where  𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the stock market volatility level (calculated as monthly standard deviation of 
market return) at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 ; 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�����  is the average market volatility level; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  
represents the state-dependent market-volatility-timing skill. In particular, a significantly 
negative value of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  indicates that the manager has sufficient market-volatility-timing skill 
to decrease (increase) the fund’s FX market exposure prior to the rise (fall) of market 
volatility level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  is characterised by the two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) as 
follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝜎𝜎 (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝜎𝜎 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                            (5. 23) 
A hedge fund can change its market exposure based on perceptions of both market return and 
market volatility. Even if fund managers foresee a high level of market return, they may not 
take heavy positions in the market without considering market volatility and vice versa. 
Expected high volatility makes the manager behave conservatively when adjusting portfolio 
holdings. Chen and Liang (2007) propose a joint timing measure that corresponds closely to 
the classical models of Jensen (1972) and Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross (1986), 
relating fund returns to the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 �2 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2� ,              (5. 24) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆  is the stock market return level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆  is the stock market 
volatility level; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 measures the timing skill of a manager who can forecast both the level 
and volatility of the stock market portfolio. Chen and Liang (2007) define the joint timing 
model as a convex function of the stock market’s excess return 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 . The timing term 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 /(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 )2 is associated with the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 /𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 , 
i.e. the ratio of expected excess return to the (conditional) standard deviation. Given the focus 
of Chen and Liang (2007) is the stock market’s excess return 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 , the timing term 
𝐸𝐸 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) is specifically set as 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 /(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 )2  in order to impose the square term of 
Sharpe ratio, (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 /(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 )2) ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 = (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 /𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 )2, thus leading to an intuitive 
appeal to relate fund return to the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Motivated by the joint 
timing model of Chen and Liang (2007), model (VI) is proposed to incorporates the Sharpe 
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Ratio of the FX market as the timing term, interpreted as a function that times risk adjusted 
market return as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1    +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1,     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2� ,                        (5. 25) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 /𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the Sharpe ratio of the FX market; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹��������/𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹��������  is the average 
Sharpe ratio level 53; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝  represents the state-dependent risk-adjusted-return-timing 
skill, characterised by the two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝)𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡.                                                             (5. 26) 
A significantly positive value of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 indicates that the manager has the risk-adjusted-market-
return-timing skill to increase (decrease) their fund’s FX market exposure prior to the rise 
(fall) of the risk adjusted market return level.  
The evidence on liquidity timing could partially reflect the fund managers' skill to time 
market return or market volatility. It would be necessary to control for both in order to 
provide further insight into the liquidity-timing skill of hedge fund managers. With this in 
consideration, model (VII) controls for market return timing and market volatility timing by 
incorporating Sharpe ratio54 as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 
+𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1��������� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ,            (5. 27) 
                                                 
53 The focus is the FX market 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 , not the stock market 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆 . Given that the timing term will be 
multiplied by the FX market factor 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1, there is no necessity to impose such squared Sharpe ratio any longer 
where the sign of return is ignored and that great losses are converted into profit.  
 
54 Model (4) controls for market return timing and market volatility timing jointly by incorporating Sharpe ratio, 
not market return and market volatility separately (Busse, 1999; Cao et al., 2013). This is because if the model 
simultaneously times market return, volatility and liquidity, their timing coefficients may be characterised by the 
different economic phases 𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 and 𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡 respectively, and the consequent large number of phases and their 
respective states imply restrictions that make the information matrix of the parameters singular under the null. 
The regularity conditions of the preceding asymptotically valid test statistics therefore do not hold. The primary 
goal in this section is to control for market return and volatility when modelling them for timing skill of the 
hedge funds. Rather than modelling them to be timed separately, the Sharpe ratio is included so that both market 
return and volatility are incorporated. Doing so allows for market return and volatility to be timed jointly and 
also helps with justifying the asymptotic tests. 
 
105 
 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2�, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 measures market-wide-liquidity-timing skill; and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 
measures Sharpe ratio-timing skill. Since the FX Sharpe ratio and FX liquidity do not always 
move in the same direction at the same time, hedge fund managers may time the two 
separately and show different time-variation in the timing coefficients. Therefore, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is 
assumed to be characterised by the 𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) as follows:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(1 − 𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 .                                                                               (5. 28) 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 is assumed to be characterized by the 𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) as follows: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 .                                                                           (5. 29) 
The two-state stochastic process on the discrete-valued, two-state Markov-switching variable 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1) can be summarised by the following transition probability matrices:  
𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑡𝑡 � 𝑆𝑆1,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠1,𝑡𝑡−1� = �𝑝𝑝00 𝑝𝑝10𝑝𝑝01 𝑝𝑝11� ,                                                                   (5. 30) 
𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠2𝑡𝑡 � 𝑆𝑆2,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠2,𝑡𝑡−1� = �𝐿𝐿00 𝐿𝐿10𝐿𝐿01 𝐿𝐿11� .                                                                   (5. 31) 
The results of model (IV), (V), (VI) and (VII) are reported in table 5.7. It is shown that 
managers of many categories simultaneously possess the skills to time volatility, return and 
market-liquidity and use a combination of timing strategies in their investment management.  
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Table 5.7 Estimates of the return, volatility, Sharpe ratio and joint timing models 
Panel A Estimates of the total indices 
paramet
er 
Model (IV) 
Market Return 
Model (V) 
Market Volatility 
Model (VI) 
Sharpe ratio 
Model (VII) 
Market Liquidity control for Sharpe ratio 
 FWCI FOFs EDI MI FWCI FOFs EDI MI FWCI FOFs EDI MI FWCI FOFs EDI MI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑅𝑅 -0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.13             
 (-0.10) (1.58) (0.74) (-1.87c)             
𝜆𝜆1
𝑅𝑅 0.58 1.35 -0.21 0.29             
 (4.38a) (7.19a) (-2.24b) (1.30)             
𝜆𝜆0
𝜎𝜎     -0.21 -0.34 -0.56 -0.13         
     (-2.02b) (-2.98a) (-2.62a) (-2.47b)         
𝜆𝜆1
𝜎𝜎     0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.23         
     (0.56) (1.80c) (-0.21) (1.55)         
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞             -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.08 
             (-0.03) (-1.30) (-0.81) (0.82) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞             0.87 0.97 1.12 0.08 
             (3.22a) (4.34a) (5.63a) (0.72) 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝         -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.23 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.23 
         (-0.42) (0.48) (-1.30) (-2.60a) (-0.16) (0.68) (-1.12) (-2.54b) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝         1.64 2.34 1.66 0.40 0.75 2.25 1.60 0.41 
         (5.21a) (7.21a) (7.15a) (2.00b) (3.31a) (7.31a) (7.05a) (2.15b) 
𝜎𝜎 0.76 0.80 0.84 1.10 0.80 0.83 0.83 1.13 0.75 0.79 0.72 1.08 0.73 0.73 0.66 1.08 
 (17.69a) (17.72a) (18.03a) (17.92a) (18.47a) (16.56a) (18.37a) (18.59a) (17.78a) (17.13a) (17.16a) (17.58a) (16.95a) (14.40a) (16.89a) (17.50a) 
𝛼𝛼 0.40 0.19 0.43 0.60 0.35 0.12 0.53 0.62 0.39 0.14 0.54 0.54 0.37 0.15 0.66 0.51 
 (2.48b) (1.16) (2.39b) (2.59a) (2.14b) (0.71) (3.08a) (2.67a) (2.43b) (0.86) (3.49a) (2.34b) (2.34b) (0.95) (4.51a) (2.22b) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.27 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.11 
 (15.21a) (8.03a) (12.30a) (4.48a) (14.25a) (8.08a) (12.63a) (4.57a) (14.76a) (8.11a) (13.48a) (4.33a) (15.88a) (8.78a) (13.94a) (4.48a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.03 
 (3.14a) (1.70c) (3.77a) (0.58) (2.76a) (1.53) (3.94a) (0.47) (2.96a) (1.52) (5.43a) (0.73) (3.45a) (1.95) (5.77a) (0.76) 
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𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-0.47) (-0.84) (-1.74c) (1.86c) (-0.23) (-0.83) (-0.85) (2.29b) (-0.11) (-0.86) (-1.26) (1.73c) (0.06) (-0.50) (-0.75) (1.76c) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 (1.98b) (2.27b) (-0.45) (3.19a) (1.29) (1.72c) (-0.03) (3.64a) (0.97) (1.73c) (0.23) (2.61a) (1.75c) (2.04b) (0.17) (2.77a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.43) (0.56) (-1.32) (2.72a) (0.23) (0.58) (-1.27) (2.86a) (0.28) (0.20) (-1.61) (2.83a) (0.84) (0.69) (-1.43) (2.88a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
 (-1.28) (-0.06) (-1.54) (-1.52) (-1.23) (-0.16) (-1.85c) (-1.59) (-1.25) (0.13) (-1.96b) (-1.57) (-1.32) (0.01) (-2.65a) (-1.42) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.22 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.34 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.22 
 (4.11a) (3.59a) (4.33a) (2.92a) (4.86a) (3.31a) (5.44a) (3.60a) (5.14a) (4.27a) (6.75a) (2.83a) (4.53a) (4.24a) (7.21a) (2.91a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 -0.22 -0.28 -0.04 -0.69 -0.08 -0.11 -0.44 -0.74 -0.03 -0.22 -0.21 -0.51 -0.36 -0.30 -0.37 -0.63 
 (-0.68) (-0.79) (-0.11) (-1.30) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-1.09) (-1.40) (-0.10) (-0.66) (-0.69) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-0.91) (-1.26) (-1.32) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -0.85 -1.08 -0.97 0.00 -0.68 -0.68 -1.44 -0.18 -0.72 -1.03 -1.35 0.25 -0.74 -0.81 -1.39 0.08 
 (-2.61a) (-3.15a) (-2.49b) (0.00) (-1.75c) (-1.69c) (-3.47a) (-0.31) (-2.31b) (-3.08a) (-4.42a) (0.52) (-2.28b) (-2.50b) (-4.77a) (0.17) 
𝑝𝑝11 0.28 0.00 0.83 0.53 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.98     0.96 0.95 0.90 0.83 
 (0.93) (0.00) (4.04a) (1.05) (8.36a) (8.89a) (7.78a) (25.55a)     (25.81a) (16.60a) (13.44a) (0.02) 
𝑝𝑝00 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.65 0.68 0.05 0.99     0.52 0.52 0.00 0.78 
 (14.63a) (16.49a) (5.86a) (3.57a) (2.27b) (2.13b) (0.14) (43.41a)     (2.13b) (1.67c) (0.00) (0.02) 
𝐿𝐿11         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.56 
         (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (1.57) (0.88) (0.00) (0.00) (1.61) 
𝐿𝐿00         0.95 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.90 
         (27.93a) (22.40a) (16.65a) (8.69a) (27.42a) (23.22a) (18.78a) (8.70a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅) (4.28a) (6.80a) (-2.35b) (1.78c)             
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎)     (2.10b) (3.38a) (2.55b) (2.28b)         
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)             (3.18a) (4.52a) (5.68a) (0.00) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝          (5.21b) (7.03a) (7.27a) (2.89a) (3.26a) (7.10a) (7.13a) (3.01a) ln 𝐿𝐿 
 
-214.12 -228.51 -228.00 -279.51 -218.88 -238.97 -225.89 -280.35 -213.67 -229.49 -216.30 -278.44 -214.25 -225.98 -208.01 -277.66 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2  0.34 0.22 0.33 0.09 0.34 0.20 0.35 0.12 0.36 0.23 0.37 0.08 0.35 0.24 0.39 0.09 
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Panel B Estimates of the sub-categories of the FOFs 
paramet
er 
Model (IV) 
Market Return 
Model (V) 
Market Volatility 
Model (VI) 
Sharpe ratio 
Model (VII) 
Market Liquidity control for Sharpe ratio 
 Conservative  
Diversif
ied  MD  Strategic  
Conserv
ative  
Diversif
ied  MD  
Strategi
c  
Conserv
ative  
Diversif
ied  MD  
Strategi
c  
Conserv
ative  
Diversif
ied  MD  
Strategi
c  
𝜆𝜆0
𝑅𝑅 -0.10 0.05 -0.34 0.03             
 (-1.79c) (1.40) (-2.41b) (0.78)             
𝜆𝜆1
𝑅𝑅 0.14 1.40 0.00 1.30             
 (4.67a) (7.48a) (0.07) (5.75a)             
𝜆𝜆0
𝜎𝜎     -3.55 -0.35 0.47 -0.26         
     (-3.51a) (-3.25a) (0.94) (-2.63a)         
𝜆𝜆1
𝜎𝜎     0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.05         
     (3.48a) (1.59) (-0.95) (1.09)         
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞             -0.03 -0.07 -0.00 -0.07 
             (-0.66) (-1.56) (-0.03) (-0.86) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞             4.62 1.01 -0.00 0.90 
             (8.30a) (4.77a) (-0.03) (5.52a) 
𝛾𝛾0         0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.21 0.04 
         (1.21) (0.19) (-2.46b) (0.20) (-0.86) (0.40) (-2.46b) (0.53) 
𝛾𝛾1         2.39 2.38 0.54 2.44 0.22 2.28 0.54 1.04 
         (8.71a) (7.50a) (2.60a) (6.62a) (2.96a) (7.51a) (2.59a) (5.49a) 
𝜎𝜎 0.63 0.79 1.23 0.99 0.59 0.82 1.22 1.07 0.62 0.78 1.18 0.96 0.57 0.72 1.18 0.98 
 (17.41a) (17.81a) (17.53a (17.10a) (18.37a) (18.10a) (16.55a) (18.36a) (17.83a) (17.23a) (17.60a) (17.11a) (17.33a) (14.63a) (17.60a) (17.57a) 
𝛼𝛼 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.31 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.07 
 (0.88) (1.17) (0.86) (0.90) (1.57) (0.70) (1.22) (0.22) (0.98) (0.84) (0.60) (0.71) (1.29) (0.95) (0.61) (0.36) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.27 
 (4.91a) (7.39a) (1.86c) (9.76a) (5.72a) (7.70a) (2.00b) (10.13a) (6.00a) (7.46a) (2.26b) (10.35a) (6.27a) (8.41a) (2.24b) (11.62a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.09 
 (0.48) (1.72c) (0.25) (2.00b) (1.07) (1.55) (0.17) (1.76c) (0.66) (1.54) (0.31) (1.99b) (1.08) (2.03b) (0.31) (2.51b) 
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𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (-2.74a) (-0.82) (0.61) (-0.38) (-1.57) (-0.81) (0.91) (-0.56) (-1.63) (-0.84) (0.66) (-0.37) (-2.03b) (-0.49) (0.66) (-0.61) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.42) (2.41b) (2.49b) (1.26) (1.70c) (1.94c) (3.97a) (0.98) (1.56) (1.75c) (2.85a) (0.97) (1.40) (2.19b) (2.82a) (1.95c) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.28) (0.45) (2.07b) (0.47) (-0.31) (0.53) (2.06b) (0.44) (-0.38) (0.04) (1.96b) (0.42) (0.23) (0.57) (1.96b) (1.22) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.01) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.34) (-0.07) (-0.39) (-0.10) (0.34) (0.18) (-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.08) (0.05) (-0.13) (-0.09) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.07 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.22 
 (1.61) (2.91a) (2.46b) (3.79a) (3.01a) (2.69a) (2.72a) (3.70a) (3.49a) (3.62a) (2.39b) (4.47a) (1.90c) (3.62a) (2.38b) (3.33a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 0.09 -0.33 0.02 0.07 -0.25 -0.18 -0.32 0.07 -0.39 -0.25 -0.48 0.12 -0.51 -0.33 -0.47 -0.34 
 (0.30) (-0.95) (0.03) (0.16) (-0.91) (-0.48) (-0.55) (0.15) (-1.49) (-0.75) (-0.95) (0.29) (-1.95c) (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.73) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -0.70 -1.22 0.77 -0.97 -0.98 -0.87 0.15 -0.88 -1.25 -1.15 0.16 -0.92 -1.19 -0.92 0.17 -1.35 
 (-2.37a) (-3.63a) (1.33) (-2.22b) (-3.52a) (-2.20b) (0.23) (-1.71c) (-4.78a) (-3.49a) (0.32) (-2.25b) (-4.55a) (-2.87a) (0.32) (-2.69a) 
𝑝𝑝11 0.81 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.99 0.93 0.81 0.91     0.98 0.94 0.81 0.98 
 (4.07a) (0.01) (3.34a) (0.00) (73.17a) (10.26a) (2.92a) (7.85a)     (75.17a) (16.85a) (0.01) (57.47a) 
𝑝𝑝00 0.86 0.90 0.73 0.89 0.00 0.71 0.67 0.80     0.00 0.48 0.79 0.86 
 (5.34a) (16.87a) (2.08b) (11.69a) (0.00) (2.28b) (0.75) (4.00a)     (0.00) (1.64) (0.01) (8.26a) 
𝐿𝐿11         0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.50 0.81 
         (0.00) (0.00) (1.40) (0.00) (3.13a) (0.00) (1.40) (4.23a) 
𝐿𝐿00         0.95 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.99 
         (36.02a) (22.64a) (10.75a) (20.79a) (10.64a) (23.14a) (10.75a) (96.73a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅) (3.75a) (7.11a) (2.23b) (5.51a)             
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎)     (3.59a) (3.58a) (-1.04) (2.84a)         
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)             (8.33a) (4.99a) (0.00) (5.37a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝          (8.43a) (7.36a) (3.34a) (6.48a) (2.92a) (7.34a) (3.33a) (4.92a) ln 𝐿𝐿 -191.69 -226.40 -296.98 -265.03 -192.04 -237.08 -296.02 -271.32 -184.70 -227.65 -293.77 -263.96 -184.59 -223.43 -293.77 -264.59 RM2  0.19 0.22 0.04 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.23 
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Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics. Panel A reports the results of the FWCI, FOFs, EDI and MI. Panel B reports 
the results of the FOFs sub-categories. In model (IV), the FX return-timing model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹������ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the FX market return level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is the average market return level; 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  measures the state-
dependent return timing skill. In model (V), the volatility-timing model to be estimated is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎 �𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹������ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the stock market volatility level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����� is the average market volatility level; 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎  measures the state-dependent volatility-timing skill. 
Monthly volatility is calculated as monthly standard deviation of market return. In model (VI), the risk-adjusted-return-timing model to be estimated is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹������ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the risk adjusted return (Sharpe ratio) at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹���� is the average Sharpe ratio level. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 measures the state-dependent Sharpe-ratio-timing skill. In 
model (IV), (V) and (VI), 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is characterized by the two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} as follows: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
Model (VII) jointly time market-wide liquidity and risk adjusted return (Sharpe ratio) of the FX market as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1��������� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2) 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  measures market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. It is assumed to be characterized by the two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 as: 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡) + (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0)𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡; 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 measures Sharpe-ratio-timing skill. It is assumed to be characterized by the two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 as: 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝  = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡) + (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,1𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 − 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝)𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡. 
The two-state stochastic process on 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is summarized by the transition probability matrix: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠1𝑡𝑡  � 𝑆𝑆1,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠1,𝑡𝑡−1� = �𝑝𝑝00 𝑝𝑝10𝑝𝑝01 𝑝𝑝11�      𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠2𝑡𝑡  � 𝑆𝑆2,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠2,𝑡𝑡−1� = �𝐿𝐿00 𝐿𝐿10𝐿𝐿01 𝐿𝐿11�. 
In model (IV), (V), (VI) and (VII), 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh (2004), the 
term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The t-statistics are in 
the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅, i.e. the difference 
between  𝜆𝜆1𝑅𝑅 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑅𝑅; 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝜎𝜎  and  𝜆𝜆0𝜎𝜎; 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞, i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞; 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝, i.e. the difference between 𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝and 𝜆𝜆0𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝. 
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Figure 5.8 Regime indicators of the ‘timing’ state for the FWCI 
 
112 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Regime indicators of the ‘timing’ state for the MI 
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The difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑅𝑅 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑅𝑅 and that between  𝜆𝜆1𝜎𝜎 and  𝜆𝜆0𝜎𝜎 of the FWCI have t-statistic 
of 4.28 and 2.10, which indicate that they differ significantly from zero at 1% and 5% 
significance level respectively. Both the FX return- and volatility-timing coefficients switch 
between a ‘non-timing’ state and a ‘timing’ state (𝜆𝜆1𝑅𝑅  is 0.583, 𝜆𝜆0𝜎𝜎  is -0.207, both are 
significant at 1% significance level). As shown in Figure 5.8, in August 2008, hedge fund 
managers on average had the skill to decrease their fund’s FX market exposure prior to the 
fall of the FX return level or the rise of FX volatility. Similar to model (IV), the results of 
model (VI) indicate that the FWCI has Sharpe ratio timing coefficient that switched between 
the ‘non-timing’ state and ‘timing’ state. The Sharpe-ratio-timing coefficient 𝜆𝜆1
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 of the 
FWCI in the ‘timing’ state is significantly positive (1.635), indicating a phase in which the 
managers have the skill to increase (decrease) the fund’s FX market exposure prior to the rise 
(fall) of the risk adjusted return level of the FX market. The results of model (VII) show that 
even after controlling for FX return and FX volatility, the FWCI still shows that the state-
dependent market-liquidity-timing coefficient which switches between two significantly 
different states (𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)  is 3.18): a ‘non-timing’ state, which dominates good market 
liquidity condition periods, and a ‘timing’ state, which the FWCI switched to during the 
liquidity crisis in 2008. The FOFs (total, Diversified, Strategic and Conservative) and EDI 
show similar results. 
On the other hand, interesting results are found in the MI and MD FOFs in that the market-
wide-liquidity-timing skill disappears after controlling for the Sharpe ratio, whereas the 
Sharpe-ratio-timing skill exists throughout the sample period, as shown in Figure 5.9. The 
results of model (VI) show that the MI and MD FOFs have Sharpe-ratio-timing coefficients 
which switch from a ‘timing’ state to another significantly different ‘timing’ state. During the 
most severe period of the financial crisis in 2008, the high-frequency trading flash crash in 
2010 and the Greece government insolvency in 2010, hedge fund managers of the two 
strategies were in a ‘timing’ state with significantly positive timing coefficients 𝜆𝜆1
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 (0.4 
for the MI at 5% significance level; 0.54 for the MD FOFs at 1% significance level). In this 
state, the managers act like managers of other strategies and decrease their fund’s FX market 
exposure prior to the fall of the risk adjusted return. In contrast, when the FX market 
conditions are good, the MI and MD FOFs switch to another ‘timing’ state which has 
significantly negative 𝜆𝜆0
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 (-0.23 for the MI and -0.21 for the MD FOFs at 1% significance 
level) and dominates the sample period. In this state, the managers decrease (increase) their 
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fund’s FX market exposure prior to the rise (fall) of FX return. Engaged in short-biased 
strategies, such as short selling and using the futures, the MD FOFs generally exhibits higher 
returns during down markets than during up markets and show a negative correlation to the 
general market benchmarks. This approach, which is the reverse of other investment styles 
found in the MD FOFs in good market conditions, helps to construct a negative correlation 
with the general market benchmarks. The sacrifice of lower return in good market conditions 
helps to explain the higher returns during down markets than during up markets.  
The broad range of strategies of the MI are executed based on the predication of the 
movement of underlying macroeconomic variables and the subsequent impact on equity, 
fixed income, currency, commodity markets and especially security prices. Given the 
frequent trading in the liquid futures markets and the frequent outright directional market risk 
taken, the MI is expected to be much less exposed to liquidity risk. This pattern is fully 
revealed in the results of model (VII).  After controlling for market return and volatility, the 
evidence of significant liquidity-timing under severe market conditions found previously 
becomes much weaker. Given that market liquidity is positively correlated with market return 
and negatively correlated with market volatility, this disappeared liquidity-timing skill of the 
MI could be merely a reflection of the managers' skill to time the future movement of prices, 
returns and volatility. Similar results are found for the MD FOFs. The MD FOFs mainly 
focuses on return and invest in short-biased strategies that attempt to capture profits when the 
market declines by holding investments that are overall biased towards holding short 
positions. Therefore, the evidence on liquidity-timing is also a reflection of the managers' 
skill to time market return and volatility. This result helps to explain the long-lasting market-
liquidity-timing skill since 2010 shown in model (I).  
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5.7 Conclusions 
Due to a different regulatory regime than those confronting the mutual funds, hedge funds 
have been able to invest with fewer restrictions and take positions in sophisticated strategies. 
Therefore, hedge fund managers are expected to be able to adapt their funds’ market 
exposure by executing their timing skill. The great liquidity deteriorations during the recent 
financial crisis highlight the importance of liquidity conditions to the investment management 
process, especially for hedge funds given their sophisticated strategies. The evidence of 
different magnitudes of timing skill found by Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) and Li, Luo 
and Tee (2016) suggest potential time-variation in timing skill. This chapter has investigated 
the structural breaks of the timing skill of hedge fund managers in relation to FX liquidity. 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of incorporating FX market-wide liquidity in 
regard to hedge funds’ investment decision-making under severe market conditions. The 
results had several implications. They emphasised the existence of FX market-wide-liquidity-
timing skill and the structural breaks in this. The timing skill was mainly triggered, when 
severe liquidity crisis occurred, by increased risk aversion to the unexpected liquidity shocks 
under the severe market liquidity conditions due to the higher trading costs, such as the cost 
of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006; Melvin and Taylor, 2009). In particular, the managers 
reduced their funds’ FX exposure prior to the deteriorations in FX market-wide liquidity, 
which captured the aggregate ease of transacting a large quantity of assets in a short time 
without incurring high costs (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). On 
the other hand, when the FX market was in good condition, liquidity was not a major concern 
for the managers given that the FX market has the largest trading volume in the world. In 
addition, managers of most hedge funds categories of hedge funds were found to 
simultaneously possess skills in timing return, volatility and market-wide liquidity in their 
investment management.  
Mixed results were found for different hedge fund strategies. Hedge fund managers on 
average and those invest in funds that have close relationships to the FX market, such as the 
FOFs and EDI, were found to have the skill to time FX liquidity. This skill was mainly 
triggered during the severe liquidity crisis in summer 2007 and fall 2008. The switching of 
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liquidity-timing skill shed some light on the inconclusive results on the existence of hedge 
fund managers’ market timing skill. Among the FOFs, the Strategic FOFs showed the 
strongest FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill, which may be partly due to its engagement 
in aggressive and opportunistic strategies, such as the Emerging Markets, Sector specific and 
Equity Hedge (Gregoriou, 2011). The Conservative FOFs managers showed an overall strong 
but short-lived timing skill, which reflected a focus on investments with consistent but lower 
returns regardless of market conditions. These results were verified using different risk 
benchmarks and controls for market return and volatility. Investigations during the period 
before and after the financial crisis consistently reveal that the FOFs only showed market-
wide-liquidity-timing skill under severe market liquidity conditions. 
Managers of most categories of hedge funds were found to simultaneously possess skills in 
timing return, volatility and market-wide liquidity in their investment management, with two 
exceptions, the MI and MD FOFs. The broad range of strategies of the MI are based on the 
predication of movement underlying the macroeconomic variables and the subsequent impact 
on equity, fixed income, currency and commodity markets, especially on outright directional 
market risk. Therefore, the managers are expected to time prices, returns and volatility 
instead of liquidity. This pattern was found to hold in the FX context in that the FX market-
wide-liquidity-timing skill of the MI disappeared after controlling for FX return and FX 
volatility. Similar results were found for the MD FOFs. In particular, timing skill reverts to 
other investment styles found in the MD FOFs in good market conditions, helping to 
construct negative correlations to the general market benchmarks. The sacrifice of lower 
returns in good market conditions helps to explain the higher returns during down markets 
than during up markets.  
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Chapter 6  
Hedge Fund Performance: Selection Ability  
The other source of the superior performance of hedge fund managers is their selection ability 
(Jensen, 1968, 1972; Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986). This is related to the 
manager’s ability to forecast the future individual security prices and pick the best securities 
at a given level of risk (Jensen, 1968, 1972; Fama, 1972). Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968, 
1972) has been commonly used to measure selectivity. It represents the incremental rate of 
average return above the beta adjusted market return and the expected excess return from 
‘microforecast’ (Jensen, 1968, 1972; Fama, 1972; Henriksson and Merton, 1981). In 
an efficient market, the expected value of alpha is zero, implying that a fund has earned a 
return justifiable for the risk taken. If otherwise, the investment has earned in excess of the 
reward (alpha is greater than zero) or too little (alpha is less than zero) for the assumed risk. 
Since hedge funds include various fees that compensate managers for their skills, and many 
managers aim to achieve a positive return regardless of whether markets are rising or falling, 
hedge funds are assumed to maintain alphas greater than their fees in order to provide 
positive gains compared to an index fund. 
Many studies in the literature suggest that hedge fund performance may exhibit structural 
breaks when suffering from sudden shocks of crisis. For instance, most categories of HFR 
hedge fund return indices experienced a common structural break in December 2000 (Fung 
and Hsieh, 2004; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008; Kosowski, Naik, and Teo, 2007). 
Some hedge funds have been found to allow large negative returns in exchange for long 
periods of above average returns, such as the Fixed-Income Arbitrage strategies. This chapter 
empirically examines whether structural breaks in the alpha exist and if they do, whether they 
are affected by FX market indicators. The model structure of Filardo (1994) is applied to 
allow the states of alpha and idiosyncratic volatility to be path dependent. In particular, the 
states are assumed to evolve according to the same first-order Markov process with time-
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varying transition probabilities. Indicators of the FX market, i.e. market return, market 
volatility and liquidity (both market-wide liquidity and liquidity commonality) are 
incorporated as exogenous variables to identify the systematic variations in the transition 
probabilities. An exploration of the potential FX related driving forces underlying the 
transition probabilities helps to identify the current phase of alpha and test the imminent 
turning points. 
6.1 The TVTP model specification 
The dynamics of the alpha and idiosyncratic volatility cannot be observed or deduced 
directly. They are both assumed to be state dependent and to evolve according to a first-order 
Markov process 55 . Specifically, each hedge fund return is regressed on risk factors as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝐽𝐽,𝑡𝑡11
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 ) ,                                                    (6. 1)          
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of strategy i at time t; 𝑓𝑓𝐽𝐽,𝑡𝑡 are risk factors that benchmark the hedge 
fund returns, including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh 
(2004), ∆Term and ∆Credit of Sadka (2010), EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001), 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 and FX 
liquidity factors, i.e. market-wide liquidity 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿55F56 and liquidity commonality 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚; 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the state-dependent alpha; and 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  is the state-dependent error process57. 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  and 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  
are assumed to be characterised by the same phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1})58 as follows:  
𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                                                   (6. 2) 
                                                 
55 This model assumes that the state-dependent alphas and idiosyncratic volatility are best characterized by two 
states. Various methods, such as the ones proposed by Boldin (1990), Garcia( 1992), Hamilton (1991), and 
Hansen (1992), are able to evaluate the number of states present in the data have been proposed. However, tests 
of the number of states imply restrictions that make the information matrix of the parameters singular under the 
null. The regularity conditions of the preceding asymptotically valid test statistics therefore do not hold. Given 
that the issue of TVTP is of primary importance in this article, assuming the presence of two states sidesteps this 
difficult issue and justifies the asymptotic tests. 
56 Spreads measure illiquidity. In this chapter, a minus sign is added to spreads of currencies so that a higher 
magnitude of average minus spreads indicates better liquidity condition. 
57 Markov-switching idiosyncratic error term 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is considered in the model specification mainly to account for 
the heteroskedasticity effect, the time-varying property of 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is not further analysed in this chapter.  
58 This model assumes that the state-dependent alphas and idiosyncratic volatility are best characterized by two 
states. Various methods, such as the ones proposed by Boldin (1990), Garcia( 1992), Hamilton (1991), and 
Hansen (1992), are able to evaluate the number of states present in the data have been proposed. However, tests 
of the number of states imply restrictions that make the information matrix of the parameters singular under the 
null. The regularity conditions of the preceding asymptotically valid test statistics therefore do not hold. Given 
that the issue of TVTP is of primary importance in this article, assuming the presence of two states sidesteps this 
difficult issue and justifies the asymptotic tests. 
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𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜎𝜎02(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎12𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                                (6. 3) 
Test of two distinct alphas assesses the statistical significance of the difference between 𝛼𝛼1 
and 𝛼𝛼0 which is denoted by ∆𝛼𝛼 as follows:  
∆𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼0 .                                                                                                                    (6. 4) 
Let 𝛂𝛂 be an (2 × 1) vector of the ML estimates of the timing coefficients [𝛼𝛼�1,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 𝛼𝛼�0,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿]T, Cov(𝛂𝛂�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) be the covariance matrix of 𝛂𝛂, Cov(∆𝛼𝛼�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) be the covariance matrix of ∆𝛼𝛼  and 
𝑔𝑔(. ) be the transformation of 𝛂𝛂 into ∆𝛼𝛼. Then the ML estimate of ∆𝛼𝛼 is obtained as follows: 
∆𝛼𝛼�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼�1,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼�0,𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ,                                                                                                      (6. 5) 
Cov(∆𝛼𝛼�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) = �𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔(𝛂𝛂�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝛂𝛂 �Cov(𝛂𝛂�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿)�𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔(𝛂𝛂�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿)𝜕𝜕𝛂𝛂 �𝑇𝑇 = [1 −1]Cov(𝛂𝛂�𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿)[ 1−1] .            (6. 6) 
The t-statistic is applied to statistically test the significance of ∆𝛼𝛼 . If ∆𝛼𝛼  is significantly 
different from zero, then the hypothesis that the alphas 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  are the same in the two states 
(𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼0 ) can be rejected. State-dependent idiosyncratic volatilities 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  are tested in a 
similar way. Tests for the existence of state-dependent alphas gauge whether there are 
structural breaks in selection ability. The inferred probabilities of the states are presented to 
verify that structural breaks in alpha are captured. In this thesis, a ‘normal’ state is 
characterised by an alpha that is insignificantly different from zero (no excess return); an 
‘outperform’ state is characterised by a significantly positive alpha (excess return); and an 
‘underperform’ state is characterised by a significantly negative alpha (excess loss). 
The state transition probabilities are assumed to be functions of the FX market indicators 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭. 
The stochastic process on the discrete-valued Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) can 
be summarized by the following transition probability matrix:  
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = �𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡� = � 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) � ,                               (6. 7)  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                        (6. 8) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                 (6. 9) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) ,                                                                      (6. 10) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1,𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) .                                                               (6. 11) 
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In the TVTP model, the Markov-switching parameters in Eq. (6.1) to Eq. (6.3) and the 
transition probability parameters in Eq. (6.7) are jointly estimated 59 . The maximum 
likelihood method is applied to jointly estimate the parameters and the Markov process on the 
states 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡. Kim’s (1994) algorithm, which encompasses Hamilton’s filter (1989) and Kalman 
filter, is used to classify the observations into the two unobserved states and to jointly 
estimate the approximate maximum likelihood estimators. The transition probabilities are re-
parameterized with the logistic functions of Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994) and Filardo 
(1994) to map the information variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 into the open interval (0, 1) so as to guarantee a 
well-defined log-likelihood function as follows: 
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 ) ,                                                                       (6. 12) 
𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 ) .                                                                        (6. 13) 
The sum of probabilities over all 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}) is equal to one for each 𝑡𝑡. If the restriction 
that 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘 = 0, for 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0 is satisfied, this model collapses to a FTP model. The Markov-
switching model with TVTP is jointly tested for the appropriateness of the Markov-switching 
alpha with heteroskedastic disturbances and the functional form of the time-varying 
probabilities using the likelihood-ratio test. In particular, under the null hypothesis of 
constant alpha with homoscedastic disturbances (no transition probabilities or time variation 
in the transition probabilities), the model is not accepted if: 
 𝛹𝛹 = 2 × [𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃) − 𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅)] > 𝜒𝜒𝐾𝐾1+𝐾𝐾2,𝛼𝛼2  ,                                                                             (6. 14) 
where 𝐾𝐾1 + 𝐾𝐾2 is the number of restrictions. In order to justify Hamilton (1990) filter for 
maximum likelihood estimation, the information variables are required to be related to the 
switches between states but conditionally independent with the latent variables indicating 
states. The candidate series for the information variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 used here include some important 
FX market indicators, i.e. market return, volatility and liquidity (market-wide liquidity and 
liquidity commonality). The type of "news" contained in the 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭 variables can be inferred from 
                                                 
59 Kiefer (1978) has shown that for an individual independent distribution switching model, if the second 
derivatives of the likelihood function are non-singular at the true parameter value, the negative of the inverse of 
the matrix of second partial derivatives of the likelihood function at the true parameter value is consistent 
estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the parameter values. For this reason, in order for the 
standard likelihood-ratio testes of the restrictions to be valid, both test for the significance of the switching 
model parameters and the joint test for the significance of TVTP coefficients will assume that functions of the 
significance of the restrictions are twice differentiable around the true parameters and the gradient of the 
functions are of full rank in the neighbourhood of the true parameters. 
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the movements in 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) and 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭). The TVTP coefficients 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝  correspond to the transition 
probabilities 𝑝𝑝00,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝01,𝑡𝑡, whereas 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝 correspond to 𝐿𝐿11,𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿10,𝑡𝑡. The information on the 
FX market indicators can generally be interpreted in the form of ‘good’ news and ‘bad’ news 
in the TVTP specifications as follows: 
(a) The coefficient of liquidity commonality in Eq. (6.12), 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀, is expected to be positive. 
An increase in liquidity commonality indicates a stronger systematic co-movement of 
liquidities. It impairs the ability to diversify liquidity risk and is interpreted as ‘bad news’.  In 
this case, the probability that alpha is likely to stay in the ‘normal’ state in the next period, 
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), increases. In the meantime, the probability of alpha switching to the ‘outperform’ state 
in the next period, 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)  decreases. On the other hand, the coefficient of liquidity 
commonality in Eq. (6.13), 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 , is expected to be negative. A decline in liquidity 
commonality indicates lower systematic co-movement of liquidities, which enhances the 
diversification ability to lower liquidity risk and is interpreted as ‘good news’. In this case, 
the probability that alpha will stay in the ‘outperform’ state in the next period, 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) , 
increases, and the probability that alpha will switch from the ‘outperform’ to the ‘normal’ 
state in the next period, 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), decreases. 
(b) The coefficient of market liquidity in Eq. (6.12), 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞, is expected to be negative. A 
decline in the aggregate liquidity indicates an overall worse liquidity condition that exposes 
investors to more liquidity risk and can be interpreted as ‘bad news’. In this case, the 
probability that alpha will stay in the ‘normal’ state in the next period, 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), increases and 
the probability that alpha will switch to the ‘outperform’ state in the next period, 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), 
decreases. On the other hand, the coefficient of market liquidity in Eq. (6.13), 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞, is 
expected to be positive. An increase in market-wide liquidity indicates a more liquid FX 
market and can be interpreted as ‘good news’.  In this case, the probability of alpha staying in 
the ‘outperform’ state in the next period, 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) , increases, and the probability of alpha 
switching to the ‘normal’ state in the next period, 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), decreases. 
(c) The coefficient of market volatility in Eq. (6.12), 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷, is expected to be positive. A 
positive volatility shock indicates a more volatile FX market condition and comes in the form 
of ‘bad news’. In this case, the probability that alpha will stay in the ‘normal’ state in the next 
period, 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), increases, and the probability that alpha will switch to the ‘outperform’ state in 
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the next period, 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭), decreases. On the other hand, the coefficient of market volatility 
in Eq. (6.13), 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷, is expected to be negative. A negative volatility shock as ‘good news’ 
is associated with higher 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) and lower 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭). 
(d) The coefficient of market return in Eq. (6.12), 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑅𝑅, is expected to be negative. If 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 
decreases and 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)  increases when a positive shock in market return occurs, the 
probability of alpha staying in the ‘normal’ state decreases and switching from the ‘normal’ 
to the ‘outperform’ state increases. In the sense that the probability of alpha being in the 
‘outperform’ state at time 𝑡𝑡 +  1 increases regardless of the state at time 𝑡𝑡, a positive shock in 
market return is interpreted as ‘good news’. On the other hand, the coefficient of market 
volatility in Eq. (6.13), 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅, is expected to be negative. A negative shock in market return as 
‘bad news’ is associated with lower 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) and higher 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭). 
Analysis of the following empirical results focuses on three research issues: (a) whether 
structural breaks in alpha exist and whether alpha can be identified as the two significantly 
different phases; (b) whether the FX market indicators are the intrinsic drivers underlying 
switching alpha; (c) whether hedge fund returns are exposed to risk arising from FX market-
wide liquidity or FX liquidity commonality. 
6.2 The FWCI 
The results of the FWCI are reported in table 6.160. The t-statistics for ∆𝛼𝛼 is 2.01 and the 
hypothesis that it is zero is rejected. Therefore, the alpha parameters 𝛼𝛼0 and 𝛼𝛼1 of the FWCI 
in the two states are significantly different from each other at the 5% significance level. The 
alpha of state 0, 𝛼𝛼0, is insignificantly different from zero, indicating a ‘normal’ phase when 
the hedge funds on average earn no excess return. On the other hand, the alpha in state 1, 𝛼𝛼1, 
is significantly positive (0.449), indicating an ‘outperform’ phase when the hedge funds 
overall have a monthly excess return of 0.449%61.  
                                                 
60 The findings are robust to the usage of the denominated currency such as CHF, EUR, GBP and JPY.  
61 The reverse is found in the idiosyncratic volatility. The volatility in state 0, 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0 , is significantly positive, 
whereas that in state 1, 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒1, is significantly less than 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0 on magnitude (𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎) is -7.82). Given the primary 
focus here is alpha, Markov-switching idiosyncratic error term 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is considered in the model specification 
mainly to account for the heteroskedasticity effect, the time-varying property of 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is not further analysed in 
this chapter. A more sophisticated test approach and analysis for 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is recommended in future research. 
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Table 6.1 Estimates of the TVTP model for the FWCI, FOFs, EDI and EMI 
  FWCI  FOFs  EDI  EMI 
Parame
ter  Total   Total 
Conserv
ative 
Diversif
ied 
MD 
 
Strategi
c  Total 
Distress
ed/Restr
ucturing 
Merger 
Arbitrag
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Asia ex-
Japan 
Global Latin Americ
a 
Russia/
Eastern 
Europe 
𝛼𝛼0  0.03  0.08 -0.92 0.09 0.02 -0.23  -0.54 0.02 0.18  0.36 0.71 0.10 1.80 -0.18 
  (0.23)  (0.33) (-2.60a) (0.44) (0.05) (-0.75)  (-1.16) (0.06) (0.46)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.49) (1.18) (0.13) (2.60a) (-0.08) 
𝛼𝛼1  0.45  0.88 0.14 0.96 0.71 0.34  0.53 1.06 0.28  3.03 3.77 2.23 2.29 4.50 
  (2.65a)  (4.04a) (0.78) (5.08a) (2.05b) (1.74c)  (2.07b) (4.55a) (0.72)  (4.71a) (5.50a) (4.77a) (3.13a) (2.95a) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0  1.22  1.04 1.36 1.03 1.50 1.71  1.44 1.31 0.88  1.63 1.99 1.49 3.93 2.50 
  (10.94a)  (15.50a) (6.31a) (15.35a) (9.31a) (9.35a)  (6.90a) (9.80a) (11.93a)  (6.60a) (10.45a) (4.03a) (8.57a) (5.39a) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒1  0.30  0.16 0.44 0.15 0.70 0.59  0.52 0.68 0.32  1.40 1.67 1.14 1.71 2.80 
  (8.47a)  (6.03a) (9.95a) (7.50a) (5.56a) (9.61a)  (10.23a) (12.47a) (11.98a) (9.41a) (8.50a) (13.75a) (10.35a) (8.81a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.23  0.19 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.24  0.20 0.15 0.11  0.41 0.39 0.31 0.48 0.61 
  (18.37a)  (16.63a) (6.63a) (16.92a) (1.67c) (11.55a)  (12.50a) (6.73a) (9.79a)  (9.04a) (7.75a) (10.48a) (8.19a) (5.57a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.11  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.09  0.16 0.07 0.02  0.02 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.14 
  (6.95a)  (2.11b) (2.40b) (2.28b) (0.61) (3.49a)  (6.95a) (2.21b) (1.33)  (0.37) (1.04) (1.57) (0.11) (-0.88) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.01  0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00 -0.01 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (2.36b)  (3.73a) (-1.56) (4.11a) (1.69c) (-0.01)  (-0.77) (-2.34b) (0.38)  (-0.79) (-0.65) (-0.75) (-0.57) (-0.51) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.01  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
  (2.86a)  (3.07a) (1.23) (3.25a) (4.38a) (2.29b)  (0.17) (0.38) (2.48b) (0.65) (1.88c) (0.63) (-0.36) (-0.98) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
  (-0.40)  (-1.01) (-0.09) (-1.00) (2.25b) (-1.22)  (-1.54) (-1.09) (-1.97b)  (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.20) (-0.15) (-1.41) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  0.01  0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02  -0.01 -0.02 0.00  -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 
  (1.21)  (-0.50) (1.33) (-1.39) (0.07) (1.69c)  (-0.82) (-1.67c) (-0.65)  (-3.71a) (-2.14b) (-3.02a) (-2.34a) (-1.16) 
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𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   0.25  0.17 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.29  0.39 0.37 0.04  0.94 0.94 0.75 0.88 1.20 
  (7.51a)  (6.33a) (4.30a) (5.36a) (2.88a) (4.94a)  (8.55a) (5.83a) (1.36)  (6.32a) (6.19a) (7.13a) (5.26a) (5.36a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.63  0.07 -0.43 0.06 -0.11 -0.26  -0.63 -0.36 -0.38  -0.77 0.09 -0.51 -1.64 -1.22 
  (-1.91c)  (0.32) (-1.65c) (0.31) (-0.22) (-0.69)  (-2.41b) (-0.95) (-2.22b)  (-1.14) (0.10) (-0.91) (-1.66c) (-0.74) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  -0.78  -0.75 -0.57 -0.91 0.55 -0.28  -1.48 -1.28 -0.58  -1.30 -0.76 -1.33 -1.14 -1.21 
  (-2.30b)  (-3.37a) (-2.14b) (-4.58a) (0.91) (-0.67)  (-5.31a) (-3.27a) (-3.22a)  (-1.97b) (-0.91) (-2.49b) (-1.07) (-0.83) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   -0.23  -0.21 -0.06 -0.16 -0.13 -0.49  0.02 -0.06 0.00  -0.49 -1.24 -0.52 -1.16 -0.37 
  (-2.17b)  (-2.28b) (-0.45) (-1.46) (-0.46) (-2.79a)  (0.16) (-0.30) (-0.03)  (-1.07) (-2.25b) (-1.38) (-2.16b) (-0.22) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.06  0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07  0.07 0.07 0.05  0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝0  0.85  2.54 -0.20 1.65 0.51 2.18  -0.89 2.21 3.16  -0.29 0.93 -0.28 1.74 0.62 
  (1.76c)  (2.40b) (-0.22) (4.15a) (0.63) (2.04b)  (-0.80) (1.90c) (2.34b)  (-0.46) (1.62) (-0.46) (2.64a) (0.92) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   -0.20  -0.06 -0.08 -0.46 -0.19 -1.22  0.72 0.98 4.43  -0.07 -0.86 0.01 -0.59 0.52 
  (-0.37)  (-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.92) (-0.32) (-0.84)  (0.67) (1.08) (2.18b)  (-0.08) (-1.42) (0.01) (-0.77) (0.45) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.19  -0.37 0.21 -0.25 -0.48 -2.24  0.03 -0.86 -2.30  -0.15 -0.21 -0.03 0.77 -0.29 
  (0.34)  (-1.10) (0.37) (-0.99) (-0.51) (-0.81)  (0.04) (-1.21) (-2.01b)  (-0.31) (-0.48) (-0.05) (1.25) (-0.63) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷  -0.14  2.37 0.86 0.73 1.41 1.54  -0.67 -0.29 -2.68  -1.13 -0.37 -0.98 -0.39 0.09 
  (-0.34)  (1.78c) (1.12) (1.58) (1.09) (1.26)  (-0.62) (-0.57) (-2.34b)  (-0.61) (-0.78) (-0.47) (-0.81) (0.20) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑅𝑅  -0.11  0.29 0.71 -0.19 0.59 0.32  -1.58 0.97 0.08  -0.29 -0.15 -0.15 -0.09 0.00 
  (-0.33)  (0.57) (0.86) (-0.42) (0.87) (0.41)  (-1.25) (1.04) (0.13)  (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.18) (-0.15) (0.00) 
𝜑𝜑𝑞𝑞0  0.83  0.39 2.39 -0.02 -0.15 2.43  1.60 2.41 2.08  1.53 1.43 2.35 2.82 1.34 
  (1.57)  (0.87) (3.30a) (-0.05) (-0.18) (4.97a)  (2.91a) (3.98a) (2.15b)  (2.12b) (1.81c) (2.73a) (3.21a) (1.77c) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   -0.19  0.36 0.09 0.80 0.01 -0.15  0.03 0.25 3.42  0.74) 0.58 1.47 0.93 0.67 
  (-0.53)  (0.90) (0.21) (0.91) (0.01) (-0.28)  (0.06) (0.51) (2.06b)  (1.22) (0.82) (0.92) (1.61) (1.39) 
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𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.21  -0.07 0.73 -0.24 0.20 -0.11  0.41 -0.71 -1.44  -0.28 -0.29 -0.14 -0.88 0.65 
  (0.48)  (-0.19) (1.07) (-0.57) (0.44) (-0.25)  (0.68) (-1.54) (-1.74c)  (-0.70) (-0.47) (-0.27) (-1.18) (1.19) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷  -1.07  -0.23 -0.02 -1.29 -0.44 -0.50  -0.60 0.08 -0.13  -1.62 -1.70 -1.88 -1.05 0.30 
  (-1.69c)  (-0.43) (-0.03) (-1.52) (-0.60) (-1.11)  (-1.76c) (0.13) (-0.29)  (-2.57b) (-2.26b) (-1.48) (-1.52) (0.72) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅  -0.39  0.55 0.59 1.36 0.26 0.25  0.09 -0.47 -0.73  2.28 2.39 2.21 0.61 2.18 
  (-0.72)  (0.92) (0.81) (1.66c) (0.39) (0.36)  (0.28) (-0.54) (-1.34)  (2.89a) (2.45b) (1.70c) (0.74) (2.36b) ln 𝐿𝐿  -179.52  -199.09 -151.23 -199.48 -272.23 -229.78  -186.07 -230.94 -135.93  -334.83 -373.07 -294.25 -395.72 -449.89 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼)  (2.01b)  (2.52a) (2.68a) (3.14a) (1.35) (1.58)  (2.02b) (2.75a) (0.17)  (2.72a) (3.37a) (2.26b) (0.49) (1.78c) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎)  (-7.82a)  (-12.20a) 
 
(-4.18a) (-12.54a) (-3.88a) (-5.80a)  (-4.27a) (-4.36a) (-7.19a)  (-0.82) (-1.17) (-0.92) (-4.56a) (0.53) 
LR  92.03  89.30 134.60 89.06 72.46 88.80  92.49 67.80 128.28  277.65 543.41 127.91 770.51 1600.2
4 
Note: This table summarizes the coefficients and the t-statistics of the Markov-switching alpha model with TVTP for the FWCI, FOFs, EDI, EMI and their sub-categories. . 
Each strategy in the sample has at least 174 monthly returns. The model specification is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡11
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 �. 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of strategy i in month t; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,11) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh 
(2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010), EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001), FXF, 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀) 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 of the FX market; 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  
measures the state-dependent alpha; 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  measures the state-dependent error process, both are characterized by the same two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1) as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,     𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜎𝜎02(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎12𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
The state transition probabilities are functions of the FX market indicators variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭, including market return (R), market volatility (STD), market-wide liquidity (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿) 
and liquidity commonality (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀) 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡), as follows:  
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = � 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) �. 
The state transition probabilities are re-parameterized with a logistic function as follows: 
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝛼𝛼, 
i.e. the difference between 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼0. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜎𝜎, i.e. the difference between 𝜎𝜎1 and 𝜎𝜎0. 
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Figure 6.1 depicts the time path of a regime indicator of the smoothed probabilities of the 
‘outperform’ state. Following the literature, the ‘outperform’ state was in force at the time t if Pr[St = 1|𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡] ≥ 0.5 (in this case, the regime indicator is set to equal one), whereas the 
‘normal’ regime was in force at the time t if Pr[St = 1|𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡] < 0.5 (in this case, the regime 
indicator is set to equal zero). The ‘outperform’ regime on average is found to be more 
persistent than the ‘normal’ regime with one year spent on it on average. Consistent with the 
notion of liquidity dryouts (Sadka, 2012), there were notable jumps from the ‘outperform’ 
state to the ‘normal’ state during the financial crisis between July 2007 and July 2012 when 
market conditions were severe. There are periods with persistent and significant alpha before 
2007 and after 2012.  
 
Figure 6.1 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the FWCI 
The statistic of LR for the FWCI is 92.03. According to the chi-squared distribution with 10 
degrees of freedom, the LR test has a p value less than 0.001, indicating that the hypothesis of 
constant alpha with homoscedastic disturbances is rejected at the 1% significance level, and 
hence the evidence is in favour of the Markov-switching model with TVTP. Among all the 
transition probability coefficients, only the point estimate of 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. It indicates that higher FX volatility leads to a lower probability that the 
alpha will stay in the ‘outperform’ phase. This may be because sudden shocks of crisis impact 
upon the price of the individual assets underlying the FWCI. Among all the related factors, 
FX volatility is an important indicator, the shocks of which are associated with the 
unexpected behaviour of certain individual asset prices that the managers fail to forecast. For 
instance, significant spikes in FX volatility were found during the 2008 financial crisis 
(Melvin and Taylor, 2009). Such higher uncertainty in the FX market caused the unexpected 
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movement of certain related asset prices and rendered the selection ability of the managers 
ineffective. Therefore, the alpha was more likely to switch to the ‘normal’ phase when hedge 
funds on average earn no excess return. It is worth mentioning that the FX volatility shocks 
were infrequent yet violent. The infrequency suggests that FX volatility was not the only 
factor explaining the switches between phases of alpha, whereas the violence of crisis implies 
that severe market conditions are associated with structural breaks in alpha, despite the rarity 
of such a crisis.  
The point estimate of liquidity commonality risk factor 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 is statistically significant at the 
1% level (-0.229). This strong negative relationship is evidence in support of an exposure of 
the hedge funds on average to systematic liquidity risk in the FX market. In contrast, the 
coefficient on the market-wide liquidity 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating that aggregate FX liquidity is not an important determinant of FWCI return. The 
factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004) were originally designed to explain the time-series return 
volatilities of hedge funds and not the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. These 
results provide evidence that holding assets with FX liquidity exposure is compensated. More 
importantly, it is the systematic component of FX liquidity that is priced by the hedge funds 
and not aggregate FX liquidity. 
These results provide a new perspective on evaluating the selection ability of hedge fund 
managers. The managers on average are able to deliver superior performance due to 
successful security selection ability. However, when sudden shocks of crisis occur, their 
selection ability is likely to become invalid. In addition, unexpected FX volatility shocks 
impact upon the managers’ forecasts about the future behaviour of individual securities and 
lead to poorer performance due to weak selection ability. These structural breaks in the alpha 
may help explain the structural breaks in returns found in Fung and Hsieh (2004), Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2006) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007). Among the six total 
categories, the MI shows no significant relationships with FX liquidity in terms of risk 
exposure or structural breaks in the alpha (see the details reported in Appendix I). The result 
is consistent with the expectation that the MI normally trades in liquid futures markets and 
takes an outright directional market risk (Kessler and Scherer, 2011). The EHI and RVI do 
not show significant structural breaks in the alpha (see the details reported in Appendix I). 
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Therefore, the following sections focus on investigating the FOFs, EMI and EDI and their 
sub-categories and do not further consider the sub-categories of the MI, EHI and RVI. 
6.3 FOFs 
The FOFs allocate funds to various managers using multiple strategies to achieve the 
advantages of diversification. As their portfolios are diversified and invested globally in a 
variety of strategies among multiple managers, the total FOFs are expected to have 
associations with FX liquidity. The results in table 6.1 show that the point estimate of 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, indicating strong exposure to the risk 
arising from the systematic component of FX liquidity. In contrast, 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that aggregate FX liquidity is not an important determinant of 
the total FOFs return. Among the sub-categories of the FOFs, only the Strategic FOFs reveal 
exposure to FX liquidity commonality, reflecting its opportunistic nature, such as investing in 
the Emerging Markets and Equity Hedge. 
The t-statistics of ∆𝛼𝛼 (2.52) shows that the total FOFs has an alpha that switches between the 
‘normal’ state and the ‘outperform’ state. The alpha in the monthly excess return in the 
‘outperform’ state is 0.883%, approximately double that of the FWCI. However, as shown in  
Figure 6.2, the ‘outperform’ regime of the total FOFs on average is found to be much less 
persistent than the ‘normal’ regime, with only 6 months in it on average but more than 2 
years spent in the ‘normal’ state on average. The total FOFs mainly stayed in the ‘normal’ 
state during the financial crisis between July 2007 and July 2012, whereas the ‘outperform’ 
state occasionally struck back during the non-crisis periods. These results are consistent with 
the typical risk-return relationships.  
Given that the FOFs invests with multiple managers through funds or managed accounts and 
are designed to significantly lower the risk of investing with an individual manager, the 
advantage of diversification among managers and styles will come at the price of lower 
returns.  Among the sub-categories of the FOFs, the Strategic FOFs, Diversified FOFs and 
MD FOFs share a similar interpretation of the switching alphas, whereas the Conservative 
FOFs shows the reverse.  
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Figure 6.2 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the total FOFs  
The Diversified FOFs has a similar performance and return distribution to the total FOFs 
(Gregoriou, 2011). Its ‘outperform’ alpha is significantly positive (0.955) at the 1% 
significance level, which is slightly higher than that of the total FOFs. The conditional 
‘outperform’ probability in Figure 6.3 shows that the ‘normal’ state dominates the sample 
period but is frequently interrupted by the ‘outperform’ state with a duration ranging from 
one month to one year, even during the financial crisis. These results are consistent with 
HFRI’s indications that the Diversified FOFs tends to show a minimal loss in down markets 
and achieve superior returns in up markets.  
 
Figure 6.3 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Diversified l FOFs  
The ‘outperform’ alpha of the Strategic FOFs is significantly positive (0.342) at 10% 
significance level. Although it is 71% lower than that of the total FOFs, its state has the 
highest persistence, which indicates superior annual returns comparing to the other indexes. 
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The ‘outperform state’ was mainly interrupted between July 2007 and March 2009. The 
Strategic FOFs shows the highest normal state idiosyncratic volatility 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0 and second highest 
the ‘outperform’ state idiosyncratic volatility 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒1 (except for the Market Defensive FOFs, but 
not far behind). The exhibition of greater dispersion of returns may be because they specialise 
in aggressive and opportunistic strategies (Gregoriou, 2011).  
 
Figure 6.4 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Strategic FOFs  
The MD FOFs invests in funds that generally engage in short-biased strategies. The funds 
underlying are constructed to be negatively correlated with the returns on the general market 
benchmarks and standard asset classes (Gregoriou, 2011). Its ‘outperform’ alpha is 
significantly positive (0.708) at the 5% significance level. The MD FOFs fell to the ‘normal’ 
state at the heart of crisis between March 2008 and April 2009 and soon switched back to the 
‘outperform’ state for one or two months later, indicating a better performance in stress 
periods due to short selling and managed futures (Gregoriou, 2011). 
 
Figure 6.5 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the MD FOFs  
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Among the FOFs sub-categories, the Conservative FOFs is the only strategy that shows a 
different pattern in the distribution of the alpha parameters. The alpha in the ‘normal’ state 𝛼𝛼1 
is insignificantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, indicating a 
phase when the Conservative FOFs earns no excess return. On the other hand, the alpha in 
state 0, 𝛼𝛼0, is significantly negative at the 1% significance level, indicating a ‘underperform’ 
phase with a monthly loss of 0.921%. The Conservative FOFs is constructed to seek 
consistent returns by primarily investing in funds engaged in more ‘conservative’ strategies 
such as Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage and Convertible Arbitrage.  
 
Figure 6.6 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Conservative FOFs  
Consistent with this notion, high persistence in the ‘normal’ state is found for more than four 
years on average. The Conservative FOFs only fell into the ‘underperform’ state during the 
financial crisis and soon returned to the ‘normal’ state in March 2009. These results are 
consistent with HFRI’s description, which indicates that the Conservative FOFs should show 
generally consistent performance regardless of market conditions. The overall lower alphas, 
i.e. negative 𝛼𝛼0 (loss) and insignificant 𝛼𝛼1 (no excess return), are reasonable given the lower 
historical annual standard deviation (volatility) of Conservative FOFs than the total FOFs.   
The total FOFs has an LR statistic with p value less than 0.001, in favour of the model 
specification. It shows a significantly positive 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 at 10% significance level, indicating 
that an increase in FX volatility will lead to a higher probability such that alpha stays in the 
‘normal’ state. For the different styles of the FOFs, the point estimates of 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝 and 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 indicate 
that no significance of time-variation in the transition probabilities, indicating that the 
switches between the two states are not associated with FX market indicators.  
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6.4 EMI  
The funds underlying the EMI are selected according to their regional investment focus only. 
There are no investment strategy criteria for inclusion in these indices. The results in table 6.1 
indicate that the alpha of the total EMI switches between the ‘normal’ state and the 
‘outperform’ state (𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼) is 2.72). In the ‘outperform’ state, the total EMI have a monthly 
excess return of 3.026%, which is more than triple that of the FWCI and FOFs. However, as 
shown in Figure 6.7, despite its high excess return, the ‘outperform’ state is much less 
persistent and is frequently interrupted by jumps to the ‘normal’ state such as those that 
occurred before 2012. Interestingly, the EMI has remained in the ‘outperform’ state since 
2012, which reflects the great developments and increasing trading volume of the currencies 
in the emerging markets since the financial crisis. The LR of the total EMI has a p value less 
than 0.001 in favour of the model specification. The transition probability of jumping from 
the ‘outperform’ state to the ‘normal’ state is found to increase when experiencing a positive 
shock in FX volatility (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 is significantly negative at the 1% significance level) or a 
decline in the FX return (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅 is significantly positive at the 1% significance level). These 
associations show that unexpected shocks in FX volatility and FX return will affect the 
managers’ forecasts about the future behaviour of the underlying individual assets and impair 
the manager’s selection ability. Hedge funds classified as the EMI have a regional investment 
focus in one of the following geographic areas: Asia ex-Japan, Russia/Eastern Europe and 
Latin America. Funds with no primary focus in any of the aforementioned regions are 
classified as Global.  
 
Figure 6.7 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the total EMI  
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The Asia Ex-Japan Index has the second highest ‘outperform’ alpha of 3.772. The 
‘outperform’ state is rather persistent, and it has been especially so since July 2012 following 
the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, this persistence was frequently interrupted by 
the ‘normal’ state. There were also several switches to the ‘normal’ state in 2002 and 2004, 
which coincided with the Asian Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster. Such sudden shocks of 
crisis, including shocks in the FX market indicators, such as FX return and FX volatility, 
caused unexpected movement in the price of the underlying individual assets, which the 
managers failed to forecast. Consequently, they impaired the selection ability of the 
managers. Therefore, a positive FX volatility shock or a negative FX return shock increase 
the transition probability of alpha jumping from the ‘outperform’ state to the ‘normal’ state. 
The point estimate of liquidity commonality factor 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 is statistically significant at the 
5% level, indicating strong exposure to FX systematic liquidity risk. 
 
Figure 6.8 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Asia Ex-Japan Index 
High persistence is found in the ‘outperform’ state for the Russia/Eastern Europe Index 
before March 2010, indicating a weak impact from the sub-prime crisis. This may results 
from the proactive and timely response of the Russian government and central bank, which 
shielded its banking system from the effects of the global financial crisis62, 63. Hence, no 
long-term damage was done and a brief recession was followed by a strong recovery64. The 
high persistence might be due to the fiscal discipline with budget surpluses65, a major boost 
                                                 
62 "Financial crisis: action taken by central banks and governments". The Guardian. 21 October 2008. Retrieved 
26 July 2014. 
63 "Insight: No more easy pickings in Russia's banking market". Reuters. 22 May 2013. Retrieved 26 July 2014. 
64 "GDP growth (annual %)". World Bank. Retrieved 26 July 2014. 
65 An Assessment of Putin's Economic Policy, by Anders Aslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
July 2008 
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from rising commodity prices, constant growth in GDP66, disposable income, the volume of 
consumer credit67 and unprecedented macroeconomic stability68. In 2014, there was a long 
stay in the ‘normal’ state, which resulted from the economic recession69 due to falling oil 
prices 70  and Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent capital flight. 
Significantly positive 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅 at the 1% significance level (2.361) suggests that an increase in 
the FX market return will raise the probability of alpha remaining in the ‘outperform’ state. 
 
Figure 6.9 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Russia/Eastern Europe Index 
The Latin America Index has the ‘outperform’ alpha over the sample period. Alpha in state 1, 
𝛼𝛼1, is significantly positive (2.292), indicating a phase when the hedge funds overall have a 
monthly excess return of 2.292%, whereas alpha in state 0, 𝛼𝛼0, is also significantly positive, 
indicating a phase with monthly excess return of 1.797%. The t-statistic for the ∆𝛼𝛼 is 0.49, 
indicating that 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼0 are insignificantly different from each other at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. Therefore, an overall significant excess return, even during the financial 
crisis, can be ascertained. The statistically significant 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  at the 5% significance level 
indicates strong exposure to the risk arising from FX liquidity commonality.  
 
                                                 
66 "GDP growth (annual %)". World Bank. Retrieved 26 July 2014. 
67 "Investing in Russia" (PDF). KPMG. April 2013. Retrieved 21 July 2014. 
68 Russia attracts investors despite its image BBC News Retrieved on March 2008. 
69 Mark Adomanis (1 May 2014). "According To The IMF, Russia's Economy Is Already In A Recession". 
Forbes. Retrieved 8 December 2014. 
70 Tim Bowler (19 January 2015). "Falling oil prices: Who are the winners and losers?". BBC News. Retrieved 
30 April 2015. 
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Figure 6.10 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Latin America Index 
The Global Index is constructed with no primary focus71 in any specific geographic regions. 
It shifts the weightings amongst these regions according to market conditions and managers’ 
perspectives. An ‘outperform’ alpha of 2.232 and a persistent ‘outperform’ state indicates that 
in general these regions are likely to remain attractive destinations for international investors 
looking for longer term returns. There were occasional jumps to the ‘normal’ state at the heart 
of the recent financial crisis and during geographic events, such as the Asian Earthquake, 
Tsunami Disaster, low oil price and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa72,73. The 
probability of jumping from the ‘outperform’ state to the ‘normal’ state is found to increase 
when experiencing a decline in FX return. 
 
Figure 6.11 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Global Index 
                                                 
71 No greater than 50% exposure 
72 http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/economic-outlook-middle-east-and-north-africa-october-
2015 
73 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
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6.5 EDI 
The EDI shows very similar results to those of the FWCI regarding switching alpha, as 
shown in table 6.1. The ‘outperform’ state has a monthly excess return of 0.533%, which is 
greater than that of the FWCI. The ‘outperform’ regime on average is found to be much more 
persistent than the ‘normal’ regime and dominates the sample period, with occasional jumps 
to the ‘normal’ state during the financial crisis. The EDI managers normally require relatively 
higher turnover. They are expected to significantly load on liquidity and be averse to 
unexpected market liquidity declines that increase the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 
2006; Kessler and Scherer, 2011). Although the EDI shows strong FX liquidity-timing skill, 
it is not exposed to FX liquidity commonality. FX market-wide liquidity or commonality is 
not associated with switching alpha. On the other hand, significantly positive 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 at the 
10% significance level is found (-1.76). An increase in FX volatility is found to be associated 
with a decline in the probability out of the ‘normal’ state. Consistent with the knowledge of 
the sub-categories, weak associations with FX liquidity are found. For instance, to act as 
‘liquidity takers’, the Merger Arbitrage strategies74 provide liquidity to investors who want to 
sell companies involved in corporate transactions, making them less vulnerable to declined 
liquidity than other hedge fund strategies (Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007).  
 
Figure 6.12 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the total EDI  
                                                 
74 No significant relationships are found between alpha and the FX indicator. The strong relationship found is 
between the switching idiosyncratic residual the FX market indicators, which is not the main focus of this thesis 
and are not further analysed. 
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Figure 6.13 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Distressed/Restructuring Index 
 
Figure 6.14 Regime indicator of the ‘outperform’ state for the Merger Arbitrage Index 
Since FX market-wide liquidity does not appear as a priced factor for hedge fund returns, or a 
significant driver for transition probabilities of state-dependent alpha, it is excluded from Eq. 
(6.1), Eq. (6.12) and Eq. (6.13) in this section to check the robustness of the results. Similar 
results are obtained. The majority of strategies have alphas that switch between the ‘normal’ 
state, where they earn no excess return, and the ‘outperform’ state, where the managers are 
able to deliver a monthly excess return due to successful selection ability.  FX volatility and 
FX return impact upon the transition probabilities of alpha for some hedge fund strategies, 
such as the FOFs, EDI and the EMI. FX liquidity commonality remains an important 
determinant of hedge fund returns such that an increase in liquidity commonality is 
associated with declines in hedge funds’ returns. See results reported in Appendix J. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
The fee structure that compensates hedge fund managers for their skills in generating 
high returns motivates them to achieve a positive return on their investments regardless of 
whether markets are rising or falling. Hedge fund managers are expected to be able to 
maintain positive alphas due to their superior selection ability in order to provide positive 
gains compared to an index fund. The evidence of time-varying alphas found by Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) suggests potential structural 
breaks in alpha when sudden shocks of crisis occur. Hedge funds often invest in low liquidity 
assets and have long been suspected to be associated with FX liquidity. Investors have been 
shown to request compensation at a premium in their investments when facing long-lasting 
shocks in market liquidity conditions (Sadka, 2010; Kessler and Scherer, 2011; Korajczyk 
and Sadka, 2008; Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer, 2013). The liquidity deteriorations 
during the recent financial crisis highlight the impact of liquidity conditions on the 
investment management process for hedge funds given their sophisticated strategies. Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka (2006) find that the systematic component of market liquidity 
is a priced factor, indicating exposure to the risk arising from liquidity commonality.  
This chapter has conducted two threads of investigations: (a) the structural breaks in the 
alphas and their potential association with the FX market indicators; and (b) the FX liquidity 
risk that the hedge funds are exposed to. The results have several implications.  
First, the results have emphasised the structural breaks in the alphas. Hedge funds on average 
and most strategies had alphas that switched between the ‘normal’ state where they earned no 
excess return, and the ‘outperform’ state where the managers were able to deliver a monthly 
excess return due to successful selection ability. Consistent with the notion of crisis, the 
sudden shocks caused unexpected behaviour in the price of individual assets underlying the 
strategies that the managers failed to forecast. Therefore, the managers displayed impaired 
selection ability and alpha switched to the ‘normal’ state. For the rest of the sample period, 
alpha stayed in the ‘outperform’ state where the managers on average were able to deliver 
excess return due to successful selection ability. The Markov-switching alphas highlighted 
the time-varying property of the managers’ selection ability and helped explain the structural 
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break in hedge fund returns documented by Fung and Hsieh (2004); Fung, Hsieh, Naik and 
Ramadorai (2006) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007). 
Second, the results have implied that there are links between the time-varying transition 
probabilities of the state-dependent alphas and FX market indicators. Among all the 
indicators, neither FX market-wide liquidity nor FX liquidity commonality was found to be 
associated with the state-dependent alpha, indicating weak links with the managers’ selection 
ability. On the other hand, FX volatility and FX return were associated with time-varying 
transition probabilities. Sudden shocks in FX volatility or FX return partly contributed to the 
unexpected behaviour of certain individual assets’ prices and rendered the managers’ 
selection ability ineffective. In particular, a positive FX volatility shock or a negative FX 
return shock is associated with the probability of a transition out of the ‘outperform’ state for 
many strategies, leading to poorer performances due to unsuccessful selection ability. For 
instance, when a positive FX volatility shock occurred, the alphas were more likely to stay or 
switch to the ‘normal’ state. In particular, the probabilities of the alphas of the EMI (total and 
Asia ex-Japan Index) and EDI staying in the ‘outperform’ state were reduced and the 
probabilities of switching from the ‘outperform’ state to the ‘normal’ state were increased, 
leading to poorer performances that can be attributed to the managers’ selection ability. The 
probability of the alpha of the total FOFs staying in the ‘normal’ state was increased and the 
probability of switching from the ‘normal’ state to the ‘outperform’ state was reduced. In the 
meantime, FX return mainly impacted on the EMI (Asia ex-Japan Index, Russia/Eastern 
Europe Index and Global Index). In particular, when negative shocks in FX return occurred, 
the alphas were more likely to stay or switch to the ‘normal’ state.   
Third, from a risk management standpoint, the results have highlighted the robustness of 
liquidity pricing. Hedge funds on average were exposed to FX systematic liquidity risk. 
Therefore, hedge fund managers would require compensations at a premium in their 
investments when facing risks arising from a positive shock in FX liquidity commonality. 
Consistent with the claims in the literature, these results have indicated that FX liquidity 
commonality is an important determinant and priced factor of hedge fund returns on average 
and impairs hedging strategies and diversification performance. Among the strategies, the 
FOFs (total, Strategic Index) and EMI (Asia ex-Japan Index and Latin America Index) were 
also found to be exposed to FX non-diversifiable systematic liquidity risk. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Future Research 
7.1 Conclusions and summaries  
The question of how hedge fund managers deliver superior performance has attracted 
tremendous research interest. This thesis conducts a structural break analysis of hedge fund 
managers’ performance in relation to the FX market, especially the liquidity characteristics, a 
research area that has been subject to little academic investigation. This research issue is of 
particular importance when the hedge fund performance before/after and during the recent 
financial crisis is compared and contrasted.  
Two aspects of FX liquidity are investigated, i.e. aggregate market-wide liquidity and 
liquidity commonality. The measure of commonality adopted in the existing literature has 
several limitations. This thesis proposes a new measure derived from the time-varying 
exposure of individual liquidities to the movement of market liquidity, termed the Beta Index. 
It is shown that the developed Beta Index has a stronger ability to identify the liquidity 
commonality level in the FX market. It is also more flexible when constructing commonality 
with different data sampling frequency. Consistent with conventional wisdom which suggests 
FX liquidity deteriorations in the recent financial crisis, high liquidity commonality is found 
to be induced by the large market downside risks taken during periods of financial turmoil. 
Specifically, three threads of investigation have been conducted: (a) the structural breaks in 
the ability of hedge fund managers to time FX market indicators, i.e. FX market-wide 
liquidity, FX liquidity commonality, FX return, FX volatility and Sharpe ratio; (b) the 
structural breaks in the selection ability of hedge fund managers and their links with FX 
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market indicators; and (c) the FX liquidity risk that the hedge funds are exposed to. The 
findings showed several important practical implications 
First, the empirical analysis in this thesis shows that hedge fund managers on average had 
structural breaks in their FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill. In particular, they were able 
to reduce their funds’ FX exposure prior to deteriorations in FX market-wide liquidity under 
severe market conditions. More importantly, their ability was triggered during severe 
liquidity crises, such as the liquidity crisis of summer 2007, which marked the beginning of a 
volatile period in market liquidity, and the negative liquidity shock of September 2008, which 
occurred at the peak of the crisis (Sadka, 2010). The switches can be explained by increased 
risk aversion to unexpected liquidity shocks under severe market liquidity conditions due to 
higher trading costs, such as the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006; Melvin and 
Taylor, 2009). If high costs induced by long-lasting shocks in liquidity occur, investors will 
require compensation at a premium in their investments (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; 
Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2013). On the other hand, when the FX market was 
in good condition, FX liquidity was not a major concern for hedge fund managers given that 
the FX market has the largest trading volume in the world. Hedge funds that often trade in the 
FX market were also found to show switching FX liquidity-timing ability, such as the total 
FOFs and the total EDI. In addition, managers of most hedge funds’ categories were found to 
simultaneously possess skills in timing return, volatility and market-wide liquidity in their 
investment management. 
Second, hedge funds on average were exposed to FX systematic liquidity risk. In particular, 
an increase in FX liquidity commonality was associated with a negative average return on all 
hedge funds. Therefore, hedge fund managers would require compensation at a premium in 
their investments when facing risks arising from a positive shock in FX liquidity 
commonality. Consistent with the conjecture in the literature, these results indicated that FX 
liquidity commonality was an important determinant and a priced factor of hedge fund 
returns on average, impairing hedging strategies and diversification performance. Among the 
strategies, the FOFs (total, Strategic Index) and EMI (Asia ex-Japan Index and Latin America 
Index) were also found to have been exposed to non-diversifiable systematic liquidity risk. 
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Third, hedge fund managers on average experienced significant structural breaks in their 
selection ability. Consistent with the notion of crisis, hedge funds on average had an alpha in 
the ‘normal’ state, where they earned no excess return during the recent financial crisis. The 
invalidation of the managers’ selection ability was attributed to the sudden shocks of crisis. 
These shocks caused unexpected behaviour of the prices of individual assets underlying the 
funds, which the managers failed to forecast. Therefore, the managers were not able to 
deliver excess return and alphas were likely to stay in or switch to the ‘normal’ state. For the 
rest of the sample period, alphas stayed in the ‘outperform’ state, where managers on average 
were able to deliver excess return due to successful selection ability. Among all the FX 
market indicators, neither FX market-wide liquidity nor FX liquidity commonality was found 
to be associated with the state-dependent alpha, indicating weak links with the managers’ 
selection ability. On the other hand, FX volatility and FX return were associated with time-
varying transition probabilities. In particular, a positive FX volatility shock or a negative FX 
return shock is associated with the probability of a transition out of the ‘outperform’ state for 
many strategies, such as the FOFs, EMI and EDI, leading to poorer performance due to 
unsuccessful selection ability. 
Mixed results were found for different hedge fund strategies. The FOFs allocates funds to 
numerous managers in multiple strategies in order to achieve the advantage of diversification. 
The total FOFs showed significant exposure to the non-diversifiable FX liquidity 
commonality risk, and the managers displayed significant skill in timing FX market-wide 
liquidity. Among the FOFs, the managers of the Strategic FOFs showed the strongest FX 
market-wide-liquidity-timing skill, which might partly be due to engagement in aggressive 
and opportunistic strategies, such as the Emerging Markets, Sector specific and Equity Hedge 
(Gregoriou, 2011). The Conservative FOFs managers showed an overall strong but short-
lived FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill, indicating that they seek consistent but lower 
returns regardless of market conditions. The Diversified FOFs performed in a similar manner 
to total FOFs, using a broad range of strategies among multiple managers. It displayed an 
association between state-dependent alpha and FX return. The MD FOFs managers did not 
time FX liquidity during the financial crisis. In addition, their FX return- and volatility-timing 
skill were reversed to other investment styles, which partly contributed to their construction 
of the negative correlation between the MD FOFs and general market benchmarks. 
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The EDI often invests in the securities of companies that are currently or prospectively 
involved in corporate transactions or capital structure adjustments based on corporate news, 
such as the post-earnings-announcement drift. Managers of such an earnings momentum 
strategy normally require relatively high turnover. Therefore, they are expected to 
significantly load on liquidity and be averse to unexpected market liquidity declines which 
increase the cost of rebalancing portfolios (Sadka, 2006). Kessler and Scherer (2011) also 
suggest that the EDI often adopt leveraged positions in various investment instruments of a 
company to arbitrage value differences caused by corporate transactions. Since the leveraged 
exploitation of value differences is highly sensitive to liquidity, the EDI is expected to rely on 
liquid markets. Consistent with these expectations, managers of the total EDI were found to 
have FX market-wide-liquidity-timing skill during the crisis.  
For the EMI, no significant timing ability regarding FX liquidity was found, implying that the 
EMI managers did adapt their FX exposure based on forecasted FX liquidity. On the other 
hand, many EMI sub-strategies priced FX liquidity commonality, such as the Asia ex-Japan 
Index and Latin America Index. Meanwhile, many showed strong links between their state-
dependent alphas and FX return or FX volatility. For instance, a positive shock in FX return 
significantly increased the probability of alpha staying in the ‘outperform’ state and reduced 
the probability switching out of the ‘outperform’ state for the total EMI, Asia ex-Japan Index, 
Global Index and Russia/Eastern Europe Index. On the other hand, a positive shock of FX 
volatility significantly reduced the probability of alpha staying in the ‘outperform’ state and 
increased the probability of switching from the ‘outperform’ state to the ‘normal’ state for the 
total EMI and Asia ex-Japan Index.   
The broad range of strategies of MI invest based on the predication of movement underlying 
the macroeconomic variables and the subsequent impact on equity, fixed income, currency 
and commodity markets, especially on outright directional market risk. Therefore, the MI 
managers are expected to time prices, returns and volatility instead of liquidity. This pattern 
was found to hold in the FX context, where the managers simultaneously possessed skills in 
timing FX return and FX volatility but not FX liquidity in their investment management. 
Generally, the findings of this thesis have indicated how hedge fund managers delivered 
superior performance based on the claim of superior information regarding FX market 
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indicators. In particular, hedge fund managers simultaneously possessed timing skill in the 
FX market-wide liquidity, FX return and FX volatility in the process of managing their 
investments. They adapted their funds’ FX exposure based on the forecasted future behaviour 
of these market indicators in order to deliver higher returns or reduce losses. In the meantime, 
hedge fund managers were able to deliver excess return from time to time due to their 
selection ability. They showed flexibility in choosing investment classes and strategies based 
on the forecasted price movement of individual securities which are partly affected by FX 
return and FX volatility. In this context, an interesting pattern was found in that the superior 
information adopted by hedge fund managers to deliver superior performance, whether 
through timing skill or selection ability, was related to relatively straightforward risks, such 
as market-wide liquidity risk and inventory risk (volatility). This preference might be 
attributed to the essence of forecasting that analysis is often conducted on variables that are 
easily observed and measured. From an asset management standpoint, the results highlighted 
the importance of considering pricing FX liquidity commonality as a determinant for hedge 
fund returns and incorporating FX market-wide liquidity in regard to the managers’ 
investment decision-making (timing skill) under severe market conditions. 
7.2 Future research  
For further investigation, the research undertaken in this thesis could be extended so that 
more practical findings can be gained.  
First, in this thesis, due to data availability and the ease of calculation, indices constructed 
with hedge funds underlying the same investment styles are investigated. Further research 
could focus on fund-specific investigations. Information of the liquidity risk attributes of 
individual funds would be useful for hedge fund managers, especially the FOFs managers, to 
better construct products and hedge liquidity risks.  
Second, in this thesis, the sample of hedge funds is from the HFRI which has a variety of 
hedge fund classifications covering numerous hedge funds in different categories. Different 
databases for hedge fund have various portfolio targets and selection standards, which may 
have an impact on the empirical results. Further researches could adopt other commonly used 
hedge fund databases such as Morningstar, TASS, MSCI, CISDM and Eurekahedge, 
145 
 
 
comparing the results of the managers’ selection ability and timing skill. 
Third, this thesis focuses on the performance of hedge funds. Further research could direct 
the focus towards mutual funds, which are less aggressively managed and more regulated 
than hedge funds. Mutual fund managers are not permitted to ‘style drift’ and are required to 
adhere strictly to the strategies described by the establishment. Therefore, the empirical 
results would be less subject to selection biases. In addition, mutual funds offer different 
liquidity provision compared to the ‘lockup’ periods of hedge funds, such as daily liquidity, 
which allows withdrawal at any time. Further research could expect liquidity to have a 
different impact on the performance of the funds, which would be useful for investors from 
an asset allocation standpoint.  
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Appendix  
A. Average daily betas 
When estimating 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡  with daily data, daily change in adjusted spread ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  for currency 𝑖𝑖 is regressed on ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑−1𝑖𝑖 , ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 , 
∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑+1𝑖𝑖 which are change in market spread on day 𝑑𝑑 − 1,𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑 + 1. Taking monthly average of Eq. (4.9) gives the form of the monthly 
average of daily spreads on the left-hand-side. Specifically, taking average on both sides for each month 𝑡𝑡 with 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 days gives: 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                                                                                                                                 
Substituting the adjusted currency spread 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 with 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 − ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑑𝑑4𝐷𝐷=1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 (𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖 and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 are constants) yields: 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 − � 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑4
𝐷𝐷=1
− 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 ,                                                        
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
−
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
��𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖∆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑4
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
−
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 ,                      
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= � 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
��𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖∆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑4
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
� + 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 ,            
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1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 + �𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖∆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑4
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
) + 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                                         
In each month 𝑡𝑡 , the total number of  Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays are approximately equal, making 
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
∑ ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑑𝑑4𝑘𝑘=1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑=1  approximately constant. Average daily holiday dummies show similar pattern that the numbers of holidays in each 
month are approximately the same with minor increase by the end of each year. Any time-variation in 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑑𝑑 and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 resulting 
from their corresponding time-varying coefficients can be included in time-varying intercept 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑, and the new intercept 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗  captures any day 
of week effect and the holiday effect (on the daily basis). 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                      
Substituting the adjusted market spread for currency is 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  with 1𝑁𝑁−1 ∗ ∑ �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘 − ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘4𝐷𝐷=1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘�𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 gives: 
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 1
𝑁𝑁 − 1 ∗��𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘 − � 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘4
𝐷𝐷=1
− 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘�𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 , 
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1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
=
⎝
⎜
⎛ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
−
1(𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 � � ��𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗,𝐷𝐷∆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘4
𝐷𝐷=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
−
1(𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡� � �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
⎠
⎟
⎞
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .                                                        
Any time-variation in ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷,𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖∆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  resulting from their corresponding time-varying coefficients can be included in 
time-varying intercept 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗ , and the new intercept 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗  captures any day of week effect and the holiday effect (on the daily basis). 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
 .      
Therefore, the right-hand-side of Eq. (4.22) represents the regression process using the daily data aggregated in month 𝑡𝑡,  1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
= 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽−1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑−1𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
�𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚) ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑+1𝑖𝑖  𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
+ 1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑=1
                                                                   
The day of week effect and the holiday effect adjusted in the daily spreads but not monthly data only impact on the time-varying intercept 
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑∗∗𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑=1  and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡.  
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B. Relationship between 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 and beta  
The relationship between 𝑅𝑅2 and 𝛽𝛽 is explored in this section. For simplicity, a simple linear 
regression analysis with the OLS estimation is applied. For a set of n observations on two 
variables 𝐷𝐷 = (𝐷𝐷1,𝐷𝐷2, … ,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)  and 𝑋𝑋 = (𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷) , 𝐷𝐷� = 1𝐷𝐷 ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=1  and 𝑋𝑋� = 1𝐷𝐷 ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=1  
denote the  means of 𝐷𝐷  and 𝑋𝑋  respectively. Let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 −  𝐷𝐷�  and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 −  𝑋𝑋�  denote the 
deviations from the means of 𝐷𝐷 and 𝑋𝑋. Consider the following linear regression of 𝐷𝐷 on 𝑋𝑋: 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, where the errors  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 are mutually independent of each other. The least-
squares estimate of the beta is given by ?̂?𝛽 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=1 /∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=1 .  
On the other hand, the correlation coefficient which measures the association between two 
variables 𝐷𝐷  and 𝑋𝑋  is 𝛾𝛾 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=1 /(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 , where 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥 = �∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2𝐷𝐷−1   and 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 = �∑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2𝐷𝐷−1  are 
sample standard deviations of 𝑋𝑋  and 𝐷𝐷 . Therefore, the relationships between 𝛾𝛾  and 𝛽𝛽  are 
given as follows:  
𝛾𝛾 = ?̂?𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦
  ,                                                                                                                                
  
𝛾𝛾2 = ?̂?𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥2
𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦2
= ?̂?𝛽2 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2
∑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
2 = ∑𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖2∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅2 ,                                                                                      
where ∑𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖2 is the variation of 𝐷𝐷 explained by variations in 𝑋𝑋, corresponding to residual sun 
square (RSS), and ∑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2  is the total variation of the 𝐷𝐷  values, corresponding to total sum 
square (TSS). In this case, the relationship between 𝑅𝑅2 and 𝛽𝛽 is as follows:  
𝑅𝑅2 = ?̂?𝛽2 ∗ (𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦
)2 .                                                                                                                                                       
Therefore for the simple regression,  𝑅𝑅2 and estimated beta coefficient ?̂?𝛽 are related through 
the standard deviations of dependent variables and independent variable 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦  and 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥 : ?̂?𝛽2 ∗(𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦
)2. In a multiple regression, 𝑅𝑅2 denotes the coefficient of determination of more than two 
variables, indicating the explanatory power of all independent variables, whereas 𝛽𝛽 reflects 
the relationship between only two variables. It is reasonable to suggest that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 provides a 
good alternative of adjusted 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡2.  
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C. Descriptions of investing strategies for different hedge fund categories 
Table A Descriptions of investing strategies for different hedge fund categories 
Strategies   Description  
Panel A: Descriptions of the six broad strategies 
HFRI Fund Weighted 
Composite Index 
(FWCI) 
 FWCI is a global, equally weighted index of over 2,000 single-manager 
funds that report to the HFR Database. Constituent funds report monthly net 
of all fees performance in U.S. Dollar and have a minimum of $50 Million 
under management or a 12 month track record of active performance. FWCI 
denominated in the USD, CHF, EUR, GBP and JPY are provided.  
HFRI Fund of Funds 
(FOFs) 
 FOFs invests with multiple managers through funds or managed accounts. 
The diversified portfolios underlying FOFs are designed with the objective of 
significantly lowering the risk (volatility) of investing with an individual 
manager. The managers have discretions in choosing strategies. 
HFRI Emerging Markets 
Index (EMI) 
 EMI managers invest, primarily long, in securities of companies or the 
sovereign debt of developing or 'emerging' countries. Emerging Markets 
regions include Africa, Asia ex-Japan, Latin America, the Middle East and 
Russia/Eastern Europe.  
HFRI Event-Driven 
Index (EDI) 
 EDI managers maintain positions in securities of companies currently or 
prospectively.  The securities involve in corporate transactions of a wide 
variety, including but not limited to: mergers, restructurings, financial 
distress, tender offers, shareholder buybacks, debt exchanges, security 
issuance or other capital structure adjustments.  
HFRI Macro Index (MI)  MI managers execute a broad range of strategies in which the investment 
process is predicated on the movements in underlying economic variables 
and the consequent impact on the equity, bond, commodity and FX market.  
HFRI Relative Value 
Index (RVI) 
 RVI managers maintain positions in which the investment process is 
predicated on the realization of a valuation discrepancy in the relationship 
between multiple securities. The security types range broadly across equity, 
fixed income, derivative or other security types.  
HFRI Equity Hedge 
Index (EHI) 
 EHI managers long and short primarily in equity and equity derivative 
securities. Both quantitative and fundamental techniques can be employed to 
arrive at an investment decision.  
Panel B: Descriptions of hedge funds in the FOFs category 
HFRI Fund of Funds: 
Conservative Index 
(Conservative FOFs) 
 Conservative FOFs seeks consistent returns by primarily investing in funds 
that engage in more "conservative" strategies such as Equity Market Neutral, 
Fixed Income Arbitrage, and Convertible Arbitrage. It generally exhibits 
lower historical annual standard deviation than the total FOFs.  
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HFRI Fund of Funds: 
Diversified Index 
(Diversified FOFs) 
 Diversified FOFs invests in a variety of strategies among multiple managers. 
It generally demonstrates close performance and returns distribution 
correlation to the total FOFs. 
HFRI Fund of Funds: 
Market Defensive (MD 
FOFs) 
 MD FOFs invests in funds that generally engage in short-biased strategies 
such as short selling and managed futures. It generally shows negative 
correlation to the general market benchmarks (i.e. S&P).  
HFRI Fund of Funds: 
Strategic Index 
(Strategic FOFs) 
 Strategic FOFs seeks superior returns by primarily investing in funds that 
generally engage in more opportunistic strategies such as Emerging Markets, 
Sector specific and Equity Hedge. It exhibits greater dispersion of returns and 
higher volatility compared to the total FOFs.  
Panel C: Descriptions of hedge funds in the EMI category 
HFRI Emerging 
Markets: Asia ex-Japan 
Index 
 Asia ex-Japan funds focus greater than 50% of their investments in the Asia 
ex-Japan region, which includes China, Korea, Australia, India, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Exposure in Japan is typically less than10%. 
HFRI Emerging 
Markets: Global Index 
 Funds underlying Global Index shift their weightings among a variety of 
emerging markets according to market conditions and manager perspectives. 
There is no greater than 50% exposure in any specific geographic region. 
HFRI Emerging 
Markets: Russia/Eastern 
Europe Index  
 
Russia/Eastern Europe funds focus greater than 50% of their investments in 
the Russian/Eastern European region, including Turkey. 
HFRI Emerging 
Markets: Latin America 
Index 
 Latin America funds focus greater than 50% of their investments in the Latin 
American region, which includes Mexico, Central and South America, as 
well as the nations of the Caribbean. 
Panel D: Descriptions of hedge funds in the EDI category 
HFRI Event-Driven: 
Distressed/Restructuring 
strategies  
 Distressed/Restructuring strategies employ an investment process focused on 
corporate fixed income instruments, primarily on corporate credit 
instruments of companies trading at significant discounts to their value at 
issuance or obliged (par value) at maturity as a result of either formal 
bankruptcy proceeding or financial market perception of near term 
proceedings.  
HFRI Event-Driven: 
Credit Arbitrage 
strategies  
 Credit Arbitrage strategies employ an investment process designed to isolate 
attractive opportunities in corporate fixed income securities; these include 
both senior and subordinated claims as well as bank debt and other 
outstanding obligations, structuring positions with little or no broad credit 
market exposure.  
Note: Sources come from the Index Descriptions for HFRI Indices (https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/hfri-
indices-index-descriptions). 
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D. Commonly used liquidity measures categories 
Table B Summary of liquidity measure categories 
Liquidity category  Measures 
High frequency liquidity benchmarks  Effective spread (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009) 
  Realised spread (Huang and Stoll, 1996) 
  Percent realised spread (Fong, Holden and Trzcinka, 2010) 
  Effective spread (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009) 
  Quoted spread (Marshall, Nguyen and Visaltanachoti, 2012) 
  Effective spread (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008) 
  Quarterly quoted spread (Lesmond, 2005) 
  Effective cost (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer, 2013) 
Low frequency spread proxies  Percent bid-ask spread (Kessler and Scherer, 2011) 
  Roll (Roll, 1984) 
  Extended Roll (Holden, 2009) 
  Effective tick (Holden, 2009) 
  Gibbs (Hasbrouck, 2004) 
  Zero (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka, 1999) 
  LOT (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka, 1999) 
  FHT (Fong, Holden and Trzcinka, 2010) 
  High-low spread (Corwin and Schultz, 2012) 
High-frequency price impact  Static Price Impact (605) (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 
   Hasbrouck (Hasbrouck, 2009) 
  Five-minute Price Impact (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 
 Low-frequency price impact  Amihud (Amihud, 2002) 
  Extend Amihud  (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009) 
  Amivest (Cooper, Groth and Avera, 1985) 
  Pastor and Stambaugh (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2001) 
  Price Impact Components (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008) 
  Conventional Liquidity Ratio (Gabrielsen, Marzo and 
  Other liquidity measures  LCAPM (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) 
  First-order Autocorrelation (Ding, Shawky and Tian, 2009) 
  Turnover (Lesmond, 2005; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008) 
  Mean Reversion (Jylha, Rinne and Suominen, 2011) 
  Variance Ratio (Gabrielsen, Marzo and Zagaglia, 2011) 
  Smoothing Process (Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004) 
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E. Time-series plots of monthly market and individual currency spreads. 
 
Figure A A time-series plot of monthly market and individual currency spreads. 
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F. Time-series plots of sum market beta for individual currencies 
 
Figure B A time-series plot of sum market beta for individual currencies.  
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G. Estimates of the Beta Index 
Table C Estimates of the Beta Index 
  𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣1 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣3 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣4 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣5 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣6 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣7 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣8 ln 𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀2  
GBP  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.25 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1801.96 0.012 
  (-1.41) (0.00) (-0.00) (2.47b) (-0.00) (2.58a) (0.00) (0.00) (1.77)   
AUD  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 1610.03 0.022 
  (6.06a) (0.00) (0.37) (0.24) (0.27) (-0.00) (0.00) (-1.43) (-2.16b)   
CAD  -0.00 0.00 0.27 0.18 -0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1784.40 0.005 
  (-1.12) (0.00) (4.91a) (1.84c) (-5.01a) (-0.01) (1.77c) (0.73) (0.00)   
CHF  0.00 0.00 0.34 0.29 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 -0.00 1641.63 0.005 
  (2.72a) (0.00) (3.63a) (2.77a) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-3.09a)   
JPY  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.24 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 1729.26 0.004 
  (1.94c) (0.00) (-0.00) (3.39a) (1.59) (-1.10) (-0.61) (0.00) (-0.96)   
SEK  0.00 0.00 0.27 0.21 0.38 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 1683.06 0.021 
  (2.35b) (0.00) (1.08) (1.76c) (1.31) (-1.79c) (1.61) (0.00) (-0.83)   
SGD  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1729.91 0.022 
  (2.29b) (0.00) (1.48) (3.47a) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
EUR  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1806.69 0.015 
  (-0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (5.83a) (-3.57a) (1.52) (0.00) (0.00) (5.06a)   
NOK  0.00 0.00 0.14 0.84 0.80 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.00 1621.11 0.010 
  (1.65c) (0.05) (0.72) (4.92a) (53.26a) (-2.78a) (-0.01) (-1.62) (1.00)   
NZD  -0.000 0.000 -0.079 1.855 2.144 -0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.004 1566.16 0.005 
  (-1.41) (0.00) (-1.28) (5.80a) (6.82a) (-1.59) (2.48b) (-1.79c) (2.75a)   
DKK  -0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.39 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 1775.79 0.001 
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  (-1.35) (-0.03) (0.91) (4.57a) (-0.11) (0.02) (1.85c) (-0.03) (2.32b)   
 
Note: This table summarize the estimates. Monthly change in spreads for each currency (∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡) are regressed on lagged change in spreads ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡−1, contemporaneous, one 
lead and one lag of changes in market liquidity ∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 , contemporaneous and one lag of market return 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 , contemporaneous and one lag of return 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ,𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1, change in 
contemporaneous market volatility ∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  and change in contemporaneous currency volatility ∆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, using the specification: 
∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚)∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖1
𝑘𝑘=−1
+ � 𝜑𝜑ℎ,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  1
ℎ=−1
+ 𝜑𝜑2,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,  
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖2 � . 
where all regression coefficients are time-varying and follow random walks: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚) = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1(𝑚𝑚) + 𝜔𝜔𝛽𝛽,𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝜔𝜑𝜑,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔,𝑖𝑖2 � . 
The Kalman filter is applied to make inference on the changing regression coefficients. Kim’s (1994) algorithm is used to obtain approximate maximum likelihood 
estimators. Estimated parameters and standard deviation are reported below. The t-statistics are in brackets. 
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H. Robust check of the liquidity timing models on the FWCI 
Table D Estimates of the liquidity timing models 
Panel A Estimates of the liquidity timing models for the FWCI dominated in CHF, EUR, GBP and JPY 
 
  Model (1) Market Liquidity  
Model (2) 
Liquidity Commonality  
Model (3) 
Joint Timing Model 
 
  FWCI-CHF 
FWCI-
EUR 
FWCI-
GBP 
FWCI-
JPY  
FWCI-
CHF 
FWCI-
EUR 
FWCI-
GBP 
FWCI-
JPY  
FWCI-
CHF 
FWCI-
EUR 
FWCI-
GBP 
FWCI-
JPY 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -1.07 -1.05 -1.05 -2.22       -3.52 -3.56 -1.33 -0.24 
  (-4.92
a) (-4.89a) (-5.04a) (-4.67a)       (-4.95a) (-5.14a) (-4.71a) (-2.42b) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03       -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
  (0.19) (0.35) (0.46) (-0.72)       (-0.75) (-0.58) (0.16) (0.50) 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01  0.19 0.21 0.37 -0.09 
       (0.07) (0.16) (0.04 (0.03)  (0.28) (0.30) (1.41) (-0.50) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀        0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01  0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 
       (0.51) (0.16) (0.35) (0.07)  (0.89) (0.80) (1.28) (1.03) 
𝜎𝜎  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76  0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82  0.76 0.75 0.73 0.79 
  (17.94
a) (17.77a) (17.66a) (18.21a)  (18.90a) (18.90a) (18.94a) (18.92a)  (17.67a) (17.73a) (17.72a) (18.44a) 
𝛼𝛼  0.23 0.42 0.57 0.14  0.24 0.42 0.57 0.14  0.26 0.45 0.58 0.06 
  (1.46) (2.70
a) (3.73a) (0.92)  (1.48) (2.61a) (3.49a) (0.87)  (1.69c) (2.94a) (3.82a) (0.37) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27  0.26 0.26 0.29 0.28 
  (16.12
a) (16.10a) (16.20a) (15.60a)  (14.48a) (14.50a) (14.52a) (14.71a)  (14.96a) (15.06a) (16.66a) (15.21a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08  0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
  (3.52
a) (3.54a) (3.53a) (3.39a)  (2.88a) (2.90a) (2.80a) (2.80a)  (3.19 a) (3.20a) (3.65a) (3.06a) 
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𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.37) (0.56) (0.34) (-0.27)  (-0.10) (0.06) (-0.18) (0.00)  (-0.16) (0.02) (0.39) (0.25) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  (1.42) (1.24) (1.41) (2.26
b)  (0.70) (0.57) (0.73) (1.02)  (1.07) (0.93) (1.52) (0.86) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.61) (0.64) (0.76) (0.18)  (-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.25)  (0.18) (0.16) (0.82) (0.12) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
  (-1.28) (-1.92
c) (-2.48b) (-0.56)  (-1.25) (-1.83c) (-2.28b) (-0.67)  (-1.35) (-2.01b) (-2.60a) (-0.38) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   -0.25 -0.25 -0.26 -0.18  -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.23  -0.23 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 
  (-4.95
a) (-5.00a) (-5.01a) (-3.47a)  (-4.86a) (-4.97a) (-5.03a) (-4.32a)  (-4.54a) (-4.62a) (-4.77a) (-4.77a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.40 -0.45 -0.43 -0.32  -0.16 -0.21 -0.16 -0.16  -0.24 -0.30 -0.49 -0.61 
  (-1.19) (-1.36) (-1.31) (-1.01)  (-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.48) (-0.47)  (-0.76) (-0.95) (-1.51) (-1.68
c) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  -0.72 -0.78 -0.72 -0.97  -0.75 -0.81 -0.75 -0.77  -0.94 -1.01 -0.75 -1.28 
  (-2.16
b) (-2.34b) (-2.23b) (-2.93a)  (-2.23b) (-2.42b) (-2.22b) (-2.28b)  (-2.84a) (-3.08a) (-2.32b ) (-3.38a) 
𝑃𝑃00  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.98  0.99 0.86 0.99 0.93  0.98 0.97 0.95 0.97 
  (25.94
a) (24.70a) (24.51a) (49.68a)  (0.14) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)  (48.02a) (48.47a) (27.57a) (24.85a) 
𝑃𝑃11  0.48 0.49 0.51 0.34  0.72 0.85 0.72 0.81  0.00 0.00 0.54 0.83 
  (2.26
b) (2.28b) (2.43b) (1.16)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (2.60a) (6.11a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)  4.85 4.86 5.02 4.59       4.89 5.09 4.68 2.31 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀)       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.23 -0.25 -1.17 0.76 ln 𝐿𝐿  -214.88 -214.30 -214.80 -213.41  -218.85 -218.13 -218.86 -218.84  -213.520 -212.578 -212.878 -216.84 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2   0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37  0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35  0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
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Panel B Estimates of the liquidity timing models for the EHI, MI and RVI 
 
  Model (1) Market Liquidity 
 Model (2) 
Liquidity Commonality 
 Model (3) 
Joint Timing Model 
  EMI EHI RVI  EMI EHI RVI  EMI EHI RVI 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -0.75 -0.06 -0.05      -0.19 -0.07 -0.05 
  (-1.02) (-0.10) (-1.06)      (-0.51) (-0.44) (-0.97) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -0.06 -0.06 0.39      -0.19 -0.07 0.35 
  (-0.32) (-0.10) (4.64a)      (-0.52) (-0.42) (4.03a) 
𝜆𝜆0
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀       0.08 0.02 0.05  0.14 0.04 0.02 
      (0.26) (0.07) (0.78)  (0.24) (0.31) (0.46) 
𝜆𝜆1
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀       0.08 0.02 0.05  0.14 0.04 0.22 
      (0.28) (0.07) (0.62)  (0.25) (0.29) (0.88) 
𝜎𝜎  1.83 1.00 0.60  1.87 1.00 0.65  1.85 1.00 0.59 
  (17.43a) (18.94a) (17.83a)  (18.97a) (18.93a) (18.90a)  (18.97a) (18.94a) (17.86a) 
𝛼𝛼  1.20 0.12 0.31  1.29 0.14 0.25  1.22 0.12 0.31 
  (3.13a) (0.61) (2.54b)  (3.45a) (0.72) (1.95c)  (3.26a) (0.59) (2.51b) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.45 0.37 0.08  0.44 0.37 0.09  0.45 0.37 0.08 
  (10.60a) (16.53a) (5.72a)  (10.53a) (16.43a) (6.42a)  (10.72a) (16.53a) (5.67a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.05 0.13 0.02  0.04 0.13 0.01  0.05 0.13 0.03 
  (0.79) (3.81a) (1.08)  (0.71) (3.78a) (0.60)  (0.78) (3.83a) (1.29) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  -0.01 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.95) (-0.84) (-2.86a)  (-1.01) (-0.88) (-1.91c)  (-0.98) (-0.86) (-3.02a) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
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  (0.45) (0.43) (-0.51)  (0.22) (0.36) (-1.38)  (0.37) (0.46) (-0.55) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (-0.46) (-0.55) (-0.82)  (-0.65) (-0.54) (-0.81)  (-0.60) (-0.50) (-0.82) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   -0.07 -0.01 0.00  -0.07 -0.01 0.00  -0.07 -0.01 0.00 
  (-2.60a) (-0.40) (0.31)  (-2.87a) (-0.50) (0.46)  (-2.73a) (-0.40) (0.28) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   0.67 0.34 0.17  0.66 0.33 0.19  0.67 0.34 0.17 
  (5.33a) (5.20a) (4.24a)  (5.41a) (5.13a) (4.47a)  (5.57a) (5.22a) (3.97a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.63 0.29 -0.59  -0.55 0.36 -1.21  -0.80 0.26 -0.61 
  (-0.78) (0.70) (-2.13b)  (-0.72) (0.88) (-4.54a)  (-1.04) (0.64) (-2.22b) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  -1.34 -0.52 -1.37  -1.17 -0.41 -2.00  -1.48 -0.52 -1.33 
  (-1.60) (-1.22) (-4.79a)  (-1.51) (-0.98) (-7.41a)  (-1.88c) (-1.23) (-4.55a) 
𝑃𝑃00  0.87 0.82 0.00  0.82 0.86 0.85  0.86 0.86 0.00 
  (2.80a) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
𝑃𝑃11  0.50 0.82 0.76  0.81 0.86 0.88  0.85 0.86 0.83 
  (0.94) (0.00) (5.18a)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (5.65a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞)  0.90 0.00 4.59      0.00 0.00 3.99 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀)      0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.80 ln 𝐿𝐿  -366.85 -255.46 -184.11  -255.86 -281.28 -191.05  -255.19 -277.27 -182.85 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
2   0.19 0.35 0.25  0.43 0.28 0.22  0.30 -0.13 0.01 
Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching timing skill coefficients and the t-statistics. Panel A reports the results for the FWCI dominated in CHF, EUR, GBP and 
JPY, panel B reports the results for the EHI, MI and RVI. Each fund in the sample has at least 174 monthly returns. In model (1) and model (2), the liquidity timing model 
estimated is as 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚� ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1      𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2), where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the hedge fund return at time 𝑡𝑡 +1; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,8) represents the eight risk factors, including the equity market factor (MKT-RF) and the size spread factor (SMB) of Fama and French (1993), the three 
trend-following risk factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004), namely payoffs from look-back straddles on bonds (B-LBS), currencies (FX-LBS), and commodities (COM-LBS), the 
term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010) and the Emerging Market Risk Factor (EMER) of Fung and Hsieh (2001); 𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 is the FX market factor 
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in month 𝑡𝑡 + 1; 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 is the liquidity level at the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1;  𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is the average liquidity level. In model (1), the FX market liquidity level 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is market-wide liquidity 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 . In model (2), the FX market liquidity measure 𝐿𝐿�𝑚𝑚 is liquidity commonality measured with monthly Beta-Index 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , characterized by the two distinct 
economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}, measures the state-dependent timing skill: 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0)𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . In model (3), timing skill of both market-wide liquidity and 
liquidity commonality of the FX market are estimated as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(−𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿�������) ∗ (−𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀������) ∗ (−𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+18𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 . 
The coefficients, 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  measures market-wide liquidity timing skill, 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  measures liquidity commonality timing skill, both switch between states simultaneously 
according to 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . Transition probability matrix of the unobserved, discrete-valued, two-state Markov-switching variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is summarized by 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 0] 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1| 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 1]�. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, 
respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 , i.e. the difference between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞  and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 . 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 , i.e. the difference 
between  𝜆𝜆1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 and  𝜆𝜆0𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 . 
 
 
Figure C Regime indicators of the ‘timing’ state for the FWCI dominated in CHF, EUR, GBP and JPY 
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I. Estimates of the TVTP model for the EHI, MI and RVI 
Table E Estimates of the TVTP model for the FWCI and broad categories 
Parameter  EHI  MI  RVI 
𝛼𝛼0  0.05  0.51  -0.35 
  (0.15)  (1.40)  (-0.96) 
𝛼𝛼1  0.06  1.04  0.14 
  (0.17)  (3.13a)  (0.67) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0  0.55  1.51  1.49 
  (7.65a)  (8.76a)  (6.13a) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒1  1.55  0.78  0.45 
  (8.67a)  (9.47a)  (10.68a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇   0.38  0.13  0.09 
  (18.63a)  (4.31a)  (6.88a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  0.15  0.03  0.04 
  (5.52a)  (0.85)  (2.34b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  -0.01  0.02  -0.01 
  (-0.95)  (2.91a)  (-1.38) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00  0.03  -0.01 
  (0.70)  (5.17a)  (-2.26b) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆  0.00  0.02  0.00 
  (-0.89)  (2.82a)  (0.25) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   0.00  -0.02  0.01 
  (0.16)  (-1.29)  (1.10) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   0.26  0.31  0.21 
  (4.82a)  (3.85a)  (5.12a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚  -0.02  0.03  -1.13 
  (-0.06)  (0.06)  (-4.02a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  -0.35  0.95  -1.19 
  (-0.81)  (1.77c)  (-4.41a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   -0.06  -0.27  0.15 
  (-0.35)  (-0.97)  (1.19) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   0.10  0.07  0.08 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝0  2.47  0.02  -0.92 
  (4.02a)  (0.03)  (-1.10) 
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𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   0.39  -0.11  -0.17 
  (0.65)  (-0.18)  (-0.25) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -0.79  0.00  0.26 
  (-1.28)  (-0.01)  (0.44) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷  -0.16  0.76  0.76 
  (-0.26)  (1.02)  (1.20) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑅𝑅  -0.35  0.33  0.18 
  (-0.50)  (0.59)  (0.30) 
𝜑𝜑𝑞𝑞0  2.23  0.65  2.66 
  (2.17b)  (0.87)  (3.01a) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀   1.15  0.79  -0.68 
  (0.93)  (0.79)  (-1.24) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞   -1.01  0.08  2.83 
  (-1.08)  (0.14)  (2.17b) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷  0.48  -1.43  -1.64 
  (0.79)  (-1.52)  (-2.09b) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅  1.10  1.62  0.23 
  (1.13)  (1.47)  (0.48) 
𝑡𝑡 (d𝛼𝛼)  (0.02)  (1.07)  (1.16) 
𝑡𝑡 (d𝜎𝜎)  (5.17a)  (-3.82a)  (-4.21a) ln 𝐿𝐿  -215.21  -257.68  -150.76 
LR  78.12  59.36  119.90 
Note: This table summarizes the Markov-switching alpha with time-varying transition probabilities coefficients 
and the t-statistics for the EHI, MI and RVI. Each strategy in the sample has at least 174 monthly returns. The 
model specification is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡11
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 ) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of strategy i in month t; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,11) represents the risk factors including MKT-
RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh (2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit 
spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010), EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001), FXF, 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀) 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 in the FX 
market; 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  measures the state-dependent alpha; 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  measures the state-dependent error process, both are 
characterized by the same two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1) as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + (𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,0)𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜎𝜎02(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + (𝜎𝜎12 − 𝜎𝜎02)𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
The state transition probabilities are functions of the FX market economic-indicators variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭, including 
market return (R), market volatility (STD), market-wide liquidity ( 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 ) and liquidity commonality 
(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀) 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡), as:  
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1,  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = � 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) � 
and are re-parameterized with a logistic function as: 
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
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𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by 
a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼) represents the t-statistic of d𝛼𝛼, i.e. the difference between 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼0 . 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎) 
represents the t-statistic of d𝜎𝜎, i.e. the difference between 𝜎𝜎1 and 𝜎𝜎0. 
 
  
Figure D Regime indicators of the ‘outperform’ state for the EHI, MI and RVI 
165 
 
 
J. Robust check of the Markov-switching alpha with TVTP 
Table F Estimates of the robust TVTP model  
 FWCI FOFs EDI EMI 
Paramete
r Total  Total  
Conserva
tive  
Diversifie
d  MD  Strategic  Total  
Distresse
d/Restruc
turing  
Merger 
Arbitrage  Total  
Asia ex-
Japan  Global  
Latin 
America  
Russia/Ea
stern 
Europe  
𝛼𝛼0 0.03 0.07 -0.89 0.11 0.01 -0.17 -0.54 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.69 0.00 2.06 -0.78 
 (0.14) (0.50) (-2.33b) (0.72) (0.04) (-0.61) (-1.28) (0.51) (1.26) (0.47) (1.25) (0.00) (2.48b) (-0.84) 
𝛼𝛼1 0.44 0.89 0.13 0.98 0.68 0.35 0.55 1.06 0.26 1.01 3.81 2.25 1.77 2.74 
 (3.69a) (8.75a) (1.01) (7.62a) (2.23b) (1.97b) (3.54a) (5.12a) (2.05b) (2.69a) (5.85a) (5.47a) (2.55b) (3.27a) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒0 1.22 1.04 1.40 1.03 1.52 1.68 1.42 1.34 0.88 0.39 1.98 1.46 1.73 2.00 
 (10.91a) (15.31a) (6.59a) (15.37a) (9.57a) (8.24a) (6.70a) (10.48a) (10.63a) (5.33a) (10.27a) (5.00a) (9.75a) (7.32a) 
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒1 0.31 0.17 0.45 0.15 0.72 0.59 0.52 0.68 0.33 2.21 1.65 1.14 3.94 3.65 
 (8.36a) (6.49a) (12.07a) (7.43a) (6.08a) (6.72a) (10.17a) (11.33a) (11.31a) (14.81a) (9.02a) (14.30a) (7.88a) (13.23a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇  0.23 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.48 0.62 
 (18.68a) (16.24a) (6.36a) (17.03a) (1.99b) (11.41a) (12.66a) (6.72a) (8.24a) (18.72a) (7.79a) (10.64a) (7.87a) (8.42a) 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.15 
 (6.93a) (2.22b) (2.06b) (2.34a) (0.57) (2.73a) (6.81a) (2.30b) (1.35) (1.43) (1.07) (1.65c) (0.26) (-1.22) 
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (2.31b) (3.90a) (-1.53) (4.15a) (1.75c) (-0.18) (-0.68) (-1.89c) (0.20) (-3.43a) (-0.64) (-0.74)  (-0.65) (-0.74) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (2.99a) (3.03a) (1.25) (3.26a) (4.66a) (2.12b) (0.18) (0.14) (2.25b) (-0.80) (1.93c) (0.68) (-0.29) (-0.73) 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀−𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 (-0.36) (-0.86) (-0.35) (-1.07) (2.20b) (-1.35) (-1.55) (-1.18) (-1.67c) (-2.83a) (-0.63) (-0.27) (-0.19) (-1.62) 
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅  0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 
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 (1.26) (-0.66) (1.23) (-1.49) (0.09) (1.27) (-0.96) (-1.82c) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-2.25b) (-3.51a) (-2.15b) (-1.27) 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  0.25 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.38 0.40 0.04 0.76 0.95 0.75 0.87 1.23 
 (7.46a) (5.66a) (4.10a) (5.35a) (2.81a) (4.78a) (8.47a) (5.78a) (1.10) (7.73a) (6.45a) (7.71a) (4.83a) (5.96a) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 -0.65 0.07 -0.38 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.61 -0.29 -0.46 0.71 0.04 -0.51 -1.88 -1.46 
 (-2.10b) (0.32) (-1.56) (0.24) (-0.07) (-0.32) (-2.30b) (-0.76) (-2.36b) (0.97) (0.05) (-0.92) (-1.67c) (-1.01) 
𝛽𝛽∆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -0.80 -0.73 -0.58 -0.93 0.64 -0.13 -1.49 -1.25 -0.60 0.19 -0.81 -1.34 -1.37 -1.28 
 (-2.55a) (-3.36a) (-2.14b) (-4.62a) (1.14) (-0.30) (-5.34a) (-3.14a) (-3.02a) (0.23) (-0.99) (-2.53b) (-1.15) (-0.94) 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  -0.23 -0.19 -0.04 -0.17 -0.14 -0.43 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.51 -1.20 -0.51 -1.03 -0.13 
 (-2.14b) (-1.88c) (-0.34) (-1.55) (-0.49) (-2.38b) (0.22) (-0.17) (-0.01) (-2.16b) (-2.26b) (-1.49) (-1.77c) (-0.18) 
𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝0 0.92 2.32 0.48 1.69 0.57 3.26 -1.02 3.75 2.28 -0.32 0.91 -0.31 2.96 0.12 
 (1.89c) (2.27b) (0.24) (4.21a) (0.74) (1.45) (-0.74) (1.68c) (2.35b) (-0.50) (1.70c) (-0.50) (3.77a) (0.16) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀  -0.10 0.00 0.22 -0.52 -0.20 -3.29 0.94 1.23 2.73 0.67 -0.87 0.10 0.94 1.05 
 (-0.19) (-0.01) (0.22) (-0.98) (-0.33) (-1.22) (0.75) (1.01) (1.83c) (0.91) (-1.51) (0.17) (1.67c) (1.74c) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 -0.10 2.16 0.57 0.67 1.34 2.15 -0.84 -0.51 -2.11 -0.64 -0.40 -1.39 -1.08 -0.90 
 (-0.28) (1.54) (0.57) (1.47) (1.15) (0.90) (-0.76) (-0.78) (-2.16b) (-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.72) (-1.87c) (-1.11) 
𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝−𝑅𝑅 -0.13 0.22 0.73 -0.24 0.64 0.13 -1.94 1.98 0.33 0.87 -0.16 -0.03 0.37 -0.23 
 (-0.39) (0.47) (0.84) (-0.55) (0.94) (0.17) (-1.29) (1.43) (0.44) (1.33) (-0.36) (-0.03) (0.51) (-0.36) 
𝜑𝜑𝑞𝑞0 0.94 0.38 2.72 -0.04 0.09 2.50 1.60 2.69 2.06 1.55 1.30 2.50 2.12 2.62 
 (1.89c)  (0.79) (2.39b) (-0.08) (0.12) (3.98a) (2.86a) (5.02a) (2.43b) (3.99a) (2.22b) (3.06a) (2.88a) (1.74c) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 -0.16 0.37 0.20 0.82 0.12 -0.26 0.08 0.02 2.40 -0.57 0.48 1.40 0.03 1.15 
 (-0.48) (0.89) (0.42) (1.01) (0.15) (-0.40) (0.21) (0.05) (2.07b) (-1.12) (0.75) (1.64) (0.03) (1.36) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 -0.96 -0.25 -0.16 -1.39 -0.40 -0.53 -0.47 -0.36 -0.66 -0.13 -1.72 -1.88 -0.34 0.30 
 (-1.72c) (-0.44) (-0.27) (-1.68c) (-0.60) (-1.19) (-1.77c)  (-0.50) (-1.20) (-0.29) (-2.52b) (-2.19b) (-0.71) (0.61) 
𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞−𝑅𝑅 -0.46 0.59 0.74 1.38 0.20 0.02 0.07 -0.27 -0.81 0.40 2.27 2.15 0.15 3.44 
 (-0.83) (1.00) (0.74) (1.67c) (0.30) (0.02) (0.21) (-0.31) (-1.32) (1.06) (2.85a) (2.49b) (0.22) (1.80c)  
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𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼) (2.65a) (7.65a) (2.75a) (8.65a) (2.50b) (2.07b) (2.79a) (4.36a) (0.69) (3.48a) (7.53a) (3.67a) (-0.38) (5.44a) 
𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎) (-8.16a) (-12.34a) (-4.61a) (-12.50a) (-4.71a) (-6.19a) (-4.22a) (-4.75a) (-6.28a) (10.72a) (-1.24) (-1.05) (4.51a) (4.27a) ln 𝐿𝐿 -183.13 -203.01 -155.23 -203.37 -276.15 -232.96 -189.67 -234.25 -141.07 -342.23 -376.45 -297.28 -400.58 -457.22 
LR 86.28 83.01 126.88 82.20 67.12 85.09 85.99 61.37 118.73 272.14 546.51 126.48 770.98 1599.55 
Note: This table summarizes the coefficients and the t-statistics of the Markov-switching alpha model with TVTP for the FWCI, FOFs, EDI, EMI and their sub-categories. . 
Each strategy in the sample has at least 174 monthly returns. The model specification is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡11
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ,     𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 �. 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of strategy i in month t; 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,11) represents the risk factors including MKT-RF, SMB, B-LBS, FX-LBS and COM-LBS of Fung and Hsieh 
(2004), the term spread (∆Term) and credit spread (∆Credit) of Sadka (2010), EMER of Fung and Hsieh (2001), FXF and MBI of the FX market, excluding FX 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿; 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  
measures the state-dependent alpha; 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2  measures the state-dependent error process, both are characterized by the same two distinct economic phases 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1) as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,     𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜎𝜎02(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎12𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
The state transition probabilities are functions of the FX market indicators variables 𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭, including market return (R), market volatility (STD), and liquidity commonality 
(MBI), excluding market-wide liquidity (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿), as follows:  
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  | 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,  𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭] = � 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 1 − 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭)1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) 𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) �. 
The state transition probabilities are re-parameterized with a logistic function as follows: 
𝑝𝑝(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
𝐿𝐿(𝐙𝐙𝐭𝐭) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 )1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=1 ) 
The t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% (two-tailed) level is indicated by a, b, and c, respectively. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝛼𝛼) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝛼𝛼, 
i.e. the difference between 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼0. 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝜎𝜎) represents the t-statistic of ∆𝜎𝜎, i.e. the difference between 𝜎𝜎1 and 𝜎𝜎0. 
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